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Ab s t r a c t
This work constitutes a study of the operations of local
authority building direct labour organisations (DLOs)
during the 1980s,
An overt aim of Part III of the 1980 Local Government,
Planning and Land Act was to improve efficiency in the
operations of local authority building direct labour
organisations (DLOs).
	
Whilst the Act did not specify
how DLOs should be organised, the legislation on
accounting and accountability clearly had Important
organisational implications.
Even prior to 1981, some DLOs already obtained the
majority of work via competitive tender, had control
over their functions and had systems for demonstrating
their efficiency. Others were not operated in such ways
and fundamental changes were needed to successfully meet
the challenge of the new legislation.
By 1988, the Audit Commission admitted that DLO5 had
very largely been successful in meeting the competitive
requirements of the 1980 Act, but expressed concern over
the varying levels of effectiveness and efficiency of
operation that existed amongst organisations.
xi.
An objective of the study is to look at the problems
associated with efficiency and productivity measurement
in the context of DLO performance. The Conservative
government of this period had a strong conniitment to the
improvement of efficiency of the public sector.	 In
other	 areas	 of public services,	 various	 forms	 of
performance Indicator were being employed to monitor
performance,	 but	 for	 a DLO the	 sole measure of
efficiency was the ability to meet the 5a target rate of
return. The concern with efficiency produced new
interest in the application of quantitative techniques
to provide methods of efficiency measurement.
This work undertakes a study of the problems associated
with efficiency and performance measurement In this
sector of the U.K. construction Industry.
The availability of appropriate data at the Individual
organisation level from 1981 onwards, enabled, for the
first time, viable lnter-DLO comparisons to be
undertaken at the micro-level and sectoral comparisons
to be made at the macro-level.
The data used In the study were obtained over a five
year period from a variety of sources of published and
unpublished sources. A unique database of expenditure
and revenue Information from over 150 DLOs has been
developed, which in many ways is even more comprehensive
than	 the	 'official'	 statistics	 collected	 by	 the
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.
Methods used for efficiency measurement
With the great emphasis placed on ensuring that the
public sector of the construction industry acts in an
efficient manner, the data are employed In various
methods for the measurement of efficiency.
1. At the sector level, total factor productivity
neasurement is used to gauge the rate of growth of the
DLO sector of the industry.
2. At the organisation level,	 'Farrell' measures of
efficiency are used.
A model for measuring the efficiency of Individual
organisations is presented.
Data Envelopment Analysis I used to consider
inefficiency that raises Costs above their feasible
minimum.
PART
DIRECT LABOUR ORGANISATIONS IN CONTEXT
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
21.1 The origins of local authority direct labour
organ I sat ions
Direct labour has its origins in the 1890s when local
government was emerging in the form we know it today.
It was set up as a response to the failure of private
contractors to provide an adequate building service for
the new local authorities. Scandals Involving private
contractors were rife at the end of the nineteenth
century,	 particularly over public building works in
London.
Also, unemployment was high during the depression years
up until 1895, and local authority direct labour was
seen by many as an effective way oI creating employment.
There was much work to be done in the construction of
housing and public buildings.
It was in order, though, mainly to break up the
monopolistic position of contractors that the growing
demand for a Works Department was accepted by the London
County Council in 1892. This lead given by the LCC
being soon followed by Battersea in 1894 and West Ham in
1896.
After 1918, the number of DLOs steadily rose.
	 Between
1919 and 1920, with growing unrest over housing
conditions, seventy new departments were set up. Out of
43 700 council houses built under the 1919 Housing Act,
5 855 were built by these new direct labour schemes.
3The emergence of a large number of DLOs after the First
World War, was repeated after the Second War.
	 As
building prices	 soared,	 local	 authorities	 needed a
method	 which	 both	 checked	 the	 prices	 quoted by
contractors and got the work done. By 1949, the number
of DLOs had doubled compared to 1939, coinciding with
the renewed Government commitment to a large-scale
council house building programme. In 1948, local
authority house building reached an unprecedented height
of 175 213 units.
Soon after the return of the Conservative Government in
1951 came a fall in the amount of local authority house
building, but the private industry was now enjoying boom
conditions and private contractors were able to draw
labour away from DLOs, as the local authorities were
empowered only to pay the lowest local level Trade Union
rates.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s though, the DLOs grew,
from employing 70 000 operatives in 1955 to 122 000 in
1964. This was in spite of the fact that the Government
had imposed the recommendation in 1959 that direct
labour must win every third contract in competition with
local and national firms - a requirement later revoked
in 1965 - and also in spite of the fact that
industrialised systems of building were expanding in
that period.	 ( Many local authorities were too small to
4have the resources to break away from traditional
techniques ). These new systems came to dominate house
building during the 1960s, and DLOs had to play a
subsidiary role, competing with smaller firms for non-
industrialised contracts ( usually small-scale projects
or in-fill housing ).
During the property boom years of the early 1970s,
contractors were less interested in local authority work
and this meant that tender prices for council work were
high. With the collapse of the speculative building
boom in 1973-74 and the decline of systems building,
however, the public sector came to be seen by many
private contractors as a reliable source of work.
It was this desired growth in the competition for local
authority work which was the major reason for government
concern over the role of DLOs in the late 1970s and the
consequent introduction of the 1980 legislation.
1.2 DLOs in the 1970s: The prelude to the 1980
legi slation
The 1980 Act, setting out new accounting, reporting and
tendering measures was the culmination of a concern with
DLO operations which had been the subject of controversy
for many years prior to 1980.
5Since the 1972-3 construction boom, there had been more
and more concern about the development of DLOs. The
relative decline of the building industry since its peak
and concern for the future of the private sector,
coupled with increased demand for reviews of public
spending, all led to the setting up of a Working Party
on DLOs in 1976, and the ensuing Report in 1978. 	 Its
original terms of reference were 'to review the
organisation and operation of local authority direct
labour departments including tendering and accounting
procedures t and to look at ways ' to provide a proper
framework for their operations .... and to achieve
maximum growth of efficient DLOs.' ( Department of the
Environment. 1978 )
Even though the main source of controversy surrounding
DLOs had been their relationship to the larger private
sector of the industry within the context of
construction as a whole, the working party emphasised
the role of DLOs within local authorities themselves,
especially the permanent on-call emergency service for
council tenants - a service which it doubted any private
sector contractor would be prepared to offer.
There was resistance from contractors' organisatlons to
proposals in the Report for increasing the scope of
DLOs, but again the accounting measures were generally
acceptable to those involved. 	 However, the Report made
6it clear that such extension could only be allowed to
DLOs with accounting on a 'profit/loss' basis and a
contractual relationship aligned exactly with that of a
private contractor.
Whilst accepting the trading accounts approach, the 1978
Working Party did not believe this would show the total
picture relative to DLO performance because of
difficulties of comparison with private contractors'
prices. For accounting, the recommendations were that
accounts should enable basic divisions of work to be
separately identified, costed and scrutinised; that each
division of DLO activity should include its direct and
indirect costs and show how these compare with value and
income; and that DLO accounts should be supported by an
analysis of results and an annual report.
The main recommendation to assist with accountability
was that on annual reports, but the 1978 Working Party
found it impracticable to compare satisfactorily public
and private sectors.
	 After corrrnenting on the degree of
contractors' interest varying according to work
available and to attractiveness of type of work, the
report included a warning that division of work into
'DLO'	 and	 'private	 contractor'	 was	 an	 over-
simplification	 and	 it	 underlined	 the	 essential
difference	 where	 private	 contractors	 work	 without
restriction and have a primary duty to maximise return
7on capital employed, and the position of a DLO In
existence to provide 'specific services'. The Working
Party considered that those services to the authority
and the cormunity it represented, together with the
production of proper value for money, were the chief
criteria on which DLOs should be judged.
Pressures to apply controls to DLOs continued, and the
next major step followed the 1979 Conservative election
victory with the production by the Department of the
Environment of a Consultation Paper C 1979 ).	 This set
out proposals for monitoring and controlling the
efficiency of DLOs, and and although it acknowledged
that there was a place for efficient DLOs and that it
was for individual local authorities to decide for
themselves, on the basis of local circumstances, whether
to use direct labour and for what sort of work, the aim
was to ensure that 'facts about direct labour shall
emerge, and that councils shall take their decisions in
the	 light	 of	 full	 and	 publicly	 demonstrable
Information'.
After outlining objectives, the Consultation Paper
proposed accounting and accountability measures based on
principles put forward by the Chartered Institute of
Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and in spite of
criticism the main issues were incorporated Into the
1980 Act.
81.3 The legislative framework of the 1980s
The 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act
introduced criteria for assessing the performance of
DLOs within all local authorities carrying out
construction or maintenance work.
C	 The	 pre-1980	 legislative	 controls	 on	 DLOs	 are
explained in Appendix 1. )
The main requirements of the 1980 Act for DLOs were
twofold:
(a) Accounting requirements
The legislation made it necessary C for the first time )
for an authority to maintain .separate DLO Revenue
accounts for the following four categories of work
Category Dl	 Highways	 and	 sewerage	 works C new
construction and maintenance).
Category D2 Major works of new construction, other
than of highways and sewers, where it is
estimated that the cost of each job will
exceed £50 000.
Category D3 Minor works of new construction, other
than of highways and sewers, where it is
estimated that the cost of each job will
not exceed £50 000.
9Category D4 Works of maintenance other than of
highways and sewers. (Minor alterations
may be considered as maintenance. )
Each local authority is required to achieve a prescribed
rate of return on each of the above-mentioned accounts.
This return is calculated on the value of the fixed
assets and stock utilised by the DLO in carrying out the
work during the year. The capital assets are valued on
a current cost accounting basis, and the prescribed rate
of	 return	 for	 each	 year	 in	 the	 period	 under
consideration was 59
The legislation requires that each authority produces
separate revenue accounts for each category of work
together with a statement of the rate of return achieved
in each category and balance sheet for the DLO as a
whole.
(b) Competition requirements
The legislation requires that a significant proportion
of an authority t s construction and maintenance work may
only be carried out by the DLO if that work has been won
in competition with private contractors. The extent to
which competition applies to the various categories of
work was the subject of frequent changes in the
legislation between the 1st April 1981 ( when the 1980
Act became effective ) and the end of the 1980s.
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Table 1.1 shows how the amount of work which local
authorities were forced to put out to tender increased
during the period.
Table 1.1 Sumary of the tendering regulations
effective (1981-89)
A. Work requiring all jobs to be subject to
tender ing.
Category	 Regs.	 Regs.	 Regs.
of work	 from	 from	 f r om
1.4.81	 1.10.82
	
1.4.87
General	 Jobs >	 Jobs >	 Jobs >
highway	 £100 000	 £50 000	 £25 000
work
Sewe rage	 Jobs >
	
Jobs >
work
	
£100 000
	
£50 000
New
	
Jobs >
construct ion	 £50 000
works
Maintenance	 Jobs >
works
	 £10 000
11
B. Work subject to partial tendering. C Percentage by
value of all work under the 100 9a tendering threshold
which must go out to competition )
Category	 Regs.	 Regs.	 Regs.	 Regs.
of work
	
f r om	 from	 f r om	 f r om
1.4.81
	
1.10. 82
	
1.10 .83
	
1.4.88
General	 0	 30	 60
highway
works
Sewerage	 0
works
New	 33
	
60
construction
works
Maintenance	 0	 30
	
60
work
12
1.4 The level of construction activity In the 1980s
When assessing the performance of DLOs In the years
subsequent to the 1980 legislation, 	 due consideration
must be given to the overall state of the construction
industry during this period.
It was the downturn years of the mid- to late- 1970s
which produced the orchestrated campaign against DLOs by
the private contracting sector of the industry.
Unfortunately for the DLOs, the early post-legislation
period was also a relatively lean one for the industry.
Table 1.2	 Value of output (GB)
(at 1985 prices)	 [Emillion]
All	 Public	 Public
work	 new	 other
housing	 new work
1982	 25 550	 1 166	 3 874
1983	 26 611	 1 241	 3 943
1984	 27 519	 1 129	 3 991
1985	 27 835	 931	 3 767
1986	 28 583	 826	 3 759
1987	 31 022	 868	 3 603
1988	 33 269	 789	 3 639
1989	 34 648	 754	 3 832
( Source: Housing and Construction Statistics. HMSO )
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Table 1.2 shows that the first half of the decade saw a
fairly slow rate of growth in total construction output,
followed by an upsurge In output in 1987 and 1988.
This 'mini boom' was, however, private sector based with
the small increase in public sector housing output In
1987 providing a brief	 interruption to the general
decline in public sector new build work between 1983 and
1988.
The local authority housing sector in particular
suffered in two ways from governmental policies in the
1980s.
Table 1.3	 Housing starts in the public sector
(England	 Wales)
C 000 dwellings )
1982
	
43.7
1983
	
41.5
1984
	
34.7
1985
	
28.9
1986
	
26.8
1987
	
24.4
1988
	
13.4
1989
	
12.2
( Source: Housing and Construction Statistics. HMSO )
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Firstly,	 restrictions	 on	 capital	 expenditure	 and
housebuilding imposed on local councils meant that the
number	 of	 new	 dwellings	 constructed	 was	 greatly
curtailed.
The	 dramatic	 decline	 in house	 building starts	 is
illustrated by the figures in Table 1.3.
Secondly, the 'right to buy' policy for council house
tenants meant that over one million dwellings were taken
out of local authority ownership between 1982 and 1989.
( Table 1.4 )
Table 1.4	 Sale of local authority dwellings
	 (England
Wales)	 (1982-89)
1982	 201 875
1983	 141 615
1984	 103 315
1985	 92 293
1986	 88 738
1987	 105 107
1988	 155 556
1989	 170 691
C Source: Housing and Construction Statistics. HMSO )
Taken together with the reductions in other areas of
current and capital expenditure In the public sector,
affecting both building and civil engineering work, It
15
is not surprising that Table 1.5 illustrates a
continuous reduction in the number of workers In the
public sector of the industry throughout the period.
Table 1.5	 ConstructIon manpower (G.B.)
(1982-89)
(Thousands)
All	 Public
Author i ties
1982	 1 123	 282
1983	 1 084	 271
1984	 1 055	 256
1985	 1 022	 253
1986	 985	 242
1987	 1 002	 240
1988	 1 009	 239
1989	 1 011	 217
C Source: Housing and Construction Statistics. HMSO )
This is in contrast to the turnaround In the private
sector In 1987.
The upswing in contractors orders started in 1987 and
continued into 1988. ( Table 1.6 )
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Table 1.6	 Value of new orders obtained by
contractors	 (England	 Wales)
(at 1985 prices)
(E million)
1982
	
11 330
1983
	
13 247
1984
	
14 005
1985
	
14 003
1986
	
14 902
1987
	
18 313
1988
	
19 523
1989
	
17 630
C Source: Housing and Construct ,ion Statistics. HMSO )
In the 1980s, therefore, DLOs were operating under
conditions in which the local authority building
workload was generally in decline. They were confronted
with a new Situation requiring them to face more
competition and operating in a climate in which private
contractors were, for most of the period, experiencing
little growth in demand from the private sector and were
themselves, therefore, taking a stronger Interest in a
declining public sector market.
17
CHAPTER 2
DATA SO!J10ES ON DLOS
18
2.1 Published statistics onDLOs
Financial and other data on DLOs can be obtained from
two main sources:
a. The annual report which each individual DLO has
been required to produce since the financial year
1981-82,	 and
b. The CIPFA annual publication 'Direct Labour
Organisatlons Statistics Actuals' first published for
the same year.
The CIPFA series was occasioned by the change in DLOs'
statutory position arising from the 1980 Act.
Previously, even simple facts such as the number of
DLOs, the types of work done and the size of
undertakings had not been available and this hindered a
proper appreciation of the roles which DLOs play.
The DLOs' individual reports vary considerably In the
degree of detail provided on a DLO's operations with the
basic provision tending to be based on the CIPFA code of
practice.
2.2 The basis of the annual reports
The annual reports constitute the best source of data on
the operations of individual DLOs.
DLOs under the 1980 Act were regarded as trading
19
undertakings and this fact was reflected in the formal
accounting arrangements and the statutory duty to
produce an annual report.
2.2.1 The accounting framework
Authorities in England and Wales are required to keep
separate DLO revenue accounts for each of the following
four areas of work:
D 1	 General highways and sewers work
D 2 Works of new construction C other than of highways
and sewers, except where they form part of some
larger construction job)	 estimated to cost more
than £50 000.
D 3 Works of new construction as above, but estimated
to cost not more than £50 000.
D 4 Maintenance work C other than on highways and
sewers ) within the meaning of the Local Authority
(Goods	 Services) Act 1970.	 This includes minor
improvements and extensions.
During the period under study, where not more than
thirty employees were engaged in any financial year on
20
any description of work , an authority did not need to
keep a separate DLO revenue account for that description
of work in the following year. (The 'de minimis' rule.)
In addition to the basic financial data, the reports
also	 tend	 to	 provide	 information	 on	 employment,
tendering performance, 	 organisatlonal	 structure,	 and
some provide detailed expenditure breakdowns.
2.3 The CIPFA surveys
The total number of local authorities in England and
Wales is 450. (458 prior to the aboLition of the GLC and
metropolitan county authorities).
Whilst all these authorities undertake some building
work, many of them keep only a small workforce in some
or all of the specified areas of work and thus qualify
from exemption from the requirements of the 1980 Act on
'de minimis' grounds.
The CIPFA annual survey questionnaire covering DLOs'
Actuals accounts elicits a response of between 280-340
with only about 170 authorities responding each year for
the full period from 1981 through to 1989.
The CIPFA statistics make year by year comparisons
difficult due to the differing number of responses each
year and cannot easily be used, therefore, to undertake
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a Tconsistentt study of DLOs' operations.
Also, comparison within each year is made even more
difficult by the fact that some authorities respond to
some parts of the questionnaire but not to others.
2.3.1 Data provided in the CIPFA reports
The CIPPA statistics provide annual data on over-all
expenditure for each category of work undertaken by a
DLO.
The survey questionnaire elicits information from the
surrrnary (historical cost) revenue account of the DLO but
does not provide an expenditure breakdown within each
category of work.
( To obtain more detailed form of expenditure data,
recourse to the annual reports of an individual
authority is needed. )
2.3.2 The form of the CIPFA statistics
The legislation introduced for many authorities some
significant	 changes	 in	 both	 the	 accounting	 and
management systems for their DLOs. This resulted from
the Act's requirement to treat the DLO operation on a
formal, quasi-trading basis even though the DLO was
still a part of the authority Itself.
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One aim of the publication of the statistics is 'to
provide a range of information, both financial and non-
financial, to assist the management of DLOs and other
interested parties in seeking an efficient and effective
DLO.' C CIPFA. 1982 )
The legislation sets down the accounting arrangements
required e.g. Section B of Part III of the Act
prescribes that there shall be a balance sheet, a
revenue account and a statement of rate of return; that
the balance sheet shall show a true and fair view of the
state of affairs of the authority's DLO; and that the
revenue account and statement of rate of return should
be calculated for each of the four types of work.
Additionally, separate 'Directions' specify certain
extra information which authorities have to include in
their annual reports.
The government accepted that CIPFA should be responsible
for preparing specific guidance on the detailed
application of the DLO legislation, where it related to
accounting and related financial management matters.
CIPFA issued the 'Accounting Code of Practice for DLOs'
in 1981 with subsequent revisions in 1982, 1983 and
again in 1986.
The Accounting Codes provided, therefore, the framework
on which its collection of statistics could be based.
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2.3.3 Accounting Code of Practice for DLOs
Whilst compliance with the CIPFA Code is voluntary,
except of course where it states the law, the form and
content of DLO revenue accounts follow best accounting
practice including all relevant advice issued by the
Insti tute.
There is inevitably a degree of variation in the ways in
which individual DLOs lay out their accounts but using
the CIPFA Code and the notes to individual accounts, it
is possible to take any individual authority's accounts
from its annual report and put the information in a
standardised form.
The four categories into which the DLOs work is divided
for accounting purposes are considerably varied in
nature with obvious differences between the resources
required toproduce the output for highways work,,new
construction work and maintenance work.
For most DLOs, previous arrangements had meant that the
actual cost of work had been charged, but now a DLO had
to give a firm quotation before undertaking any work for
a client department , irrespective of DLO tendering
regulations, and charge that amount regardless of how
much the work actually cost.
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2.4 Financial performance and capital measurement
Legislation requires DLOs to work on a quasi-commercial
basis and to seek to achieve a financial performance
target which is common to all DLOs.
The data cannot normally be found directly from the
historical cost accounts of a DLO operation. The
financial target is intended to measure the productive
use of assets.	 This means that account has to be taken
of physical consumption of assets, rather than the
financing costs of those assets which is what the
historical costs accounts of local authorities normally
show. In any event the historical cost information does
not yield comparable data between authorities, since
each is based on essentially arbitrary effects such as
the age and the data of acquisition of the assets, the
financing policy towards those assets and the provision
for future assets, and the rate of inflation relevant to
those assets which has prevailed from purchase to the
present day.
The purpose of current cost accounting is to measure
costs at current prices, rather than out-of-date prices.
It produces a current cost operating surplus which
differs from the historical cost operating surplus in
two ways - it allows for depreciation at current prices
and for additional working capital made necessary by
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price increases.
Consequently, it is the surplus after providing for the
maintenance of existing levels of operation.
The following is therefore involved;
1. The current value of the capital employed in the DLO
is usually based on its equivalent current replacement
cost.
2. Depreciation costs measured at current prices have to
be added back to the historical cost operating surplus,
after removing financing costs such as principal
repayments and revenue contributions to capital outlay.
3. A cost of sales adjustment is made to ensure the
costs charged for the use of stock are shown at the
current replacement cost.
The latter two adjustments convert the historical cost
surplus to ,a current cost operating surplus before
interest, which can then be expressed as a rate of
return on the capital employed.
2.5 Acquisition of detailed cost and revenue data
The CIPFA statistics do not provide a breakdown of costs
by work category when a DLO undertakes work in more than
one area.	 For a breakdown of cost data between work
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categories from the CIPFA data, it is possible only to
refer to those authorities which undertook a single
category of work throughout the 1981-89 period.
There were twenty one authorities, who undertook only
Highways	 and	 Sewers	 work	 (Dl)	 and	 thirty	 four
authorities, who undertook only Maintenance (1)4) work.
There were no authorities undertaking only work of New
Construction (1)2 and/or 1)3).
To obtain data on these latter categories of work C and
also to increase the amount of data on the other
categories ), recourse had to be made to individual
authorities' annual reports.
In order to obtain a consistent set of data, one hundred
and eighty local authorities in England and Wales were
contacted and a full set of their DLO's annual reports
from 1981-82 were requested. Additionally, the
opportunity was sought to obtain a contact in the
authority who would be willing to furbish me with
Information not found in the reports and to discuss the
contents of the reports with me.
Seventy five authorities made favourable responses i.e.
provided a full set of reports, showed a willingness to
provide further Information on the operations of their
organisatlon and agreed to a personal visit.
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This may be considered to be a good response rate, in
view of the fact that DLO managers were inevitably, at
this time, wary of divulging cost information in a
competitive environment.	 The response compares well
with	 that	 from	 an	 Association	 of	 Direct	 Labour
Organisation	 (ADLO) survey.	 In 1988, all building DLOs
in ADLO membership were sent a questionnaire asking for
a	 range	 of	 information	 relating	 to	 workload	 and
operations, employment and training. Even after a
considerable amount of pressure, only 67 of ADLO's
members were persuaded to complete the survey.
Many of the other authorities were able to provide me
with an incomplete series of reports, but some insisted
on charging the permissable 'nominal fee' for their
reports which, for a full series, turned out to be
prohibi tive.
Appendix	 2	 lists	 those	 authorities,	 whose	 DLO's
financial data are used in this study.
The total number providing cost data for each category
of work are
Dl	 50	 authorities
D2	 27
D3	 29
D4	 61
(Note: By 1988-89 only 65 authorities in the country
were involved in any new construction work.)
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2.6	 Information from the annual reports
With the data from the authorities, cost information can
be obtained on the separate areas of work.
The financial data sheet depIcted in Table 2.1 shows my
attempt to standardise the cost and revenue data for
each DLO and for each category of work.
Table 2.1 Financial data sheet for DLOs
Expendi ture:
Direct Labour
+ Direct Materials / Stores
+ Transport and plant
+ Sub-contractors
+ Overhead accounts
+ Change in work-in-progress
+ Change intoss provision
+ Exceptional items
= Total Expenditure
- Total Income
= Surplus
- Adjustment
Current cost operating surplus C CCOS )
[Capital employed = Land	 buildings + Vehicles + Stock]
Rate of return on capital employed
= CCOS / Capital employed
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A major aim of this study is to use the data in the
computation of cost and productivity measures but
several questions can be considered when the annual
reports are studied.
All of the following questions will be addressed in
ensuing chapters
What are the objectives of the DLO ? These may be:
- To provide and market an efficient, value for
money, cost effective, high quality building
service.
- To be a good employer, providing fair wages,
safeguarding employees t safety and welfare.
- To contribute to the future of the industry by
training and employing a proper ratio of
apprentices.
Has the departmental structure of the authority t s ]JLO
altered in reponse to the new conditions ?
- There may now be separate contracting and client
organi sat ions.
How does the DLO gauge success ? This may be in
terms of:
- Percentage of work won in competition.
- Maintenance of employment levels.
- Outturn for repair work.
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2.7 The value and 'validity' of the annual reports
The advent of annual reports meant that new accounting
procedures had to be introduced for DLOs, and their
'validity' as a reliable source of data had to be
considered.
A study of selected annual DLO reports for 1981-82
( Department of the Environment. 1984 ) was carried out
to assess the value of DLO reports for that first year.
The sample size was 123 with 30 selected for a more
detailed study.
The following points arising from this
	 study were
relevant to the data usage made for this work.
- Presentation of accounts
Of the accounting documents, the revenue accounts were
generally the best. They corrmonly provided some
measure of performance, disclosed a surplus or deficit
as appropriate and often gave more detailed information
than profit and loss accounts prepared in accordance
with	 the	 minimum	 disclosure	 requirements	 of	 the
Companies Acts.
The DLO legislation created difficulties for authorities
by an implied move towards private sector accounting
practices in respect of DLOs, and by the creation of a
'fictitious' DLO entity within the legal entity of an
authority.
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- Capital employment
In 1981-82 there was confusion as to what should be
Included as capital employed.
They estimated that In 49 of the sample reports, the
capital employed was understated. (Since 1982 there has
been considerable clarification in respect of internally
leased assets.)
- Impact of DLO legislation in 1981-82
The impact of the DLO legislation was felt evenly across
all types of authority and all sizes and types of DLO
activities.
The	 legislation	 introduced	 new	 practices	 and
requirements regarding the operation and accounting of
DLOs. Only 45 of the reports sampled gave details of
any changes which had been made to enable compliance
with the regulations.
Although the DLO legislation introduced new competition
requirements there was only limited competition between
DLOs and private sector contractors during 1981-82.
- Form of accounting documents
Disclosure of information was in some respects more
extensive in OLO accounts than in company financial
statements, particularly with respect to revenue account
I n f o rma t I on.
As for expenditure, practically all indicated costs of
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material and labour, as well as providing some breakdown
of	 indirect	 costs.	 A very	 high	 proportion	 also
Identified	 general	 overheads	 separately,	 usually
representing	 a	 proportion	 of	 central	 establishment
charges allocated to the DLO.
Practically all accounts identified transport and plant
costs. However, authorities differed considerably as to
the	 basis	 on	 which	 these	 transport	 charges	 were
included.	 While some DLOs clearly operated their own
transport and bore the costs, in other cases the
authority itself was deemed to be the owner and operator
of the transport and the DLO was charged with a
proportion of attributable costs for its use of the
vehicles.
Greater disclosure of the treatment of hire and leasing
costs generally was recommended, particularly because of
the implications when considering the rate of return on
assets employed.
The number of people working in a DLO was frequently not
disclosed. The practice (of disclosure) could provide
data upon which to find a possible alternative measure
of DLO efficiency in terms of value added per man
employed.
- Conclusion
The rate of return on capital employed would still seem
to be the best available measure of performance of DLOs.
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The conclusion must be subject to all the reservations
which Inevitably follow from applying any one single
measure of efficiency. Other possibilities were
considered. To an extent the possibilities were limited
in that any calculation of a measure of performance
would have to be based on financial data published in
the DLO accounts.
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CHAPTER 3
DLOS' RESPONSE TO THE LEGISLATION
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3.1 DLOs in a competitive environment
In the 1980s a central theme of Ministerial statements
was	 the	 question	 of	 efficiency	 and	 of	 improving
Britain's industrial performance. The fundamental
reason for this poor track-record being stated to be a
lack of incentives to improve performance.
In the case of local authority building work, protection
from competition granted by statutory monopoly powers
and the availability of local authority support in times
of	 trouble have supposedly enabled 	 inefficiency to
ex 1 s t.
Greater efficiency in the operation of DLOs was one of
the main objectives of the 1980 Act and this was to be
achieved by increased competition, pre-estimatlon for
work and by setting a required rate of return.
3.2 The rate of return requirement
DLOs are required to earn a rate of return of five per
cent on capital employed in the organisation. The rate
of return is to be achieved in each category of work and
must be determined on a current cost accounting basis.
The rate of return is calculated by dividing the current
operating surplus by the net operating assets at the end
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of the year. This entails the valuation of all land,
buildings and stock held by a DLO, together with an
allowance to reflect the impact of price changes on
stock consumption.
Any authority which fails to earn the specified rate of
return for any category of work is required to notify
the Secretary of State of the Environment within six
months of the end of the financial year. Failure for
any category of work for two consecutive years can be
the subject of a report to be considered by an authority
and a copy must be sent to the Secretary of State, who
may direct that an authority shall cease to have power
to do direct labour work of all or ay description.
As a result of the legislation, each authority Is
required to secure such a positive rate of return on
capital employed as the Secretary of State may direct.
The rate of return is required in each financial year
for each description of work and must be determined on a
current cost accounting basis. The statutory
requirements to meet a target expressed in terms of a
return on capital employed can lead to contradictions
between efficiency and meeting the rate of return. For
example, stocks are included in the measurement of
capital employed, and therefore a reduction In the level
of stocks will increase the rate of return, all other
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things being equal. This, however, may be incompatible
with the need to carry such a level of stocks as will
enable emergency and other repairs to be carried Out
more efficiently.
The legislation discriminates against DLOs on the
question of the rate of return. The requirement to meet
a rate of return on a current cost basis is inconsistent
with the requirements of private industry, where there
was,	 in	 the	 1980s,	 considerable	 debate	 as	 to	 the
usefulness of current cost accounting altogether. The
Inland Revenue do not accept accounts prepared on a
current cost basis as being valid for taxation purposes.
Inevitably, the requirement to conform with current cost
accounting	 requirements,	 in	 itself,	 increases	 the
administrative cost of DLOs.	 Most of the small private
companies competing with DLOs do not keep their accounts
on a current cost accounting basis. Indeed, the
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice was drawn up
with large companies in mind. C See Brler. 1981 and
Folwell. 1981 ).
To Impose such measures on DLOs, when the meaning of
current costs accounts themselves are in question, seems
to be most unfair. In addition, DLOs are required to
make, each year, a rate of return on each individual
area of work as a measure of efficiency. The same rules
and limits do not apply to private contractors and they
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are not required to achieve any particular rate of
return, or show any other comparable measure of
efficiency.
DLOs are not allowed to transfer surplus across the
different work areas as defined in the legislation. So
a DLO could comfortably exceed the statutory rate of
return on its operation as a whole, but one or more
individual areas may fail to meet the required rate of
return.
3.2.1 The choice of target rate
The purpose of the financial target is to ensure that
DLOs account for the use, and identify the true economic
cost,	 of	 resources	 that might	 otherwise	 be made
available to the private sector. 	 This is supposedly
achieved by creating a financial	 regime for DLOs
equivalent to that faced by their private sector
competitors so that the prices they quote can be
compared directly.
The 5o figure is drawn from the government's policy of
ensuring that financial targets are consistent with the
long-run marginal 'opportunity cost' of resource use to
the private sector. 	 The use of the 5o figure has been
questioned. C Notably by FoIwell. 1981 ). Table 3.1
shows how rates of return in industry in general have
varied considerably in the nineteen eighties.
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Table 3.1 Net real rates of return - Industrial
companies
1980	 3.8o
1981
	
2.9
1982
	
3.6
1983
	
4.8
1984
	
6.1
1985
	
7.5
1986
	
8.0
1987
	
6.2
1988
	
5.3
1989
	
4.9
(Source: British Business)
As certain categories of work carry more risk than
others, it would make more sense to reflect this by, for
instance, requiring a higher rate of return to be
achieved on major construction work than on routine
maintenance work. But the question must be asked of
whether the performance of a DLO can be measured by
calculating its return on capital.
Generally, building and civil engineering work are not
capital intensive so doubts must arise about a specified
financial target being worthy of consideration. 	 The
variability	 of	 results	 for	 individual	 authorities
0
0
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<25
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<40
<45
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40
appears to bear this out.
Table 3.2 shows the rates of return achieved by DLOs
responding to the CIPPA survey for a year in the mid-
eighties.
Table 3.2 Distribution of percentage rates of return
for all categories of work combined
( DLOs England	 Wales )
	
1984-85
No. of DLOs
6
59
53
31
35
18
16
13
12
15
6
6
7
4
>70	 25
(Source: CIPPA)
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Other accounting ratios, such as return on turnover or
value added per employee, may be considered more
appropriate, but the use of other targets based on non-
financial measures and incorporating some measure of
quality has found favour amongst many DLO managers.
3.3 The general effects on DLO operations
Two important changes might have been expected in the
new environment, notably:
a. Comparatively less work being undertaken by DLOs due
to the increased competition.
b. An increased rate of return being achieved as IJLOs
are forced to gear their operations towards meeting
this particular requirement.
The CIPFA data give an indication of the validity of
these assumptions and show some broad trends.
3.3.1	 Increased competition
A DLO Is obliged to submit a written statement of its
charge for carrying out work and the Accounting Code of
Practice puts forward five main methods of providing
these written statements.
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The government and CIPFA consider tenders/lump sum
contracts and schedules, where tenders specify
percentages on- or off-schedule rates (put forward by
the authorities) for doing work, as the appropriate
basis for competition.
Once a schedule rate for doing a job has been prepared,
It can be used for all an authority's work for that
trade and, for building maintenance, it allows for a
proper comparison of tenders.
Neither 'target hour' and day works contracts nor 'bulk'
offers normally provide the right basis for competition.
The 'target hour' method requires the use of bonus
schemes. DLOs give client departments copies of their
bonus schemes together with statements of the prices per
productive target hour, which they will require to be
credited to their account. Day works contracts require
that prices are expressed as amounts per actual hour
worked, not per target hour earned.
It is a less satisfactory method as the charge would be
partly dependent on the speed with which a job is done.
It would involve the ability on the part of the
department to forecast and compare the total number of
hours which different tenderers would take, and the
tenderer with the lowest hourly price could take the
longest time to do a job.
'Bulk' offers made to client departments require a DLO
to tell each of its client departments how much it would
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require to do all jobs of specified types for a specific
period.
Changes in the methods used to charge for work are shown
In Table 3.3 and illustrated in Fig. 3.1. In 1981-82
day works contracts still achieved 25o of total ' income
compared with only 15o for schedule contracts, but by
1988-89 there had been considerable movement towards the
more competitive methods with a 55°o figure for schedule
contracts.
Table 3.3 Methods of charging for DLO work
1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
Lump sum contracts
	
15	 20	 24	 22
Schedule contracts	 15	 24	 32	 43
'Target hours'
	
17	 17	 14	 11
Day works contracts 	 25	 25	 22	 18
'Bulk offers'	 16	 8	 4	 2
Other	 12	 6	 4	 4
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89
Lump sum contracts	 21	 22	 21	 23
Schedule contracts	 48	 51	 53	 55
'Target hours'	 8	 7	 6	 5
Day works contracts	 17	 16	 13	 11
'Bulk offers'	 3	 2	 2	 2
Other	 3	 3	 5	 4
(Source: Derived from CIPPADLO Statistics 1981-89)
Target
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FIg. 3.1	 Changes In the tendering methods used by DLOs
Tendering methods
1981-82
Tendering methods
198 7-88
Target
Lump Sum
21%
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3.3.2 Loss of work by DLOs
The total value of the construction work undertaken in
one mid-eighties year (1985-88) was just under £4bn,for
the 318 local authorities showing full statistics in the
CIFFA survey of that year. This represents a large
market for construction work yet a reduction in the
proportion of work undertaken by DLOs was inevitable
over the period.
There was clear variability in the proportion of work
undertaken by DLOs but Table 3.4 shows the greatest
relative loss to be in the field of major works due to
the increased competition. This represented a loss of
almost a third in the eighties in the value of larger
scale capital work.
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the over all change 1981 to 1989.
Table 3.4 DLO work undertaken as a percentage of an
authority's construction and maintenance work
Category	 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
Dl	 53.0	 51.6	 48.5	 48.1
D2	 16.0	 12.9	 14.6	 10.3
D3	 24.4	 23.6	 26.9	 24.3
D4	 61.2	 57.8	 55.1	 51.2
All categories	 44.3	 43.3	 42.6	 39.9
(Source: Derived from CIPFA DLO Statistics 1981-89)
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Fig. 3.2 Percentage of work won by DLOs
DLO work
1981 compared to 1989
Highways	 New work	 Maintenance
1981.
1989
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Category	 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89
Dl	 46.6	 46.0	 42.9	 44.8
D2	 11.5	 12.1	 12.4	 10.8
D3	 25.6	 22.3	 23.0	 33.2
D4	 53.6	 52.5	 51.0	 48.9
All categories	 42.6	 41.9	 40.4	 39.9
(Source: Derived from CIPFADLO Statistics 1981-89)
3.3.2.1 Maintenance organisations
The Audit Commission (1989) looking at DLO5 in London
reported that DLOs were market leaders in building
maintenance because of their size and approach to
jobbing	 repairs	 with many
	
DLOs	 being	 substantial
businesses -	 (70o) having a turnover greater than Elm
i.e. employing at least 40 operatives. There were very
few private sector firms of this size in the jobbing
maintenance industry with building maintenance In the
private sector being a cottage industry of small firms
and the self-employed.
DLOs have usually been successful, for this category of
work, In meeting the targets Imposed by the 1980 Act.
In 1987-88 only 9 out of the 284 DLOs quoted In the
CIPFA statistics made a loss and a further nine made
less than 5o rate of return on capital employed.
When a DLO fails to achieve Its rate of return, the
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authority must notify the Secretary of State, who has
had the ability to order a special report at any time,
once an authority failed to make the required rate of
return. It has been normal policy to order a special
report from the authority when this occurs in two
consecutive years C until February 1987, it was three
consecutive years ).
	
In the light of these reports, he
could order the DLO to wind up its operation.
For general building maintenance DLOs there were, pre-
1989, nine such reports, but no closures were ordered.
This contrasts with DLOs engaged in new construction,
where twelve reports were ordered and four DLOs were
instructed to close.
DLOs managed to increase their turnover In maintenance
work in real terms during the 1980s, but their market
share fell from 610 to 51g6, though it is notable that
most of the fall occurred between 1981 and 1983.
One contributory factor behind this fall In shares has
been the growth of planned maintenance as a proportion
of the total.
THe managers of DLOs themselves recognised, in an ADLO
members' survey, that DLOs' traditional area of strength
Is jobbing repairs, which probably account for 7O-8Oo of
DLO turnover. (ADLO. 1989)
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3.3.2.2 New construction work
Only 52 local authorities had DLOs undertaking works of
new construction In 1987-88 compared to 90 in 1981-82,
and their turnover was relatively small and declining
as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5	 PLO turnover (Em) on new construction
Major works of	 Minor works of
new construction	 new construction
1981-82	 106	 25
1987-88	 94	 34
(1987-88 at	 68	 24
1981-82 prices)
Real terms change
on 1981-82
(Source: Derived fromCI pFADLO Statistics 1981-89)
As Table 3.4 showed, in 1981-82 PLOs were undertaking
16.0o of their authorities' large new construction work,
but this proportion had fallen to 10•8g6 by 1988-89.
3.3.2.3	 Smaller workforce
Lower workloads,	 particularly	 in new building work
obviously reduced the average number of operatives
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engaged In this area.
For the sample of 27 DLOs shown in Appendix 2 who were
undertaking category D2 work, the total number of direct
employees fell from 2 235 to 1 928 between 1981-82 and
1988-89.	 The corresponding fall in category D4 work
C for 51 DLOs ) was from 9 868 to 8 497 employees.
The average number of direct employees also fell as a
proportion of the total workforce.
3.3.2.4 Higher average rates of return
In 1981-82 little of the work was competitive so that
DLOs had a comparatively easy task in fixing their
charges.	 So long as these covered their costs with a
little bit to spare, they were home and dry. The test
became more difficult each year though, as more work had
to be put to competition.
Yet even though the proportion of DLOs showing a deficit
increased from 6.4o in 1981-82 to 7.8 In 1988-89, the
average rate of return (for those DLOs showing a
positive rate of return) rose from 15.1 to l8.4a and
the proportion with a rate of return greater than 7o
went up by a third.
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3.4 RevIew
Every DLO, just like a private contractor, has to
constantly make economies and review working methods In
order to keep costs, particularly overheads, as low as
possible.
Coupled with reduced public sector spending, Increased
competition had been reducing DLO work. Looking at the
results on a purely objective basis it is apparent that
many DLOs found difficulty in achieving the objective of
transforming	 a	 service	 department	 into	 what	 was
essentially	 needed	 -	 a	 commercial	 contracting
organi sat ion.
Oft-made criticisms that DLOs are not allowed to compete
'freely and fairly', being denied the right to compete
against private industry on the open market and being
unable to offset losses In one division by profits In
another, did appear in the 1980s to have some
justification.
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PART!
PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY
MACRO-AS PECTS
CHAPTER 4
AGGREGATE P RODIJCT IV! TY MEASUREMENT
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4.1 Productivity measurement for DLOs
Coninon measures of productivity Involve the use of the
ratio of a measure of output to a measure of a single
input. Labour productivity, in particular, isa widely
used measure of an organisation's efficiency, but this
is mainly due to the difficulties in obtaining
quantitative measures for the other productive inputs.
The calculation of output per worker is, at best, a
crude measure of the ability of an organisation to use
efficiently	 its resources in production.
It was on the basis of this partial productivity measure
- the average product of labour - that the campaign
against DLOs in the late 1970s, which led to the
subsequent 1980 legislation, was launched C Fleming.
1978 O'Brien. 1977 ). Criticism was levelled at
direct works departments, based on the claim that the
productivity	 of	 private	 contractors'	 labour	 was
significantly higher than that of direct labour. The
implication being, that any extension of direct labour
would lead to an inefficient use of resources.
The validity of the argument, based on aggregate gross
output data, was extremely suspect, with such a large
degree of variation in the type of output produced in
the industry.
This prompted others, such as Lowe ( 1987 ), to advocate
the	 virtue	 of	 average	 capital	 productivity	 as	 an
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alternative single factor productivity measure, but It
is total factor productivity which is the Ideal against
which other approaches should be measured.
4.2 Concerning factor productivity
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Fabricant (1959),
Kendrlck (1961) and Solow (1959) established on the
basis of single factor productivity measures that the
conventially measured inputs, capital and labour, leave
a large portion of the growth of output unexplained.
Since then, considerable research on the measurement,
determinants and consequences of factor-productivity has
been undertaken.
4.2.1 Technical change and the production function
Productivity indices are deduced from an explicitly
defined production function.
The accurate specification of the form and estimation of
the parameters of the production function are crucial to
the measurement of these indices.
Consider the aggregate, two factor, twice differentiable
production function for output Q using the two factors
labour ( L ) and capital C K )
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Q = A.F ( L,K )	 (1)
where A is a measure of disembodied technical change and
the function F is homogeneous.
Suppose the production function (1) is 	 Q = ALaK,
then = 1 — a
 and constant returns to scale prevailing.
This supposition is confirmed by a number of empirical
studies carried out in various countries. (See Chau and
Walker.1988 and Lowe.1987).
If the inputs K and L are measured erroneously, say, by
multiplicative factors V 1 and 
'1k denoting the quality
Improvement of L and K, then it can be shown that:
dA	 =	 a(	 dV 1
	)
	
+	 (1—a) C	 dV i.	 )
	
(2)
A
	
VI	 Vk
That is, the "res1dual becomes a weighted sum of the
growth rates of the quality changes "embodied" in the
conventional inputs.
Similar results are obtained when a third factor is left
out of	 the production	 function	 (1).	 Suppose	 the
function is defined as	 Q = A La K M "
then the corresponding productivity relation would be
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=	 dQ	 - (a dL	 +	 +	 )	 (2a)
A	 Q	 L
	
K	 N
where M is the omitted variable.
It is clear then, that any misspecification or errors in
estimatimg the parameters of the aggregate production
function - errors in measuring the variables, errors due
to omission of relevant inputs - will spill over to the
measure of total factor productivity. If these sources
of bias are successfully removed, the remaining portion
of dQ/Q, unexplained by the combined rate of growth of
all the factors of production, is the measure of 'true'
total factor productivity or technical change.
4.3 Total factor productivity ( TFP )
Although several theoretical approaches to the
measurement of TFP in industries and individual firms
have been developed, a measurement method proposed by
Caves ( 1980a and 1980b ) can be justifiably selected,
because it avoids restrictive assumptions about the form
of	 the	 underlying	 production	 function	 selected	 to
represent an industry or firm.
A production function shows	 the maximum obtainable
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output rates for all possible sets of input usage rates
and, by definition, specifies a particular technology.
Caves begins by assuming that output Y is produced by
combining a set of inputs X	 according to a general
implicit production function:
f ( Y; X1 , X2 ,.....X; T ) = 0	 (3)
where T is time, which allows for shifts over time in
the production function. Such shifts In the production
function are equivalent to changes In technology, which
could represent changes in productivity. Using a
duality theorem developed by McFadden C 1978 ), the
following unique cost function corresponding to this
production function can be specified:
C = g (Y; W1 , W2 ,....W; T )
	
(4)
where W 1 is the price of input X 1 and C is total cost:
n
C=
	
	 (5)
1=1
By taking the natural logarithm of the cost function,
and totally differentiating with respect to time, Caves
allocates the rate of growth of cost among changes In
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the output level, changes in input prices and shifts in
the cost function ( i.e. productivity changes In the
opposite direction ) respectively.
a
d in C =
	
in g d mY +
	
in g din W +in_g(6)
dT	 óin Y dT	 i=i In W dT
Following Shephard's lenma, It can be shown that the
first partial derivative of the logarithm of the cost
function with respect to the logarithm of each input
price is equal to the cost share of that input:
s ing	 = WX 1 	 S1	 (7)
c
where S i represents the cost share of the ith. input.
This useful characteristic of the cost function can be
illustrated by the hypothetical data In Table 4.1.
59
Table 4.1 Hypothetical industry data for two time
periods
	
1987	 1988
W 1	£100	 110
X 1	£200	 200
C
	
£100 000	 102 000
Since the price of input i has increased by £10 between
1987 and 1988, if we hold output, technology, all input
quantities, and all other prices constant, then total
cost will increase by £2 000.
Using 1987 as the base year, the continuous partial
derivative
1ng / 1n W , can be approximated with discrete data
by the ratio of the percentage change in total cost to
the percentage change in the price of input i, that is
((102 000-100 000 I 100 000))	 / ((110-100)	 / 100)
= 0.2
Consequently, 5lng	 /	 3m	 W = Sj, since the cost
share of input I in the base year is
((100)(200)) / 100 000	 = 0.2
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Caves takes the total derivative of the natural
logarithm of equation (5) with respect to time and
obtains:
n	 n
d in C =	 WX	 d in	 +	 WX d in X 1 (8)
dT	 1=1 C	 dT	 1=1	 C	 dT
Substitution of equation (8) into equation (6) and
further substitution of equation (7) into the result
yields the following expression for productivity change:
n
—sing =	 ing dinY -	 Si d in Xi (9)
inY	 dT	 i=i	 dT
If constant returns to scale are exhibited in the
production process, and if, in a competitive market, the
firm is unable to influence input prices, then the given
percentage change in inputs will	 lead to the same
percentage change in total cost.	 So, the percentage
change in total cost Is equal to the percentage change
in output and the partial derivative &ln g I	 ln Y can
be assumed to be equal to one.
Equation (9) can be modified to
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n
-	 in g	 = d m y -	 Si d in Xi
	
(10)
dT	 i=i	 dT
In order to apply this index to discrete data, thefirst
diferences in natural logarithms and of beginning and
end-of-period averages for the input cost shares can be
used.
For equation (10), one obtains the following formula for
measuring the rate of growth in TFP compounded
continuously over the time period T-1 to T:
TFPGrowth Rate = in T - in T-1
-Z ½( S j , T +S j , T_i)( ln Xj , T - in x1,T_1)
i=i	 (11)
The application of equation (11) can be illustrated with
the hypothetical data in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 HypothetIcal data on output and input
quantities, input prices and cost shares of
an industry for two time periods
	
1987	 1988
	
Price	 Cost	 Price	 Cost
Quant. (E/unit) share Quant. CE/unit) share
Y Output	 100
	
110
X1 Labour	 40
	
15	 0.115	 30
	
16	 0.082
X 2 Capital	 30
	
20	 0.115	 40
	
22	 0.150
X3 Materials 2000
	
2	 0.770	 2200
	
2.05	 0.768
The r.h.s. of equation (11) would be evaluated as:
In 110 - in 100	 -	 (0.082 + 0.115) (in 30 - ln 40)
-	 (0.150 + 0.115) (In 40 - in 30)
-	 (0.768 + 0.770) (In 2200 - in 2000)
= 0.0122
This means that the continuous rate of growth in TFP
between these two periods is approximately l.2o. Since
the data are given as annual values for successive
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years, this result is interpreted as a continuous annual
rate of productivity Increase of 1.2a
4.4 Choice of methodology
This work attempts to develop an analytical framework
for productivity analysis of the DLO sector of the
construction industry after examining various analytical
standpoints by which productivity can be defined and
measured. The work draws upon previous research in
other countries concerning construction productivity.
Whilst the methodologies adopted elsewhere are useful,
data availability is significantly different between the
U.K. and the countries in which the previous work was
conducted, to such an extent that the previous studies
cannot be adopted directly.
The original concept of total factor productivity 	 can
be traced to the work of Stigler (1947). The concept
was later developed by researchers such as Kendrick
(1956), Solow (1957), Denison (1962), Abramovitz (1956)
and Griliches and Jorgenson (1966).
Domar (1962) described the trend of TFP as the trend of
'residual', which is a measure of the change of
aggregated tangible inputs to aggregated total outputs,
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neither input nor output being adjusted for quality
change.	 This measure of productivity will	 reflect
change	 in	 real	 output	 resulting	 from changes	 in
intangibles	 such as economies of scale,	 change	 In
qualities of inputs and advance in technology.
4.5 Empirical research into productivity at the
industry level for construction
Empirical research into TFP at the industry level for
the U.K. is rather lacking.
In the U.S., Dacy (1965) estimated total factor
productivity of the construction industry with indices
of building price, hourly wages, output per man-hour and
material price, and Stokes (1981) noted a decline in
labour productivity and attempted to explain such
decline by error in measurement of output, change in
output mix, change in capital per worker, demographic
change	 in construction	 labour,	 economies of	 scale,
change in regulations and regional shifts.
Chau and Walker (1988) estimated TFP for the Hong Kong
construction Industry but aggregation of inputs and
outputs renders the results of the study to be rather
limited.
Lowe (1987 and 1988) considered the problems of TFP
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measurement for the U.K. construction industry as a
whole and, pointing out the difficulties inherent In
obtaining suitable data concentrated on the relative
merits of labour and capital productivity.
4.6 Multi-output techniques
Index number procedures represent production processes
and it is necessary to choose a procedure capable of
representing a diversity of possible production
structures.
Duality theory allows the derivation of a procedure
which avoids	 restrictive assumptions,	 viz;	 constant
returns	 to	 scale,	 predetermined	 elasticity	 of
substitution and transformation, homogeneity or
homotheticity of the input structure and Hicks neutral
technical change.
This approach begins with a general	 transformation
function and its corresponding (multi-) product cost
function.
Total differentiation of the cost function leads to an
index of productivity which is a function of the rates
of growth of the Individual outputs and inputs. The
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weights for the input growth rates are the elasticities
of total cost with respect to the corresponding input
prices. The weights for the output growth rates are the
elasticities of total cost with respect to the output
levels.
If cost elasticities with respect to input prices and
output levels are not directly observable, input cost
shares provide defensible estimates of the input
weights.
If relative prices for all outputs do not reflect their
relative marginal costs of production, then revenue
shares do not provide defensible estimates of the output
weights.	 Estimates	 of	 the cost	 elasticities with
respect to	 output levels can be found from cross-
sectional cost function regressions.
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4.6.1 Methodology
Transformation function
f	 1'2'm X1 , X2 ....X	 : T ) = 0	 (12)
Cost function
C = g ( Y i Y 2s•••• Ym W1, W2 ...W: T )	 (13)
Total cost
n
C =	 WX	 (14)
j=1.
(W	 price at which Xi can be purchased)
The cost function is homogeneous of degree one, non-
decreasing and concave in the factor prices C Wi ).
The first partial derivatives of the cost function with
respect to the Wi's are equal to the cost minimising
input levels,' (the property known as Shepherd's lemma),
written in log form as
5 ing = wjX1 =
Sinw i	C
(S 1 = share of factor i in total cost) 	 (15)
Total differentiation of the log of the cost function
with respect to time yields
m	
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d inC =	 Sing dinY +	 S ing dinw +Sing	 (18)
dT	 5 inY dt	 S inW dT	 S T
i=i	 j=i
This shows the rate of growth in total cost can be
allocated among changes In output levels, changes in
factor prices and shifts in the cost function (changes
in productivity).
Total differentiation of total cost with respect to time
now gives:
n
dinC =
	
( WX ) ( dinW1 + dinX )
dT	 C	 dT	 dT
i=1
n	 n
=	 S dinW + Z S i dinX	 (17)
dT	 dT
i = 1	 i=1
(15) and (17) can be substituted into (16) to obtain
m	 n
- Sing =	 ing dinY1 -	 S dinX
ST	 mY1 dT	 dT	 (18)
i = 1	 i=i
The 5lng/lnY	 are cost elasticities of output and if
output prices reflect marginal costs (feasible in the
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highly competitive construction Industry) and the
Industry exhibits constant returns to scale (undesirable
'a priori' assumption) then the cost elasticities would
be equal to the shares of the outputs In total revenue.
This means the use of cost elasticities with respect to
outputs,	 rather than revenue shares, to weight the
output growth rates.	 However, costs shares provide
satisfactory estimates of cost elasticities with respect
to	 factor	 prices	 if	 inputs	 are purchased	 in	 free
markets.
The index of productivity (18) is defined in continuous
t ime.
For a discrete approximation, differences in natural
logs can be used to approximate the log derivatives, and
arithmetic averages of the weights at the beginning and
end of the period approximate the instantaneous weights.
-(lng - lng_ 1 )	 (½( 3
	
) + ½ &n)(1nYT 1T-1
1flYT	 &nYT_l
i= 1	 (19)
n
- Z (½S i,T + ½ 5 j,T...l)( lnxj , T	 lnXi,T_1)
1=l
All the variables in (19) are observable, except for the
elasticities of cost with respect to output.
These can be estimated from cross-section data from a
sample of DLOs.
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CHAPTER 5
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ( TFP ):
MITHODOLOGY
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5.1 Components of productivity indices
Ideally, components of productivity Indices are
denominated in physical units of measurement, but with a
lack of such data, use can be made of quantity indices
that are obtained by deflating, to their constant £
equivalent, the current £ values corresponding to their
physical	 quantities,	 in order	 to correct	 for price
changes.
Other measurement considerations 	 that a pp l y to all
components include:
(a) Development of an appropriate weighting system, if
heterogeneous items comprise a single component.
(b) Adjustment for changes in component quality over
t ime.
(c) Inclusion of new outputs and inputs introduced into
the production process.
5.1.1 Measurement considerations for individual inputs
Labour input:
In a competitive labour market, in which any category of
labour is paid a wage equal to Its marginal contribution
to output, we can weight labour by the corresponding
average earnings. A measure of labour input can be
obtained by deflating total labour compensation with an
Index of average earnings.
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Materials input:
Materials	 input basically refers 	 to all	 inputs not
classified as labour or capital.
Capital input:
Capital Input is by far the most difficult component of
productivity indices to quantify. Unlike materials,
measurable quantities of which are completely consumed
during the current time period, capital provides a flow
of services that extends beyond the current period.
Real (i.e. constant value) capital input must therefore
be derived.
Output:
An appropriate value measure for output is receipts. (No
inventory changes arise when payment is based on
completed work - the usual case in construction ). The
value of receipts should be deflated with an index of
output prices rather than of input costs. Categorisation
of construction output into homogeneous units obviously
poses some problems but the breakdown of DLO data into
the four categories of work does impose a considerable
degree of uniformity.
For aggregate time series data on each category of work,
a breakdown of input costs can be made and appropriate
index series applied to the costs, in order to construct
a constant price estimate and measure changes in the
volume of these inputs and of the output as well.
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5.2	 Input identification
From a DLO's revenue accounts, a breakdown of input
costs into three areas is possible. This is illustrated
in the Data Appendix: Section 1, where the aggregated
data for the sample authorities in each category are
shown.
The basic breakdown is
Labour costs
	 -
Material costs -
Capital costs	 -
Direct labour and indirect 	 labour,
including employee related costs.
Supplies	 and	 services,	 including
sub—contractors.
Transport and plant;
administration overheads;
loan repayments and interest charges
Note on capital costs:
Vehicle and plant replacement may be financed in various
ways:
- By external leasing or by internal leasing, with the
DLO paying hourly rate hire charges for the use of
transport and mobile plant to another department, which
manages the fleet, and whose charges are set at rates
which include depreciation and renewals provisions.
- From an authority's specific repairs and renewals
fund, with annual contributions based on the current
replacement	 cost	 and	 anticipated	 future	 life	 of
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individual assets.
- The other charges made within the revenue accounts for
the utilisation of assets are payments of principal on
outstanding capital advances from an authority's capital
loans fund. Interest changes paid by the loan fund tend
to be recharges to revenue accounts at an average rate
of interest.
5.3 Choice of appropriate deflators
Data on cost and price indices for the construction
industry are available from various sources. In addition
to governmental publications, a major source is Building
Management Information Ltd. ( BMI ), formerly the
Building Management Cost Information Service ( BMCIS ).
For each separate input and for output prices, the most
appropriate index has been chosen as a deflator.
Each index has been adapted or constructed to have a
base year of 1984-85, a middle year in the series.
5.3.1	 Labour costs
For direct labour costs, the source of cost data is the
'Joint Negotiating Committee for Local Authority
Services'.
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Circulars 'Building and Civil EngIneering' (1982-89)
give the basic weekly rate for 39 hours (40 hours prior
to 1982 - adjustment made here).
As more than 95o of authorities follow these pay and
conditions, the data provide an appropriate basis for a
deflator. (ADLO. 1989).
Table 5.1 shows the weighted mean labour wage rates for
DLOs.
Table 5.1	 Index of direct labour costs
Basic rates for craftsmen (E)
(weighted according to trade
proportions for all DLOs)
	
1981-82	 87.90
	
1982-83	 91.85
	
1983-84	 95.32
	
198 4-85
	
100 .82
	
1985-86
	
103.93
	
1988-87
	
109.02
	
1987-88
	
125.77
	
1988-89
	
133.0
Index
(1984-85=100)
86.3
90.0
94.2
100.0
103.0
106.0
112.1
136.8
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For indirect labour, LACSAB, the local authorities
employers organisation, produce indices of white-collar
workers' pay rates. A weighted composite index based on
the grading structure of a typical DLO can be used as a
deflator. This Is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2	 Index of indirect labour costs
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
198 6-87
19 87-88
198 8-89
Index of clerical
staff pay rates
(1984-85=100)
87.9
91.2
95.0
100.0
103.6
108.5
125.1
131.5
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5.3.2	 Materials costs
The source of cost data is the BMI Quarterly Cost
Briefing:	 Building Maintenance Cost	 (April 1990).
Separate indices can be compiled for materials prices
for highways work and for new construction work.
The following table shows the compiled indices, amended
to give the mean value for a financial year.
Table 5.3
198 1-8 2
198 2-83
198 3-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
198 8-89
Indices of materials prices
Material prices (1984-85=100)
Highways	 New Construction
Work	 Work
81.2	 81.5
86.8	 87.6
92.8	 93.6
100	 100
104.9	 105.3
111.1	 109.1
116.8	 115.0
123.8	 121.1
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For maintenance work, an index is provided by the BMI to
reflect the general movement of the cost of carrying out
maintenance work in local authorities using directly
employed labour.
The Index is based on the BMI maintenance materials
index and the costs of employing operatives under the
local authorities' services agreements for builders,
plumbers, electricians and engineers.
Table 5.4 shows	 this	 index series expressed on a
financial year basis.
Table 5.4 General maintenance cost index
(1984-85=100)
	
1981-82	 86.0
	
1982-83	 91.0
	
1983-84	 95.2
	
1984-85	 100
	
1985-86	 103.5
	
1986-87	 108.8
	
1987-88	 117.1
	
1988-89	 123.8
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5.3.3 Capital costs
Capital costs can be split into those costs associated
with plant and other overhead costs, mainly associated
with property occupation.
For plant, the BCIS Input Cost Indices include a 'Basic
Plant Cost Index' based on the cost model for the
General Building Cost Index (ABa7) Sept 1989.
The following table shows this index rebased on 1984-85.
Table 5.5 Basic plant cost index
(1984-85 = 100)
	
1981-82
	
93.3
	
1982-83
	
97.4
	
198 3-84
	
98.3
	
1984-85
	
100
	
198 5-8 6
	
105.5
	
198 6-87
	
104.5
	
19 87-88
	
110.8
	
198 8-8 9
	
115.3
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As property Is the other major component, recourse needs
to be made to indices showing corrnercIal and industrial
rents, in order to compile a cost Index to be applied to
overheads. The validity of this application Is based on
the large proportion ( over 95o of revenue account
overheads for a typical DLO ) of overheads related to
property costs
Appropriate sources for such data are the 'Hillier
Parker'	 - 'All Commercial Rent Index' and 'Industrial
Rent Index'	 (August 1991).
A weighted, composite rental index, adapted to a base
period of 1984-85, is shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Composite rent index (Overheads)
(1984-85=100)
	
19 81-8 2
	
90.8
	
1982-83
	
94.0
	198 3-84
	
94.6
	
198 4-8 5
	
100
	
198 5-8 6
	
105.4
	
198 6-87
	
112.5
	
19 87-88
	
139.1
	
198 8-89
	
182.1
(1984-85 = 100)
95.2
94.2
96.5
100
103.3
106.2
110.5
121.7
19 81-82
198 2-83
198 3-84
198 4-8 5
198 5-8 6
198 6-87
19 87-88
198 8-89
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5.3.4 Output
The source of data on appropriate output prices is
'Housing and Construction Statistics' (1980-90) (HMSO).
'Table A' Construction Cost and Price Indices provides
an index of output prices for public sector construction
work. In a competitive market It can be assumed that the
index applies to work undertaken by DLOs as well as by
private contractors.
Table 5.7 shows the index based on 1984-85.
Table 5.7 Output price index
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5.4 Calculation of growth rates
The derived cost and price Indices can be used to
deflate the input and output value data.
The input and output cost / price indices, when applied
to the expenditure and income values, allow the
calculation of input and output volume coefficients for
use	 in	 the	 computation	 of	 growth	 rates.	 These
calculations are shown on a category by category basis.
The data to be used as the input and output values in
the calculations on expenditure categories and income
are taken from the figures in the Data Appendix: Section
1. The breakdown is on the basis of the three inputs of
labour, materials and capital, except for Category D4
work, where the use of the combined direct labour /
materials cost index means that it is more appropriate
to deal with indirect labour on its own.
The calculation of the input and output volumes is shown
in detail for Categories Dl and D2 but only in suninary
for the other two categories, except where the direct
labour / materials index is used for maintenance work
(Category D4).
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The formula used for measuring the rate of growth in TFP
compounded continuously over the time period CT-i) to
CT) is:
TFP Growth Rate
=	 in OUt P Ut T - in OUtPUtT_i
- Z+( S IT + S i , T_1) (in X j , T	 in Xj,T_i)
where X is an input and S is the cost share of the I th.
input.
The cost shares are calculated from the breakdown in the
Data Appendix: Section 1.
The calculation of input and output volumes and their
use,	 together with	 the	 cost	 share values,	 in the
determination of TFP growth rate, are shown in the Data
Appendix: Section 2.
A surmary of the growth rates is shown in Table 5.8.
P3
	
P4
	
9.8
	
7.4
	
11.9
	
0.3
	
4.3
	
1.1
	
-13 • 4
	
3.2
	
12.2
	
1.6
	
-10.0
	
4.5
	
-7.1	
-0.4
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Table 5.8
1981/2 to 82/3
1982/3 to 83/4
1983/4 to 84/5
1984/5 to 85/6
1985/6 to 86/7
1986/7 to 87/8
1987/8 to 88/9
Growth rate (9o)
Dl	 P2
8.0	 3.7
0.6	 0.5
2.5	 9.4
0.8	 12.6
1.1	 -10.4
2.3	 8.5
0.1	 -1.7
5.5 Comments on TFP results
The inconsistent TFP growth rate for new construction
work ( both P2 and P3 ) is not really unexpected in view
of the fluctuating level of work in this area. This has
been a vdifficultt area of work for DLOs as shown by the
fact that 90 DLOs undertook work in this category in
1981-82 but less than 50 did so in 1988-89.
	 Apart from
the high value for the first year of the series ( which
was the first year of the 'financial independence' of
DLOs and one in which the compilation of some DLOs'
accounts may have lacked some accuracy ) the figures for
maintenance work ( D4 ),
	 (apart from 1987/8-88/9),
reflect a healthy situation and offer a basic impression
of efficient resource usage.
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In highways work C Dl ) the figures are even more
consistent after the first year. This is not too
surprising, in view of the relatively stable workload
presented by the authorities and a degree of competition
considerably lower than that 	 in existence in other
categories of work.
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CHAPTER 6
ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
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6.1 Efficiency assessment in the local authority sector
With the great emphasis placed on public sector
efficiency by the Conservative government of the 1980s,
Mrs. Thatcher, on the advice of her first tefficiency
adviser t
	Lord	 Raynor,	 instituted	 a	 prograrmie	 of
management reforms.
The 'Financial Management Initiative' resulting from the
programme of management reforms for central government,
had repercussions in the establishment of economy and
efficiency measures at the local authority level too.
Prior to 1981, in many building and highways
departments, there was no separation of the functions of
client and contractor, and the same people were expected
to perform both buyer and seller roles.
In housing maiiltenance, there had already been, in many
authorities	 such	 as	 Manchester	 City	 Council,	 a
separation of 'contractor' people with Housing
Departments acting as landlord and contracting work out.
This was especially the case in the metropolitan areas,
where there had developed large DLOs, which engaged in
new building during the 1960s and had turned themselves
into mainly maintenance organisations by the end of the
1970.
The new arrangements though, divided the roles within
the organisation into client and contractor function,
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which was considerably different from the traditional
way of thinking.
Since the contractors are operating in competition, the
control over their expenditure Is carried out through
the bidding mechanism and the payment for work due at
the previously agreed price.	 Corporate policy ( e.g. on
redundancy ) is not relevant to the contractors. If
they fail in competition, jobs cannot be preserved. Nor
need the contractor be involved in corporate decisions
about budgets.
A few years after the introduction of compulsory
competition tendering for local authority building work,
it was found that over 7O of authorities had made some
reorganisation. C ADLO. 1989 ).	 This mainly consisted
of	 separating the clients	 from the contractors 	 at
management level.
The best way to achieve a good service is not
necessarily to separate buyer and seller, but to be
clear about the different functions.
6.1.1 The 'buyer'
One	 of	 the	 difficulties	 which	 managers	 in	 local
authorities	 have	 faced,	 is	 in	 deciding	 who	 Is
responsible for pay and conditions.	 The traditional
model was that nationally agreed rates and conditions
would be applied throughout 	 local government, with
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personnel and finance departments monitoring gradings
and pay. When part of the organisatlon Is set up to
compete with outside firms, its managers feel that they
need more discretion. This implied that those people at
the 'centre' of the organisation have correspondingly
less power over these matters.
Another difference is that those elements of the
'centre', which are traditionally concerned with control
(such as the accounting and finance functions), are now
more concerned with developing support systems, such as
management accounts and management information systems,
which are useful for managers as well as for financial
accountability.	 Some central personnel have found It
difficult to make these changes; switching from being a
relatively	 powerful	 controller	 to being	 a	 support
service is not easy. 	 A struggle for control emerges as
the	 managers	 of	 the	 new,	 relatively	 autonomous
contracting	 organisations	 try	 to	 manage	 all	 the
important aspects of their 'business'.
6.1.2	 The 'seller'
In the early 1980s, local authorities' response to the
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering	 In
highways	 and	 building work	 ranged	 from panic	 to
complacency according to the first of ADLO's members'
surveys. (ADLO. 1985). 	 Panic was inappropriate In th€
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circumstances, given that the phasing was relatively
gradual and that, in general, authorities had already
been using private contractors extensively In these
areas of work. This gave the in-house teams time to
prepare and also allowed them to bid for work, which had
previously been carried out by contractors. By 1983,
the numbers of people employed in public sector highway
construction and maintenance had actually increased.
In the longer term, there were significant changes in
management; costs were examined and reduced, structures
altered, working practices	 streamlined,	 new systems
installed, payment schemes reformed. In many cases,
local authorities displayed classic elements of private
sector corporate turnaround strategies experienced by
companies, which were bankrupt or close to It, and which
were bought by new owners. (ADLO. 1986).
6.1.3 Change of management
Many authorities	 felt that	 the old style of local
government	 manager	 was	 inappropriate	 to	 the	 new
competitive circumstances. In any case, in many
authorities there was no position of manager in the
contracting part of the organisatlon. Such a role had
not previously existed.
Finding completely new management was not easy.	 The
jobs were not especially attractive to private sector
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managers, unless they were in areas where employment
opportunities were scarce. For example, in the early
1980s, jobs for clvii engineers were scarce as road
building declined in the UK and opportunities In the
Middle East were reduced. Many engineers were attracted
to jobs running DLOs. In the mid- 1980s, as civil
engineering and building work picked up it became more
difficult to attract new people and the new jobs simply
created	 a	 circular movement
	 of managers	 fom one
authority to another.
6.2 Performance measurement for management
6.2.1 Organisational objectives
Whilst DLO managers were forced to recognise the
required change in focus from service delivery to
business management, non-economic factors were still
important to those who supervise DLOs.
	
An Audit
Corrrnission survey (1988) found t management for quality'
to be the most important objective. Typical of many
DLOs was Kirklees MDC whose Building Services Division's
objectives were:
'To provide and market an efficient, value for money,
high quality building and constuction service.'
( Kirklees MDC. 1989 )
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Of concern, is how these long range objectives are
translated into more specific and unambiguous goals at
the level of individual projects.
For the management and professional staff who are part
of the DLO unit, overall assessment of performance must
be based on their unit's ability to compete. The actual
existence of the DLO depends on its ability to do the
job more cheaply than private competitors. The ultimate
test of a private firm's performance is the bottom line
of profit.
Performance measures in public sector organisations,
such as DLOs, are substitutes for profitability measures
in the private sector. This measurement, however is
much more difficult and calls for a complex mosaic of
indicators.
It would, though, be a mistake to make too much out of
the difference between the public and private sectors.
Information about profit performance comes a long time
after the events that generate the profits have taken
place. Profit is only known once the accounts have been
finalised.	 In the meantime, private sector managers
require	 a	 series	 of	 indicators,	 against which	 the
performance of current activities can be judged. 	 There
is, therefore, not as much difference between public and
private	 sector	 performance management	 as	 is	 often
supposed.
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Performance measurement can be distinguished from
monitoring and assessment. The former involves attempts
to appraise service delivery in a quantitative fashion,
usually by developing what are known as output or
performance indicators.	 The recurring measurement of
performance Is performance monitoring. Performance
monitoring systems are orientated to administrative
objectives and can be distinguished from longer-term
approaches by the fact that they must be simple,
understandable,	 cost-effective	 and	 within	 the
administrative	 and	 financial	 capacity	 of	 an
organi sat ion.
The term performance assessment is used here to denote a
broader managerial function encompassing quantitative
and qualitative approaches, and recurring and one-off
attempts to assess performance of agencies or individual
profess ion a 1 s .
6.2.2 Performance indicators
A distinction can be drawn between performance measures
and performance indicators, but whilst it is possible to
make this difference conceptually, in practice the two
concepts tend to merge. Where performance can be
measured precisely, reference is made to a performance
measure; like reading data from a drawing. If, however,
as	 is	 frequently	 the	 case,	 there	 is	 no	 precise
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interpretation of the data then It is referred to as a
performance indicator; an alarm bell.
A performance indicator is provocative and suggestive.
It alerts management to the need to consider the issue
further. Thus, for example, the target times for jobs
completed for one work team might be three times those
in another. That piece of data is not a measure that
one team is three times more efficient than the other.
Instead, it is an indicator that further investigation
is required to find out why this is so.
6.2.3 Quality and performance
Quality of service is an important element of any
performance review. Value for money is not synonymous
with economy or effectiveness. Costs can be cut by
sacrificing thequality of service.
Whilst the consumer's perception of quality differences
is highly subjective, the manager of public services has
some idea of the factors that give rise to these
differences. Quality differences stem from:
(a) A different degree of technical sophistication or
technology used in producing the service.
(b) Differences in the quality of materials,
workmanship or maintenance used.
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(c) The varying quality of the management of services.
For example, when comparing the quality of public sector
housing provided by different local authorities, or by
the same authority over time, indicators can be used
such as the speed at which housing repairs are completed
or how often the lift in a high-rise flat is out of
order.
6.2.4 Performance assessment and service delivery
Progress has been made in performance measurement for
manual services at the local authority level. But more
problematic is the measurement of the quality of service
delivery for the non-manual professional services of
local government.
The main argument here is that although performance
measurement may be difficult for some public services,
systematic performance assessment is an important
managerial function and can substitute for measurement.
In other words, what is important is not the measurement
of performance per Se, but its enhancement, and where
measurement is too difficult or not cost-effective, the
task must be recast in terms of managerial review which
Is both contextual and constructive.
In general, performance measurement requires that two
related questions receive positive answers.
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The first question asks whether agreed objectives of the
service can be set out clearly and simply. This is
necessary to understand what a service should be doing,
and to generate criteria for evaluating performance.
The second question asks whether it is possible to
measure reliably the extent to which these objectives
are being fulfilled. To answer 'yes' to the second
question requires a prior affirmative answer to the
first.
6.3 Value-for-money management
6.3.1	 Interpretation
A management handbook for DLOs, published in 1989, was
concerned with advising management on ways of improving
the value-for-money service they deliver. ( Audit
Commission. 1989 ).
The three 'E's' - economy, efficiency and effectiveness
- are widely viewed as the principal components of the
value-for-money approach to management. However, there
is some confusion as regards the interpretation and use
of these concepts in the public sector; particularly the
interpretation of 'effectiveness'.
Effectiveness is defined by Butt and Palmer (1985) as
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'ensuring that the output of any given activity C or the
Impact that services have on the community ) is
achieving the desired results.'
To evaluate effectiveness we need to establish that
approved/desired goals are being achieved. Yet the
achievement of goals Is potentially an overly narrow
interpretation of effectiveness. 	 Those organisations
which choose instrumental or low-level goals may be able
to	 demonstrate	 'effectiveness'	 against	 such	 goals
without any significant impact on the community.
The kind of performance indicators that each of the
three 'E's require, include:
Economy:
The	 tendering,	 contract	 and	 project	 control
procedures to establish how far consttuctiott wotk had
been built to specification,	 on time and at	 lowest
achievable cost or within approved cost limits.
Efficiency:
Utilisation of workforce and equipment; direct and
administrative staff allocations and mix; Integration
of services; management and resource allocation
systems etc.
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Effectiveness:
Results In terms	 of, for example,	 reductions in job
waiting lists, increases in jobs performed.
6.3.2 Value-for-money auditig
The Audit Con-mission has done much to promote the
concept of value-for-money auditing and to develop
performance indicators for local government services.
( Audit Con-mIssion. 1988 ).
The Corrinission publishes occasional profiles of local
authority activities across a wide range of dimensions,
Including comparative costing profiles in which the cost
of providing a specific activity is measured and
compared for all authorities in England and Wales.
One such profile presented for the housing maintenance
department is the cost of painting a standard door.
This	 is	 an	 example	 of	 an	 t economy t	performance
indicator.	 Nothing is said about what the cost should
be. Local authority management is provided with
information that shows there is a variance In the cost
between local authorities.
An individual local authority can identify its
maintenance costs on the profile and ask itself foi
e x amp 1 e:
Are there acceptable reasons why our costs are above o
below those of others ?
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Note that being below the average can be of as much
concern as being above, since it could Indicate that,
rather than being superior in terms of 'economy t , an
inferior quality of output is being produced.
6.4	 Improving productivity and effectiveness
In the 1980s, many DLOs began to see the need to prepare
a business plan to set out ways in which they intend to
improve performance. The nature of the plan depends
upon the authority's individual objectives but needs to
reflect a continuing quest for improved efficiency and
effectiveness.	 The 'management handbook' proposes a
list of basic questions - drawn from a survey of DLO5'
annual	 reports	 and	 relating	 to the bases of IJLC
management	 operations	 -	 to	 be	 addressed	 in	 the
determination of the plan. These are:
(a)	 What is the DLO good at?
The DLO's productivity can be compared with benchmarks
If the DLO is not efficient then potential Improvement
need to be identified.
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(b)	 What does the customer think?
Too few DLO5 have established systems which regularly
provide them with the customers' views. 	 Sample surveys
of tenants and tenant report cards will provide valuable
market information.
Cc)	 What are the threats and opportunities?
The first two stages give managers a view of the DLO's
strengths and weaknesses. The next step is to look at
the threats and weaknesses e.g. the likely introduction
of new capital controls.
(d)	 Where can the DLO do better?
Many DLOs can improve their effectiveness and efficiency
and very often the incentive scheme Is the starting
point. This not only improves productivity but can also
improve efficiency by freeing supervisors etc.
Ce)	 What are the views of the workforce?
Consultation is not a sign of weakness but an essential
element of maintaining the morale of the workforce.
101
(f)	 Do the managers have the right information?
Few businesses with a turnover of more than £ lm would
survive with the poor information that is available to
many DLOs. The use of standard costing would let
managers know how each work unit was performing.
Such questions as these enable managers to identify a
number of items or projects, and to set out an
improvement prograrrnne with each prograrmie having an
idetified	 aim	 to	 improve	 cost,	 productivity	 and
efficiency.
The successful management of any organisation depends
upon	 the	 managers t	ability	 to meet	 predetermined
objectives,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 DLOs	 may	 vary
considerably from authority to authority. 	 Indeed, the
performance of any DLO must be seen within the context
of	 the parent authority's own objectives. 	 Whilst
legislation and regulation have introduced another
dimension and DLOs have had to recognise the importance
of financial performance, there has still been a clear
desire by the leaders of many authorities to pursue
wider objectives.
For example, a wish to maximise full-time employment and
therefore aim for as high a turnover as possible.
Others have aimed for a mixed economy with the DLO
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restraining private sector prices. Yet others have DLOs
which may only undertake emergency work that the private
sector cannot provide.
Fig 6.1 shows the results of the 1988 survey of DLO
managers	 on	 non-economic	 factors	 important	 as
objectives.
Managers were asked to give a score for each of eight
factors as a measure of the relative importance of the
factor.
The authority's choice must be made clear to DLO
managers before the business plan is set.
The nature of the objectives may be much more complex
than for a private sector organisation but the new
environment, in which DLOs have been placed, has at
least forced them to examine their reasons for existence
in a rational manner and structure their management
strategies accordingly. In the creation of a management
for quality ethos, the reforms have helped to create
organisations	 better	 equipped	 to	 survive	 In	 a
competitive	 environment	 with	 their	 private	 sector
counterparts.
Community needs
Max. employment
Improving pay rates
Extend DLO workforce
Equal opportunities
Influence market
Employee involvement
Quality management
103
Fig. 6.1 Non-economic management objectives of DLO
managers ( ADLO. 1988 )
Low
	
	 High
Relative importance
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CHAPTER 7
FRONTIER METHODS AND
ORGANISATIONAL EFFICIENCY
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7.1 Approaches to efficiency measurement
In the late 1980s, the U.K. Government's commitment to
the improvement of efficiency of the public sector led
to the development of various forms of performance
indicators (PIs) by government agencies.
Their	 application	 in	 the	 broad	 fields	 of	 health,
education,	 police services etc. produced a common
criticism that they shed little light on the question of
efficiency.	 (See Jackson and Palmer. 1990).
Dissatisfaction with	 performance	 indicators	 led	 to
attempts by researchers to try to improve on them, using
statistical and other quantitative techniques. One
result has been the development of new methods for
measuring efficiency, many of which, have in common the
concept of the frontier: efficient organisations are
those operating on the cost or production frontier,
whilst inefficient organisatlons operate either below
the frontier (in the case of the production frontier) or
above the frontier (in the case of the cost frontier).
Though empirical applications of such frontier
techniques has tended to be mainly in the private
sector, several of the methods have been used to analyse
the efficiency of public sector bodies.
106
7.1.1 The modelling and measurement of inefficiency
According to many studies on Industrial inefficiency In
the 1980s,	 technical	 ineficiency appeared to be an
Important source of under-performance.(Caves 1988).
Daly (1985) suggests that the major discrepancy between
efficient and inefficient producers is not a lack of
capital, in the form of plant and machinery, but an
inability to exploit that capital due to poor skills of
both operatives and management. Technical inefficiency
therefore embodies all the managerial and organisational
sources of inefficiency, what Leibenstein (1966) refers
to as X-inefficiency.
The approach used in this research is based on the
notion that productivity may vary among organisations,
due to their ability to produce different levels of
output from the same levels of Input.
This means that there may be inefficiency of some
description in the production process.
Traditional economic analysis relies heavily on the
production function to describe a hypothetical
relationship between inputs and output. The measurement
of efficiency tends to be output orientated, based on
product per unit of labour or some other input.
However, as an alternative to this type of output-
orientated	 efficiency	 measure,	 an	 Input-orientated
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approach first suggested by Farrell C 1957 ) may be
adopted. This is based on the notion that , if a
production unit Is technically efficient, it must be
using the minimum amounts of Inputs required to produce
any given level of output.
7.1.2 Cost Frontiers
The main concern in this study of DLOs,	 Is with
inefficiency that raises costs above their feasible
minimum.	 In theory, costs can exceed their minimum
feasible level for one of two reasons. The first Is
that the inputs are being used in the wrong proportions
given their prices and productivity at the margin - this
is allocative or price inefficiency. The second is that
too little output is being produced from a given bundle
of inputs - technical inefficiency.
Whilst it may be possible to distinguish the absolute
frontier, indicating what could be achieved if the
available technology were used to full advantage, in
practice, this study concentrates on the best-practice
frontier,	 which	 reflects	 the	 achievements	 of	 the
organisatlons in the sample.
Different methods though, interpret the term frontier
differently.	 Some methods aim to uncover the absolute
frontier,	 indicating what could be achieved if the
available	 technology	 were	 used	 to	 full	 advantage.
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Others aim to uncover what Farrell ( 1957 ) termed the
best-practice frontier. This reflects the achievements
of the organisations in the sample. Exercises aiming to
reveal the absolute frontier may well fail to find an
authority in the sample operating at 100g6 efficiency.
This is not true of methods aiming to uncover the best-
practice frontier.
A more important distinction concerns whether the method
used is parametric or non-parametric.
7.2 Non-parametric approaches to efficiency measurement
The non-parametric approach, referred to in management
science literature as data envelopment analysis ( flEA ),
has its origins in Farrell's article.
The approach can be illustrated with the aid of a
diagram ( Fig. 7.1 ).
Here there are seven organisations C A to G ), all
producing a single output C y ) with two inputs ( x 1 and
x 2
 ).	 It	 is assumed that all seven organisations
produce one unit of output. In the absence of
information on the exact location of the unit isoquant,
there are no grounds for supposing B,C or D to be
technically inefficient. 	 Organisatlon B uses more x1
than	 organisation	 C	 but	 less	 x2.	 Similarly,
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organisation D uses more x 2 than organisation C but less
x 1 . There are grounds, however, for believing authority
E to be technically Inefficient. It uses more of both
inputs than organisation C and yet produces no more
output.
Fig. 7.1 A hypothetical best-practice frontier
x2
3
0	 I	 3	 1-	 5
xl
Measuring the technical efficiency of an organisatlon
requires an estimate of the location of the efficient
unit isoquant. Farrell proceeded by assuming that the
latter is never upward-sloping and Is always convex to
the origin.	 Convexity means that if two input bundles
can each produce one unit of output, then so can any
weighted average of them. 	 In terms of the diagram it
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means that an organisatlon could, for example, operate
at C or D or anywhere along the line segment CD. These
two assumptions allow efficient input bundles to be
separated from inefficient bundles. Efficient bundles
are found by picking adjacent pairs of bundles and
joining them with a line segment. If the line segment
has a non-positive slope and none of the other bundles
on the isoquant map lie between it and the origin, the
chosen bundles are declared efficient. 	 Otherwise they
are not.	 Bundles B and C, for instance, would be
declared efficient.	 The line BC has a negative slope
and there are no bundles between it and the origin.
The line segments linking all the efficient input
bundles trace out the efficient isoquant. This isoquant
envelops all the inefficient organisations ( such as A )
- hence the term flEA.	 Points at the kinks ( such as B
and C ) represent real organisations. Points between
the kinks represent hypothetical organisations formed by
taking weighted averages of of the input bundles of the
real organisations.	 The technical efficiency of an
organisation 'dominated' by two organisations is then
measured by comparing its input usage with that of a
hypothetical organisation which uses the Inputs in the
same proportions.
In A's case the relevant hypothetical organisatlon Is
organisation A
	
- a weighted average of Its 'peers' B
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and C - and its technical efficiency is measured as
OA/OA. The technical efficiency of organisations,
dominated by only one organisation, is measured with
reference to the organisation at the beginning of the
flat portion of the isoquant.
An organisation's technical efficiency is computed using
linear programming techniques.
The linear programing approach allows the construction
of a frontier production function without the imposition
of artificial restrictions concerning functional form.
Importantly, the method also allows the calculation of
the technical efficiency (TE) of each observation in the
S amp I e.
7.2.1 Reasons for not using non-frontier approaches
A number of authors have attempted to improve on P1-type
measures of efficiency using standard regressioin
techniques.
An early attempt was made by Feldstein (1967)	 to
estimate	 technical	 inefficiency	 in N.H.S.	 hospitals
based on a Cobb-Douglas type production function.
With a production function of
my =
	
+1.	 lnx	 + Ui
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Where y = output	 = inputs
= coefficient of output elasticity
u	 = error terms
Application of, say ordinarly least squares to (7.2)
gives estimates of the from which the residuals
can be computed.
Feldstein suggested that the latter may be used as
estimates of technical inefficiency. Similar approaches
have also been used to analyse the technical efficiency
of local education authorities (Department of Education
and Science 1983) and police authorities (Levitt and
Joyce 1987).
The non-frontier approach suffers though from two major
shortcomings.
It does not tend to provide information on the level of
efficiency.
Obviously, it is important to know whether inefficient
organisations are very inefficient or only marginally
so. Second, it implicitly assumes that all cross-sample
variation in the error term of the estimating equation
is due	 to variation	 In efficiency:	 in reality,	 the
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residuals are also likely to reflect random influences
outside the organisation's control, as well as
statistical 'noise'.
7.2.2 Measurement of technical efficiency
Following a methodology proposed by Barrow and Wagstaff
( 1989 ), a non-parametric approach can be used in which
the technical efficiency of any authority 0 is obtained
by solving a linear prograrrrning problem of the form
TE 0
 = nun 8
	
(1)
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subject to
	
p	 < Ox 1 	 i =	 1....n	 (2)
J
.IjYrs	 > y r 0	 r =	 1....m	 (3)
x 1
 = amount of the Ith input used by the jth
organ i sat ion
rj = amount of the rth output produced by the jth
organisat ion
= amount of the rth output produced by org. 0
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= weights
0 measures the technical efficiency of organisation 0
This formulation implicitly imposes constant returns to
scale.	 Reducing the	 to sum to unity allows for non-
constant returns	 to scale.	 ( See Byrnes, Fare and
Grosskopf. 1984 ).
The right-hand side of (2) gives the potential input
usage of the organisation whose efficiency is being
measured, which, if the organisation is inefficient,
will be a fraction of its actual input usage.
The	 left-hand	 sides	 of	 (2)	 and	 (3)	 represent	 the
hypothetical	 organisation formed by taking weighted
averages of the real organisations. 	 The fact that the
j are the same in all of the constraints, means that
each of the inputs and outputs of the hypothetical
organisation is the same weighted average of those of
the real authorities. The first set of constraints
indicates that the weights will generally be chosen so
that the hypothetical organisation uses the inputs In
the same proportion as the organisation whose efficiency
Is being measured. The inequality Is to allow for the
possibility that the organisation, whose efficiency is
being measured, is on a flat segment of the isoquant,
such as point G in Fig.7.1.
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The second set of constraints indicates that the weights
must be such that the hypothetical organisation produces
at least as much of the output as the organisat ion whose
efficiency is being measured.
7.3	 pplication of flEA to DLO data
The basic categorisatlon of output into the four areas
of work means that a single output method of application
of DEA can be employed.
Consider the organisations in Fig. 7.1. It may be
verified that, in the case of organisation A, equations
(2) and (3) hold with equality, with
+ 4IB
	
= 38
	
(2a)
21	 +
	
LIB
	
= 28
'I C	 +
	
=	 1
	
(3a)
These equations solve to give:
Pc = 5/7	 = 2/7	 and 8=
The	 latter	 can	 be	 interpreted	 to mean	 that	 A's
coefficient of Technical Efficiency is 6/7 (= 0.8571).
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The	 1	 are	 the weights	 used	 to construct	 the
hypothetical organisations on the isoquant diagram.
Their values in this example indicate that the
hypothetical organisation A* is formed by taking 5/7 of
C's input bundle and 2/7 of B'S.
7.3.1 Definition of output and inputs
The measure of output used is that of net output ( i.e.
gross output net of direct and indirect materials and
services ).
[ Net output = Total income less supplies and services
(materials and stores)
less	 expenditure	 on
subcontractors
less variations in work in
progress
less	 loss	 provisions and
other exceptional items)
This means that inputs can be classified in terms of the
two basic factors - labour and capital.
The labour	 input	 includes both direct and indirect
labour.
[ Salaries and wages ^ Support costs I
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The capital input incorporates transport and plant usage
C rental and depreciation costs ), oncosts and
administration overheads.
[ Transport and plant + Depots ^ Support costs I
As output is measured in value terms, the inputs are
expressed per £000 of output produced.
7.3.2 DLO data employed
From the DLO database, those organisations who undertook
a particular category of work during two specific years
were Identified.
One objective of the exercise being to compare the
relative performances of individual authorities over a
period, a year near the beginning of the period ( 1982-
83, in preference to 1981-82 when authorities were less
certain of the new accounting system ) and one near the
end of the eighties C 1987-88, in preference to 1988-89
when less data were available ) were chosen.
The number of organisatlons for which the requisite data
were available for both years were as follows:
Category	 Dl	 47 organlsations
D2	 26
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D3	 28
D4	 55
Data Appendix: Section 3 shows the value of the labour
and capital inputs per £ unit of output produced for the
four categories of output for the two years and these
input data are illustrated by appropriate diagrams.
The	 effective
	 best-practice	 frontier	 isoquants	 are
derived	 from	 the	 input	 diagrams	 and	 are	 also
illustrated.
From these tfrontierst the Technical Efficiency ( TE )
of each individual organisation can be measured.
7.4 Results from TE measurement
The results of the measurement using the reiterative
linear prograrrining technique of the program DEA (
University of Bristol.1990 ) are contained in the Data
Appendix: Section 3.
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CHAPTER 8
A COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES
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8.1 Efficiency indicators for DLOs
Prior to 1981 no local government trading service had
ever been required by central government to achieve a
specific financial target, so why did the government set
such a target for DLOs ?
The purpose was to ensure that DLOs account for the use,
and identify the true economic cost, of resources that
might otherwise be made available to the private sector.
This was to be achieved by creating a financial regime
for DLOs equivalent to that faced by their private
sector competitors, so that the prices they quoted could
be compared directly.
During the first year of operating the new requirements,
only one in ten authorities failed to meet the 5%
requirement, a fact which led to criticism of the
appropriateness of the measure. A target which is too
easily achieved being unlikely to stimulate a local
authority to achieve an improvement in the performance
of its DLO.
8.1.1 Low capital employment
A particular problem which affects DLO performance
measurement is that the building industry is highly
labour intensive with low capital employment.
Percentage rates of return are, therefore, unstable with
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very high rates of return on capital being corrnion.
Also, to replicate the functions of the capital markets,
different targets would be appropriate to reflect
different levels of risk. Major construction work, for
example, is likely to be a higher risk, and should
therefore, have a higher target rate of return when
compared with routine maintenance work.
8.1.2	 Performance indicators
The annual DLO reports are Important not only in
providing an assessment of individual DLOs but also in
making public, information which was not previously
available about other features of DLO operations. In
consequence, other accounting ratios and performance
indicators may be measured using such data.
Other accounting ratios, such as return on turnover or
value added per employee, could be used as performance
indicators. For central government, the suitability of
such measures is limited by the fact that there Is no
readily available external standard against which DLO
performance could be measured, but for a comparative
assessment of a DLO T s performance they could supplement
the rate of return on capital measure.
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8.2 The performance measures employed
Having undertaken the measurement of Total Efficiency
(TE) for the different categories of DLO, comparisons
may be made with other measures of performance using the
DLO data.
For such comparisons, the performance measures chosen
are:
(a) The rate of surplus to turnover.
As early as 1983, CIPFA indicated that it deemed
this to be the most appropriate performance measure
for DLOs. (CIPFA.1983)
Profit to turnover rates	 for firms	 in the private
sector of the industry could be used by the
Secretary of State to formulate a yard stick rate
against which DLO performance might be measured.
(b) The rate of return on capital employed.
The 'official' performance measure.
Cc) Value added per employee (direct and Indirect).
Value added can be calculated from gross output
net of materials and services.
Cd) Coefficient of total efficiency.
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Data Appendix: Section 4 shows the performance measures
(by category) for individual DLOs for the years 1982-83
and 1987-88.
The number of DLOs, for which these data were available
are as follows
Category 1
	 47 DLOs
Category 2
	 24
Category 3
	 23
Category 4
	 51
The weighted arithmetic mean, maximum and minimum values
for performance measures (a), (b) and (c) annually for
the full period 1981-89 are also shown in Data Appendix:
Section 4.
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8.3 Observations on the performance measures
8.3.1 The rate of surplus on turnover:
The rates are significantly lower for the major capital
works category than for other areas of work, with a
greater degree of variation in this area, too.
With the nature of such capital works, this type of
variation might be expected.
8.3.2 The rate of return on capital:
The quite massive variation which occurs in the rates of
return is a main reason for the criticism levied by
CIPFA at the rate of return as a performance measure.
The undermeasurement of capital in the measure is the
obvious reason for the peculiarly large returns in the
minor capital works category.	 As the 5% figure is the
crucial minimum for a DLO, it Is worth considering how
well	 the	 sampled DLOs	 performed	 in meeting this
requirement.
Table 8.1 Indicates a particularly high failure rate in
the major capital works category.
Total
5
2
0
0
0
2
1
3
13
1
0
1
0
2
2
4
1
11
4
3
2
4
7
5
6
8
39
3
1
0
5
2
1
3
6
21
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Table 8.1 Number of DLOs (by category) failing to meet
the rate of return requirement
Dl
	
D2
	
D3
	
D4
19 8 1-2
1982-3
1983-4
1984-5
1985-6
1986-7
19 8 7-8
1988-9
Failure rate (9)
over total
	
3.5
	
20.3
	
5.9	 4.9
period.
C Source:	 Department of the Environment. 1990 )
8.3.3 Value added per employee:
The results illustrate a fairly steady growth (in money
terms) in all categories but at different rates. VA per
employee more than doubled in the minor capital works
category over the eight year period in significant
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contrast to the mere twenty per cent rise In the major
capital works category over the same period.
The changing nature of the work undertaken In the D3
category was probably a major factor here. The massive
decline in the local authority housebuilding programme
in the eighties, meant that housebuilding formed a much
smaller proportion of local authorities' major capital
programmes, with school, offices and other non-housing
projects now relatively more important. The value-added
for the latter type of scheme tends generally to be
lower than for housing work.
8.4 Ranking the DLOs by performance measure
To consider the overall picture, and to compare the
relative performance of the various DLOs using the
different measures. Data Appendix: Section 5 shows
rankings by performance measures for two chosen years,
1982-83 and 1987-88.
To consider the idea of being able to determine a
notionalised overall ranking of DLOs by 'performance',
an aggregated ranking by measures (a),(b) and Cc) Is
shown.
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CHAPTER 9
ATTRIBUTE TESTING
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9.1	 Attributes and efficiency
The ranking list of DLOs can	 be used to analyse the
differences	 between	 'good	 performance'	 and	 'poor
performance' authorities.
As the ranking of authorities by performance measure is
intended to indicate the relative efficiency of DLOs,
hypotheses may be put forward regarding the attributes
which exist in the 'good performance' authorities but
not in the others.
Statistical analysis of attributes may be performed to
indicate the significance of attributes, but as a first
stage in the analysis, appropriate attributes need to be
identified.
The question needs to be posed:
What are the features that can be found in DLOs, which
perform well, but are absent from those organisatlons at
the lower end of the rankings ?
Statistical methodology exists to gauge the significance
of specific attributes to ranked data and an initial
step in the use of such analysis is the choice of the
appropriate features or attributes for testing.
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In general, studies of the productivity of building
organisations have considered a wide variety of factors
but many are not relevant in this context.
Several attributes were considered for inclusion in the
analysis but were rejected. This was due mainly to their
unsuitability in the context of the specific DLO data.
For example, studies on productivity have often found a
relationship between productivity and unionisation of
the workforce. ( See Allen. 1984 and Cremeans. 1981 )
With comparisons of local authority DLOs, though, this
has not tended to be a factor, 	 due to the high
unionisation rate amongst all DLOs.
In early work on productivity in the U.S. construction
industry, Dacy (1965) put forward three major
explanatory variables of (labour) productivity levels:
a. A shift in the construction product mix. A change in
composition favourably affects productivity if the shift
is in the direction of less labour-intensive activities.
At the extremes for the major components of DLOs'
activities, the labour share in highways is 15 	 % and
about 40 90 in maintenance and repairs, but the DLO
data are, of course, already split into the four work
categories and it is comparisons within each category
that are being made here.
b. The size of the construction organisation. There was
an indication that economies of scale were In evidence
up to a firm size of $ 1.5m.
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c. The	 success of the construction organlsatlon in
resource management.
The latter two factors can be considered to be relevant
in this study.
The important difference between this study and the
general research into productivity in the industry, Is
the fact that it is a set of efficiency measures being
used in the inter —DLO comparison and not just a single
productivity measure.
9.2 General hypotheses on required characteristics
Following on from Dacy's and others' ideas, several
hypotheses may be put forward concerning the
characteristics required for an efficient organisation,
for which there may be theoretical or preconceived
just i i cation.
a. The fact that	 scale economies may exist In building
operations has received recognition both in the U.K.
( Hillebrandt.	 1989 ) and in the U.S.A., where Koch
et al.	 (1979)	 and Stokes	 (1981) found evidence of
scale	 economies	 in both highways	 and	 building
maintenance work.
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Generally, the larger the amount of work undertaken
by a DLO, the greater the scope for scale economies,
which result in cost saving and a higher level of
efficiency.
This has been acknowledged by IJLOs such as Ceredigion
recognising the threat from competitors and, being
concerned with the need to "undertake expansion aimed
at	 achieving	 lower unit	 costs	 for the benefit of
clients	 through economies of scale".	 C Ceredigion.
1989 )
The potential for economies of scale, in terms of
bulk	 purchase	 of materials, better utilisation of
capital equipment, dilution of overheads and labour
specialisation is apparent in many different areas of
DLO operation, and specific examples gleaned from the
1987-88 annual reports of various DLOs can be used to
illustrate the point.
- Manchester DLO,	 engaged in large-scale material
purchasing, found it worthwhile to create a
specialist buying department, which can ensure the
most favourable terms for acquiring supplies.
In terms	 of capital usage, Redbridge DLO,	 with its
large maintenance operations, purchased in 1987 a
large fleet of well-equipped, radio-controlled trade
vehicles to "meet the demand on their services with
e f f i c I en c y".
- S.Tyneside DLO was, according to its annual report,
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an organisation which achieved considerable unit cost
savings	 over	 the	 period, due	 to	 its	 ability	 to
maintain a large workload.	 Its own joinery service,
for all aspects of new construction, modernisation
and maintenance work, had been operational since 1981
and this was complemented, in 1987, by a UPVC window
fabrication	 unit,	 which	 also	 gained	 success	 in
tendering for the	 supply of windows	 to other
authorities.	 A computerised stock control 	 and
purchasing system was fully implemented by 1987 with
an on-line	 system to provide	 up-to-date	 cost
i n format ion.
- In	 terms of	 labour specialisation,	 a DLO with a
large workload is able to carry a workforce with a
variety	 of	 skills.	 Sheffield DLO for instance,
employed a workforce containing sixteen different
categories of
	 tradesman	 and had a	 "policy of
diversifying wherever
	 possible	 into	 specialist
areas of maintenance work to provide flexibility to
respond	 to	 its	 clients'	 requirements".	 As	 an
example, it introduced an 	 inspection service to the
authority's	 highrise	 and multi-storey buildings to
identify spalling concrete. The inspections being
undertaken using abseiling techniques to traverse the
face of the buildings. The cost of the operation was
50% cheaper	 than that charged by specialist sub-
contractors.
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b. The more efficient organisations win a larger
proportion of the work for which they are forced to
c omp e t e.
The justification for the 1980, and subsequent,
legislation requiring DLOs to compete for work was
that only the more efficient DLOs would be able to
compete	 successfully with private contractors for
local authority work.
c. Efficient DLOs have	 reorganised	 since	 ( or even
before)	 1981	 by	 developing a contracts division
divorced from the service division.
The separation producing a situation in which a DLO
can be clear about the different functions.
In the authorities where no split occurred, the lack
of a distinct position of manager in the contracting
part of the organisation was less appropriate to the
new circumstances.	 (See Chapter 6 )
d. Those DLOs which operate in all areas of work benefit
from cross-fertilisation of experience and expertise.
There is a greater likelihood that specialised skills
as well as plant and equipment exist in those DLOs
undertaking a wider spread of activity.
Additionally,	 fuller utilisation of such
	 skills and
equipment makes for cost savings.
Again some specific examples from the 1987-88 annual
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reports can be used	 to provide	 evidence that
economies of scope do exist in DLO operations.
- Sheffield DLO started to
	 operate a	 separate
engineering	 services division	 to provide	 services
to other divisions.
It won	 contracts	 in	 its	 own	 right	 in	 direct
competition	 with	 the	 private sector, and 	 also
provided	 'sub-contract'	 services to other divisions
e.g.	 the	 lifts	 section was	 able	 to provide	 a
design,	 advisory and supervisory	 role on
	 new
installation work.
- Mid-Glamorgan IJLO,	 like the majority of county
authorities' organisations, specialised in civil
engineering work but the 'Trans-Plant' section of the
civil engineering unit provided services and repaired
all	 types	 of plant	 and vehicles	 for use by other
units of the DLO.
- A DLO carrying out Category 4 work only, is
unlikely to be able to carry a wide enough variety of
tradesmen to prevent it having to rely heavily upon
specialist	 private	 contractors,	 whereas	 an
organisation	 undertaking capital work as well, will
have a wide variety of specialist tradesmen.
Boothferry DLO, with a maintenance unit only, and
having four types of craftsmen, contrasted with the
situation	 in nearby	 Sheffield, with its
	 ability to
cater for sixteen different types of craft.
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e. Bonus schemes based on productivity have a positive
effect on the level of 	 efficiency in a DLO.	 Whilst
some DLOs	 operated some	 form of bonus scheme
throughout	 this period,	 others did not.	 For those
that did,	 a variety of forms of schemes were in
operation,	 but	 they can be split into those which
were based on an assessment of operative performance
( e.g. work study, schedule of
	 rates etc ) and those
which were not.
The Audit Corrfniss ion (1988) study on DLO management
took the view that the schemes based on performance
were more conducive to higher productivity.
9.3 Testable attributes.
The	 chosen attributes for testing in this work were
ones for which:
- Suitable data could be obtained.
- There was theoretical, or preconceived,
	
justification
for supposing it to be a
	 characteristic required	 for
for an
	 efficient organisation.
A small set of independent attributes was chosen, in
order to simplify the problem of interpretation.
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Five	 such	 characteristics	 were	 considered	 for	 the
analysis.
Relating back to section 9.2, the chosen attributes were
based on:
a. The size ( by value ) of the DLO's output.
b. The proportion of the work won by the DLO in
competition with private contractors.
c. The	 management	 structure	 of	 the	 DLO in the
competitive climate.
d. The degree of cross-fertilisation and number of areas
of work in which the DLO operated.
e. The types of bonus schemes operated in the DLO.
137
9.4 Attributes defined
For the type of attribute analysis used in this study,
it is necessary to designate an attribute as being
either present or absent.
The following designations are used:
a. Designation 1	 Output> Prescribed level
0	 Output < Prescribed level
C For category Dl the prescribed level is £5.0 million
D2	 £3.0 million
D3	 £0.5 million
D4	 £1.5 million )
b. Designation 1
	
Proportion of work won > 50
	
0
	
Proportion of work won < 50a
c. Designation 1
	
Separate contracts division
	
0
	
No separate contracts division.
d. Designation 1	 > 3 categories of work undertaken
	
0
	
< 3 categories of work undertaken.
e. Designation 1	 Bonus scheme based on productivity
employed.
	
0	 No such scheme employed.
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Data Appendix: Section 6 shows the attribute
designations of DLOs C by work category ) for 1982-83
and 1987-88.
9.5 Explanation of choice of thresholds in designations
a. The size distribution of DLOs by value of output
( when categorised )
	
appears	 to follow the general
spread of	 firms in the U.K. construction industry as
a whole. This pattern is characterised by a clear
distinction between those operations at the lower end
of the output scale and those at the upper end, with
a relative void in the middle ground.
The reason for this characteristic is fairly apparent
in the case of highways work. The majority of
district authorities concern themselves with smaller
roadworks, whilst the counties and those larger
district authorities carrying out agency work for the
counties undertake major roadworks.
In the other categories of work, there also appear to
be bimodular distributions of output values.
Figs. 9.1 (a - h)	 Illustrate	 the	 nature	 of	 these
distributions	 for	 1982-83	 and	 also	 indicate	 the
appropriateness of the threshold value chosen. 	 The
distributions	 for	 1987-88 follow a similar pattern.
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The counterbalance of price inflation to the general
decline in local authority work make appropriate the
same threshold values for this later year.
In the case of repair and maintenance, the majority
of smaller authorities deal only with 'ad hoc'
emergency repair work or minor routine maintenance
programmes.	 This	 stands	 in contrast with those
authorities who have, historically, had a large
number of council properties and need to continually
award large-scale repair contracts, often won by
their own direct labour department.
Alyn and Deeside DC is a good example of a smaller
authority with a DLO workforce just above the
reportable minimum of thirty employees in 1987-88 and
a workload of emergency repair work only. Manchester
DLO, on the other hand, employed almost three
thousand workers on the repair and maintenance of its
eighty thousand council properties.
b. The distributions of 'work won' percentages for 1982
-83 are shown in Figs. 9.2 (a - d) and illustrate
the appropriateness of the 5Oo threshold.
The general	 tendency is for DLOs to split into two
categories - those who are able C or content ) to
acquire around a quarter to a third of their
authority's work, and those who remain the dominant
force in undertaking such work in the face of private
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sector competition. This pattern of distribution Is
particularly apparent for categories Dl, D3 and D4
work. Abimodular type distribution also exists for
category D2 work but with a general lowering of the
values as fewer authorities are equipped to compete
for major capital work than is the case for other
work areas.
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Figs. 9.1 (a-h) Size distribution of DLOs by value
of work (by category) 1982-83
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Figs. 9.2 (a-d) 'Work won' by DLOs (by category)
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9.6 The analysis of attributes by a method of monotone
regression
Conjoint measurement Is a technique that can be used to
measure the joint effects of a set of independent
variables on the ordering of a dependent variable.	 The
procedures of conjoint analysis 	 require only rank-
ordered input yet yield interval-scaled output.
The practical usefulness of conjoint measurement
techniques is well established in such areas as consumer
research but such techniques may also be gainfully
employed in any area where attribute analysis needs to
be carried out.
A model of attribute analysis, which is appropriate
here, Is the simple additive one, in which the existence
of an attribute is considered to have a 'part value',
and where the 'total value' is the sum of the 'part
value 'of Its attributes. The input data for analysis
consists of rank orders of organisatlons, which differ
in known ways on several attributes.
In additive conjoint measurement, one asks if the cell
values	 can	 be	 monotonically	 transformed	 so	 that
additivity can be achieved. The method entails the
development of numerical estimates on a 'single factor
at a time basis' i.e. without explicit consideration of
interactions.
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For a model of this type, some regression-like procedure
is required to estimate the part values.
A principal advantage of using regression analysis is
that the coefficient estimates possess certain desirable
qualities, If it can be assumed that the error terms are
normally distributed.
However, the normality assumption requires that the
dependent variable be measured on at least an interval
scale.	 Unfortunately, the efficiency measure uses an
ordinal	 scale,	 violating	 the	 requirement	 for	 the
normal ity assumption.
Since the input data are scaled only at the rank order
level,	 standard	 regression	 techniques	 are	 often
inadequate.	 However,	 tnonmetrict	 or	 tmonotonet
regression can be used.
In conjoint measurement, a coefficient matrix of dumy
variables consisting of zeroes and ones can be used to
indicate presence or absence for an organisation of each
attribute.	 This matrix has a row for each organisation
and a column for each attribute level. A unit element
in the i,j th. position would indicate that organisation
I had the j th. attribute level.
A set of weights has to be found, one for each column,
so that the weighted row sums of the coefficient matrix
are monotonic with the rank order of the organisatlons
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described by that matrix. The weights can then be
interpreted as the part value to that organisation of
each attribute level.
The program NMREG, using a multi-dimensional scaling
technique, is an algorithm for this purpose ( see
Smith. 1988 ) and is used in this analysis.
9.7	 Nonmetric regression
NMREG performs nonmetric regression analysis using dummy
variables. The use of factorial designs is permitted.
A nonmetric regression algorithm performs an evaluation
of	 attribute	 pair	 preferences	 for	 multi-attribute
products.
DLO rankings are input to the analysis in the form of
attributes.
NMREG uses an iterative monotonic regression procedure
to maximise congruence between a weighted X vector of
dummy variables and a vector of rankings for the pairs
of independent variables.
Given an unknown vector W, which contains weights XW =
Z, the nonmetric regression problem may be described as
one of finding a vector of weights W, so that the
elements of Z have the same rank orders as Y.
Mathematically, this relationship may be defined as one
of minimizing the sum of squared differences between
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predicted values ( that Is, the squared differences of
those in the wrong order divided by the total sum of all
squared differences ). This is the percentage of the
variation among the Zs which Is Inconsistent with the
Ys.
As a measure of the monotonicity of elements of Z with
those of Y, the measure 8 can be used, the square of
which is defined by Johnson (1973):
	
8 2 	 =	 j	 Zj - z ) 2
Z ( z -	 ) 2
	
ij	 =	 1	 ifsign(z1—z)#(y—y)
0	 otherwise
The numerator of 8 2 is the sum of squared differences
between the predicted values in the wrong order, and the
denominator the sum of all squared differences ( both in
correct and incorrect order ). The denominator tends to
normalize the function, constraining 82 to be of unit
interval with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 1.
Output from the NMREG procedure can be produced in the
form of a set of impact values for the independent
variables included in the analysis.
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The results of the NMREG application, together with the
impact values of the five attributes, are shown in the
Data Appendix: Section 7.
9.8	 Comments on results
a. Value of output
For category Dl the negative impact values appear to
indicate a poorer performance on the part of those DLOs
undertaking a larger workload.
Only for larger capital work does the attribute seem to
have relative importance.
b. Proportion of work
In highways work ( in the earlier year ) and in
maintenance work, the higher-ranked DLOs are those
holding this attribute.
c. Separate divisions
An important attribute in categories Dl, D2 and 04
particularly in the earlier year.
d. Categories of work
It is almost inevitable that a DLO performing category
D3 work will have this attribute, hence the relatively
low impact value.
The DLO5 undertaking all categories of work hold higher
rankings in category Dl especially in the later year.
e. Productivity bonus
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Perhaps the most Important of the tested attributes
particularly in the area of category Dl work in the
later year.
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RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 10
A REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
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10.1	 The initial analysis
The early part of this study ( Chapter 2 ) was concerned
with an analysis of the annual reports of seventy five
DLOs in order to obtain basic data on their financial
operations and perceived objectives. 	 By 1988,	 the
reports	 contained valuable	 information on	 financial
aspects of IDLOs. Various propositions were to be
investigated concerning the effects of the legislation
on DLO operations and part of this work has been
concerned with an attempt to answer the questions posed
therein.
The findings of this analysis	 in relation to those
questions were as follows:
On the objectives of a DLO:
The provision of a value-for-money, high quality
building service was mentioned in over fifty annual
reports in 1988-89, whereas only about twenty reports
gave prominence to the aim of employment maintenance in
the organisation, and very few mentioned the training
role of the IDLO.
On departmental structures:
As detailed in Chapter 6, a strong response to the need
to	 acquire	 a	 more	 business-like'	 organisational
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structure was shown by the fact that over 60 g6 of
authorities had restructured to provide separate client
and contractor functions.
On conditions of successful operation:
The percentage of work won in competition with private
contractors was the main concern. This was the most
popular benchmark of success rather than the rate of
return	 figure -	 provided of	 course	 that	 the	 5o
criterion had been met.
10.2 The general effects of the legislation
General findings on DLO response to the legislation were
shown in Chapter 3.
The target rate of return remained unchanged throughout
the decade, in spite of the fact that the net real rate
of return in the private sector of industry only
exceeded 5 over the period 1984-88.
Considerable changes to the methods of charging for DLO
work occurred over the decade, with a move towards the
more competitive method of using schedule contracts and
a move away from ttarget hours' and day works contracts.
It was expected that DLOs would be undertaking less work
due to the increased competition.
Overall,the proportion of local authority work obtained
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fell from 44o to 390 over the period of study, with a
major trend being the loss in the value of larger scale
capital work undertaken. 	 It fell by more than one-third
over the decade. Of the ninety DLOs undertaking new
construction work in 1982, only fifty two remained in
that field of work by 1988.
Yet, many DLOs still remained big business by the end of
the decade, with 60g6 of DLOs still having a turnover of
£1 million and one with work valued at more than £70
million. Their success in operations was shown by the
fact that only nine out of the two hundred and eighty
four DLOs quoted in the 1987-88 CIPFA statistics made a
loss.
In general building maintenance work, by 1989 no
closures had been ordered but four authorities had been
forced out of new construction work.
The results of the measurement of total factor
productivity (TPP), shown in Data Appendix: Section 2,
indicate that growth had occurred throughout the period
in some areas of work.
The growth in the area of highways work was not so
surprising , with the inconsistent workload in these
areas producing an unclear picture, but generally the
TFP figures indicate a reasonably healthy situation
concerning resource usage in this sector of the
construction industry.
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10.3 The assessment of performance
Chapter	 6	 was	 concerned	 with	 the	 organisational
objectives	 of,	 and	 performance	 assessment measures
utilised in, DLOs.
As already mentioned, a split into separate contractor
and client functions was a necessary response to the new
climate in many organisations. This type of change in
structure tended to go hand-in-hand with an examination
of potential cost savings and a streamlining of work
practices.	 The Audit Commission (1989).attempted to
promote value-for-money auditing and the development of
performance	 indicators,	 and	 its	 comparison	 costing
analysis	 helped	 to	 provide	 benchmarks	 for	 all
maintenance DLO5.
Another notable change was the adoption of business
plans by DLOs.
Over fifty DLOs were found to have developed detailed
business plans by 1988. Invariably, the plan recognised
the importance for improved management information and
also a requirement for the organisation to recognise its
own strengths and weaknesses. What was really
emphasised in virtually every instance, though, was the
essential need to take account of the views of the
customer and to work towards meeting these needs with
the constraint of market conditions.
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10.4 Alternative performance measures
A consideration of alternative performance measures, and
calculation of appropriate ratios was undertaken in
Chapter 8.
Criticism had been levelled at the government for the
imposition of a specific financial target which was too
easy to attain. In an industry with a low capital base,
the use of a target based on the achievement of a rate
of return on capital employed can lead to misleading
results.
The use of data from the annual reports to measure other
accounting ratios and performance indicators represents
an attempt to overcome this problem. CIPFA (1983)
indicated that it considered the operating surplus to
turnover ratio to be the most appropriate measure for
comparison of DLO performance with the private sector.
The results of my study indicate that the rate of return
on capital employed is too volatile a measure, due to
possible problems in the undermeasurement of capital, to
give it any great validity as a measure of performance.
The 5% figure is too easy a target to reach, and offers
no incentive to improve performance beyond that level.
The rate of surplus 	 results,	 as a test of relative
success in the market situation, confirm the view that
the level of this measure varies inversely with the
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degree of competition. For instance, the results show
that the ratio tended to be significantly lower in the
category of major capital works, where there was greater
competition for a limited amount of work.
10.5	 Efficiency rankings
The idea of a 'good performance' authority is a notion
pursued in Chapter 9, and the work carried out in the
calculation of technical efficiency measures in this
study enables the ranking of DLOs by performance, in the
different categories of work.
Having obtained the rankings of authorities on the basis
of	 efficiency,	 the	 concern	 in	 Chapter	 9	 is	 with
answering the question:
"What makes	 for a	 'good performance'	 authority? H
The answer requires an examination of the features, that
can be found in lJLOs, which perform well, but are absent
from those organisations at the lower end of the
rankings.
The characteristics used for the Attribute Analysis were
based on 'a priori' assumptions with their origins,
either in economic theory or in previous studies of the
construction industry.
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The results of the Non-metric Regression technique used
in the analysis validated most of the assumptions:
- Economies of scale were found to exist in terms of
highways and large capital work but not with
maintenance work.
- The separation of divisions within a DLO was found
to be important, as those DLO5 with distinct
contracts and client divisions ranked well in all
categories.
- The greater the proportion of a local authorityts
work won by a DLO, the higher tended to be the DLOts
ranking. This appeared to be particularly true for
maintenance work.
- As the Audit Corrmiss ion (1988) speculated, bonus
schemes based on performance were conducive to better
performance.
- But, surprisingly, authorities, who undertook several
categories of work, did not appear to benefit from
specialisation economies to any great degree. This
may have been due to the way in which resources
(specialist labour and equipment) are allocated to one
division within a large DLO and expertise does not
cross divisional boundaries.
Table 10.1 suwmarises Data Appendix SectIon 5 In term5
of the ranking of DLOs, by category, for the two years
1982-83 and 1987-88.
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Table 10.1	 DLOs' performance rankings
Highlj ranked Lowly ranked Biggest 	 Biggest
both years	 both years	 rise	 fall
Dl	 Sunderland	 Greenwich	 Redbridge	 Northumb.
Hinckley	 Kent
D2	 Sunderland
	
Bradford
	
S.Tyneside Burnley
Du r ham	 Reading
D3	 Derby
	
Leeös
Du r ham	 Stoke
D4	 Bracknell
	 01 dham	 Bassetlaw	 Crawley
Sunder land
	
Bradford
In	 the	 next Chapter,	 the particular	 strengths	 and
weaknesses of some of these authorities are examined.
Attempts are made to explain how some of the DLOs, who
improved their performance over the decade managed to
achieve those improvements.
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CHAPTER 11
DLOS IN AN ERA OF CHANGE
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11.1 An assessment of the effects of the changes
Any review of the effects of the legislative changes on
the operations of DLOs in the 1980s, must take account
of	 the basic rationale for the introduction of the new
competitive environment. The basic premise of this form
of competition policy was that the formerly inefficient
public sector DLOs would be forced to become as
efficient as their private sector counterparts in the
contract ing industry.
To consider the justification for this view, it is worth
looking at the evidence from other fields of study,
where private-public sector comparisons have been made.
11.1.1 Private-public sector efficiency comparisons
The most comirehensive comparison of public and private
enterprises in the U.K. was that carried out by Pryke
(1982). He was able to compare three activities where
services were provided by both the public and private
sector - airlines, ferries and hovercraft, and the sale
of gas and electricity appliances. In each case, Pryke's
analysis showed a picture of a more profitable private
enterprise increasing its market share at the expense of
the public sector. Comparisons of cost and productivity
showed the private enterprises in a favourable light.
Pryke concluded that the public enterprises he studied
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had been badly managed and that the main explanation for
the poor performance was a weakening of incentives
resulting from public ownership.
When looking at the whole range of studies which have
compared the efficiency of public and private provision,
it is far from clear that private enterprise is better
than public enterprise. The many studies carried out in
the	 U.S.	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s	 came	 to
contradictory conclusions.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) showed that that there was a
greater incentive to shirk in public than in private
enterprise,	 for	 the	 public	 employee's	 wealth	 is
generally not affected by his decision. Moreover, the
private firm must meet the test of the market place
which inefficient operations do not survive for long,
but:	 'government firms, particularly those endowed with
a politically influential clientele, can survive for
long periods, and their managers prosper in the presence
of persistent deficits ( let alone economic losses ) and
grossly inefficient management.' ( De Alessi 1974. )
To assess the empirical evidence on whether the private
production of goods and services is more efficient than
public production, Spann (1977) reviewed five different
activities:	 airline service,	 fire protection,	 health
care	 and	 hospitals,	 electric	 utilities	 and	 refuse
collection.	 He concluded that: 'For the majority of
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activities,	 private producers	 can provide the same
services at the same or lower costs than can public
producers.	 In some cases, the costs of private firms
are half that of government agencies for producing the
same goods or services.'	 Spann attributes this lower
cost of private production to two factors:
1. Private profit-maximising firms	 having an	 incentive
to minimise costs whereas public sector firms do not,
and
2. The size of	 private	 firms	 not	 being restricted by
political	 boundaries, as is the size of governmental
producers. Private firms are able to reach the
maximum efficient size, which is an opportunity not
necessarily allowed to public firms.
C The latter point has particular validity in the case
of DLOs, where the restrictions placed on a DLO's
ability to compete for work outside the localauthority,
have often been a source of irritation to those large
DLOs with manufacturing workshops and operatives with
highly specialist skills. Manchester DLO, for instance,
had developed by the early 1980s, one of the largest
joinery workshops in the country and would have been
able to provide a window-frame supply service to meet
the needs	 of all	 the other nine local	 authorities
throughout Greater Manchester. )
Yet, there was conflicting evidence on the impact of
ownership on the cost of even such an uncomplicated
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service as refuse collection. Kemper and Quigley (1976)
reported from their econometric analysis of 	 refuse
collection in various U.S. jurisdictions that:
'Collection cost appears to vary systematically with the
organisation of collection, even after controlling for
other factors.	 Private collection appears to be about
30% more expensive than municipal collection, which in
turn appears	 to be about 25% more expensive than
contract collection.'
Other studies, such as Edwards and Stevens (1978) on
sanitation services, Hirsch (1977) and Savas (1977) on
refuse collection and Florestano and Gordon (1980) on
general municipal services, come to reserved judgments
on the improvements in efficiency resulting from
increased competition.
11.1.2 EfficIency assessment studies in the U.K. local
authority sector
There may be doubt over whether there is anything
inherently superior about performance under private
ownership.
Yet, support by the Thatcher government for the view
that the economic performance of all firms, private or
public, is improved by a competitive output market and
that, under competition, private firms are likely to do
better, was shown to be strong. In a speech made in
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November 1983, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
John Moore, stated that: 'The long-term success of the
privatisation programme will stand or fall by the extent
to which it maximises competition.' 	 The government did
not,	 in	 general,	 choose	 to pursue	 the	 option	 of
increasing	 competition	 in	 its	 privatisation	 policy,
probably due to its emphasis on the other effects of
privatisation	 (	 raising	 revenue	 and widening	 share
ownership ), except in the local authority sector.
In this sector, the study of the costs of refuse
collection services emphasised the diversity in the
efficiency of public suppliers in different locations
(Audit Commission. 1984.) It was clear from that
analysis that an efficient supplier (public or private)
should be able to undercut substantially the costs
incurred by the least efficient local authorities. But
the Commission also concluded that the most effective
local authorities ( the top 25g6 ) achieved cost levels
as	 low as	 those	 of	 the	 private	 contractors	 they
invest igated.
In their look at the introduction of competitive
tendering in the U.K., Hartley and Huby ( 1985 ),
appeared to provide evidence that increased competition
increases	 efficiency.	 Domberger,	 Meadowcroft	 and
Thompson (1986), examining the consequences of tendering
and	 contracting	 out	 for	 the	 efficiency of	 refuse
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collection, estimated a single-equation model relating
an authority's costs of refuse collection to a range of
explanatory variables, such as the method of collection,
frequency of collection and the number of properties
from which collections are made. The authors then
compared the distribution of residuals for authorities,
where tendering had taken place, with the distribution
of residuals for those where it had not. They found
that authorities, which had tendered, were likely to
have a negative residual, whilst those which had not,
tended to have a positive residual. The authors
concluded that 'where tendering has been introduced,
this has resulted in a significant improvement in the
efficiency with which refuse services are provided.'
The later study by Cubbin, Domberger and Meadowcroft
(1987) did not support the view that the bulk of the
recorded cost savings arose from lower wages, but found
that the efficiency gains resulted from greater
productivity of labour and vehicles.
The investigation, carried out by the Audit Commission
(1989) into DLOs' performance, came to the conclusion
that: 'There is powerful evidence to show that the
operating performance of DLOs is highly variable and
that in many cases there are significant opportunities
for improvement.' This rather narrow study, based on
detailed visits to only twelve DLOs, and concerned with
only housing maintenance work, showed that the inter-
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quartile range for a comparable basket of work varied by
more than 20g6 above and below the median.
This diversity was further illustrated by the later
report on London and metropolitan DLOs' production costs
( Audit Commission 1990 ) which indicated that London
DLOs' costs were twice the metropolitan average.
11.2 Contributions to improved performance
By the end of the 1980s, whilst there had been no
notable contraction in the overall aggregate real value
of output or in employment in the DLO sector, there had
been significant changes in category workloads of the
organisat ions.
Having been faced with a new competitive climate and
tighter accounting regulations for eight years, DLOs had
responded to the new conditions in different ways. Some
DLOs had responded successfully and held their ground -
in some cases even expanding operations in the face of
competition; some had concentrated their effort on those
areas in which they could compete most successfully, and
some had been forced to withdraw from areas in which
they were not economic.
The successful organisations had taken on board new
practices.	 As	 discussed	 in	 earlier	 chapters,	 the
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important attributes of reorganisatlon Into two distinct
departments, revised tender-led productivity schemes and
the Introduction of senior management with private
sector experience, were all important factors.
Yet, Individual DLOs approached their own particular
problems, and sought to improve efficiency and respond
to the new competitive climate, in specific ways.
11.2.1 The achievement of efficiency : The case of
Sunderland DLO
Those organisations, which obtained high efficiency
rankings achieved their success by adapting to the
conditions imposed by the new competitive climate.
Some of the organisations were ranked highly in the
different categories during both years, and other DLOs
managed to greatly improve their performance in specific
areas of work over the period.
Sunderland DLO is an example of both the former and the
latter type of organisation. A high ranker In three of
the work categories in 1982-83, It maintained this
status for 1987-88 and also managed to become the most
Improved organisation in its previously tweakl new minor
works category.
171
In Chapter 9, the attributes of an efficient
organisation were expressed in terms of the production
of output large enough for scale economies to exist; the
organisation	 winning	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the
authority's work; the separation of contracts and
service divisions, and the implementation of incentive—
based bonus schemes.
A fundamental question to pose, therefore, is:
How did an 'efficient' organisation such as Sunderland
DLO achieve these attributes?
Section	 6	 of	 the	 Data	 Appendix	 displays	 those
authorities,	 which	 introduced	 productivity	 bonus
schemes, reorganised into separate divisions etc.
What the information does not show, is the mechanism by
which these characteristics arose.
Sunderland DLO, as indicated in Table 10.1, is an
organisation which performed well over the period, and
even achieved apparent improvements in the one area for
which its ranking had not been high in the early years.
As early as 1982, the Public Works Board had decided to
set out a business plan to reflect the continuing quest
for improved efficiency and effectiveness. Together
with the Works Director and his senior management team,
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a business plan was formulated, which included both
internal DLO changes and recorrmendatlons for changes on
the client side and on the part of central departments.
A suninary exhibit of this initial business plan is shown
in Fig. 11.1
This plan was set out in general terms, and its
development was based on the concept that Sunderland DLO
would continue to operate as the main provider of
building services to the local authority, but with a
redefined operational ethos.
The business plan included the adoption of a business
and marketing approach and recorrrnended organisational
changes, including a new financial policy, and a change
In management style, all of which was incorporated in a
new management structure. Four separately accountable
business units were created along with a conxnercial and
support services unit.	 Each unit being managed by an
Assistant	 Director	 to	 enable	 Independence	 and
accountability, and enable the Works Director to
concentrate on the strategic direction and profitability
of the whole organisation.
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Fig. 11.1	 Business Plan for Sunderland DLO
Vision	 A large all-embracing building
company
Strategy	 Maximise workload
Structure	 Member board
I Systems	 Cornputerised management accounting
Cost centres
Tender performance monitoring
Style	 Corporate identity
Staff	 Qualified professionals
Skills	 Full range
Marketing
Apprentice training
C Source: Derived from Sunderland Public Works
Department Annual Report. 1982-83 )
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From the findings of the 1989 ADLO members' survey, it
was apparent that all of the top ten ranked maintenance
organisations in 1987-88 had developed a business plan
by that financial year, and were showing a strong
response to the need to acquire a more business-like
organi sational approach.
11.2.2 Improvements in the organisatlon of Sunderland
DLO
With reference to earlier parts of this study
(particularly Chapter 2), two basic questions on DLOs'
operations have been posed
- What are the objectives of a DLO ?
- How does a DLO gauge the success of its operation ?
In Sunderland DLO's 1982-83 Annual Report, both these
questions were answered.
The prime objective of the organisation was:
The provision of a value-for-money high quality building
service.
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After meeting the minimum rate of return requirement,
the percentage won in competition was stated to be the
most important benchmark of successful operation.
A preliminary internal report, instigated by the Public
Works Board, focused on areas of potential improvement
in the operation of the DLO in order to meet its prime
objective. (See Sunderland DLO Annual Report 1982-83).
There were three themes which the report sought to
address:
a. Cost control
b. Improved management information
c. Customer needs
In the light of these themes, the report put forward
several areas of improvement to the departmentts
operations. The more important of these reconxnendatlons
were put into operation during the period 1983 to 1987
and are exemplified below:
a.	 Cost control
Greater cost control and cost savings resulted from
several aspects of policy:
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- Better materials management:
To achieve greater control over materials usage, it was
determined that each materials store should set limits
on the issue of materials to about £ 150 000 per annum
and transport costs should be identified to allow
calculation of the cost at site. Additionally, it was
decided that, in many areas, imprest stocks should be
used for jobbing maintenance.
- Controlling overhead costs:
The department sought to limit the paperwork generated
by a poor bonus scheme and place more emphasis on work
planning and control.
Money had been wasted in the administration of an over-
complex bonus scheme, and savings occurred when
simplified incentive schemes linked to schedules of
rates were introduced.
DLO management, together with central establishment
charges, accounted for about 12o of total operating
costs in 1982-83.	 C This had been reduced to about 7%
by 1986-87 ). Prior to the changes in tendering
regulations, accountability in Sunderland, as in many
local authorities, had been from the services to the
centre.	 The	 introduction of competitive tendering
reversed the direction. The DLO came to 'service level'
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agreements specifying the service and Its costs with the
Treasurers and other central departments.
- Increasing the working time:
Although persistent short-term sickness was not a major
problem, firm management action by way of Interviews and
medical reports were instigated. A two per cent
reduction In days lost through sickness occurred over
the period 1984 to 1986.
Management began to monitor sickness time closely. Time
on productive work was increased by improved materials
delivery, use of imprest stocks and flexible working - a
policy was agreed with trades unions to reduce the ratio
of labourers to tradespeople.
- Improving the rate of work:
The organisation was operating too detailed an incentive
scheme.	 The	 new	 scheme,	 introduced	 in	 1985,
consolidated allowances for travel, and abortive calls
were incorporated into the basic job times. The number
of jobs was simplified and the times updated In response
to changes In working methods.	 It was decided to
improve incentives and not consolidate bonus with basic
wages.
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The over all success of the changes may be gauged by the
fact that cost per comparative hour C all categories of
work ) was at least twenty per cent below the target
rate in the Audit Comiss ion Management Handbook.
b.	 Management information
It was, of course, recognised as a prerequisite to a
sensible tendering strategy, that there was a need to
prepare a business plan, setting out ways in which the
organisation intended to improve performance.
Emphasis was placed on the acquisition of management
information to allow the performance and profitability
of one unit of the DLO to be compared with another.
For Its information needs, the department had been using
custom-built	 programs	 on	 the	 local	 authorltyts
mainframe, but in 1983 decided to make use of a
proprietary	 system,	 which was	 part	 of	 a housing
management and maintenance computer suite. The system
had the ability to provide an overview as well as
progress orders and generate charges and thereby provide
management at a more aggregated level.
( See Fig. 11.2 ).
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Fig. 11.2 Sunderland DLO and client computer system
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( Source: Sunder land DLO Report 1984 )
C.	 Customers' needs
- Increasing effectiveness:
Effectiveness	 was	 improved	 by	 operative	 training,
emphasising the implications of working in someone's
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home, by keeping tenants Informed of the progress of
their repair order and by keeping the quality of the
work up to standard through post-inspection.
- Improved customer service:
The DLO tried to project a new image.
Sunderland DLO organised a series of two-day courses for
both management and front line staff, which outlined the
Importance of customer care, and trained staff on ways
of identifying and meeting customer needs and dealing
with their problems. One change was the introduction of
customer satisfaction cards and appointment systems.
The development was reinforced by renaming the DLO and
by the Introduction of uniforms and a new logo for the
vans and letter headings.
In 1985, the workforce was decentralised into six local
neighbourhoods for maintenance work and the DLO began to
undertake non-urgent repairs through a zoning system.
One problem of adhering to planned response times was
the variable nature of the workload, and to acconmodate
the variation in orders without a large backlog, the DLO
switched tradespeople between work groups and used
overt ime.
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11.2.3 Setting improvement targets
In addition to the identification of a range of
potential improvements, the management of Sunderland DLO
attempted to quantify the major elements and set
estimates of potential cost savings for each financial
year.
By way of example, the estimates for the financial year
1984-85 is surwnarised in Table 11.1
Table 11.1	 Estimated potential cost savings
Input cost
	 Potential saving as b of
cost of comparative hour
Management plus CEC
	 3
Cost per vehicle (inc. fuel)
	
2
Sickness	 5
Stores overheads	 2
Comparative productivity 	 3
( Source: Sunder land DLO Report 1984 )
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Whilst management recognised that improvements in major
elements could not be quantified in such a simple way, a
strong recognition of the need to improve the
effectiveness of its service continued throughout the
period,	 especially	 as	 further	 legislative	 changes
occurred.	 The word 'target' was avoided in the cost
saving estimates, but the annual report refers each year
to	 the organisation's	 success	 in meeting the cost
savings objectives.
11.3 Conclusions and epilogue
The findings of this study of the effects of the
legislation on DLO operations have been detailed in
Chapter 10, where the conclusions to be drawn from these
findings have also been considered.
The study has had two main aims.
A global aim of the study has been to analyse the ways
in which DLOs responded, during the ensuing decade, to
the requirements of the 1980 legislation.
	 Such analysis
has	 been	 carried	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 organisational
structure and resource usage with consideration of how
the	 changes	 in	 operational	 performance	 could	 be
me a sure d.
The study has dealt with several
	 issues of performance
measurement.	 The DLOs found themselves, in 1981, for
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the first time, faced with an externally imposed
performance constraint. Of major concern was the nature
of the choice of constraint.
Alternative options have been discussed and calculated
in some detail, as a second major aim has been one of
considering whether the available data could be used In
the more appropriate performance measures.
One conclusion of the study is that alternative measures
of performance would certainly constitute a better
appraisal of resource usage within the organisation.
There are obviously many blatant discrepancies between
the relative performance of some authorities under total
efficiency C TE ) measurement and under the rate of
return on capital measurement.
Indeed, on the basis that TE measurement gives an
'ideal' performance measure, the rate of surplus
especially, and also the value-added measure are more
closely correlated with TE than the rate of return on
capital.
The rate of return Is too volatile a measure, due to
possible problems in the undermeasurement of capital to
give it any great validity as a measure of performance.
However, the rate of surplus measurement results, as a
test of relative success in the market situation,
confirm the view that the level of this measure varies
inversely	 with	 the	 degree	 of	 competition,	 when
considered on a work category basis.
Manpower
120,000
1*000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1981-2 9E2-83 198384 1984-85 1985-88 1988-87 1987-88 1988-89
184
Regardless of the inappropriateness of the rate of
return on capital the need to meet a performance measure
initially constrained behaviour in many authorities.
After	 eight	 years	 of	 enforced competition and 	 the
imposition of a rate of return requirement,
	 it was
perhaps surprising that so many local authorities still
operated a viable DLO. Certainly the increases in
compulsory competitive tendering throughout the 1980s
had forced DLO managers to make greater effort to ensure
that enough work was won to maintain the economic
viability of the organisation.
As Fig. 11.1 shows that the number of workers in this
sector of the industry was at about the same level in
1988-89 as it was in 1981-82 C based on CIPFA survey
figures ), there had been no major shedding of jobs as
might have been predicted at the beginning of the
decade.
Fig. 11.3 Total manpower of responding DLOs
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By 1989, DLOs had generally been forced to realise that,
In building work, their strength lay In their ability to
provide a maintenance and repair service as opposed to
new build work.	 Table 11.1. shows the value of work
undertaken by	 DLOs in each of the four work areas
(based on CIPFA survey data).
Table 11.2 Estimated cost of all functional work and
contracts undertaken by DLOs.
	 CE 000)
Category
D2	 D3
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
198 4-8 5
1985-86
198 6-87
1987-88
19 8 8-89
Dl
536 853
724 542
729 196
708 081
694 366
720 211
705 576
650 633
123 509
119 452
133 843
100 042
81 315
91 766
93 870
80 783
22 114
40 357
45 876
36 575
31 425
28 949
29 974
47 742
D4
540 656
801 060
864 390
843 864
880 422
940 934
931 465
845 601
(Total no. of
respondents)
(268)
(327)
(337)
(335)
(318)
(301)
(279)
(263)
C Source: DLO Statistics [Actuals] 1981-89. CIPPA )
So, whilst the legislation had forced DLOs to undergo a
period of adaptation and reorganisation, very few had
gone to the wall, and after eight years most were much
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better	 equipped	 to	 survive	 in	 an	 increasingly
compet It l y e environment.
The results of the study of total factor productivity
indicate that, in basic economic usage terms, DLOs had
generally operated on an efficient basis.
Regardless of the constraint of a performance measure,
the single most important factor to have influenced the
efficiency	 and effectiveness	 of operation of	 local
authority	 building	 departments was	 undoubtedly	 the
introduction	 of	 the market	 and	 the	 setting-up	 of
'private-sector' practices in DLO management and
operation, as indicated in previous sections of this
wo r k.
There was powerful evidence to show that the operating
performance of DLOs in the early 1980s was highly
variable and that in many cases there were significant
opportunities for improvement, yet, by the end of the
decade, the objective of transforming a service
department into a conTnercial contracting organisation
had generally been achieved.
With a clear view of the existing performance of its
DLO, a local authority was better placed to make the
longer-term strategic decisions and to establish a
business plan for its DLO.
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Appendix A	 Legislation affecting DLOs prior to 1980
Until April 1981, there was no specific piece of
legislation concerning DLOs.
The 1972 Local Government Act gave certain 'permissive'
powers to local authorities, to provide services for
their areas in addition to their duties.
Sections 111 and 137 of this Act, were interpreted to
mean that a local authority could provide any services,
which it thought would benefit the area and which cost
the equivalent of a 2p property rate.
This Act and the various Housing Acts, which empowered
local authorities to build houses provided the statutory
basis for DLOs. This scant legislation was supplemented
by circulars from the Department of the Environment,
which were mainly concerned with tendering procedures.
Until 1981,	 therefore, the operations of DLOs were
guided still by Circular 57/69	 'Building by Direct
Labour Organisations'. ( Department of the Environment.
1969 ).
There were three main points made in this document:
a. The successful operation of a DLO requires stability
'built up over the years from continuity of operations,
which enables labour and plant to be used effectively
and continuously, It is, therefore, necessary to avoid
a workload which fluctuates from year to year; to plan
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any build-up of activity with care and with due regard
to the capacity of the management; and to proceed very
cautiously into types of construction with which the
organisation has had little previous experience'.
b. For DLOs to be fully effective, their productivity
must match that of the industry as a whole. They should
introduce bonus schemes based upon standards of output
established by work study, and these should be applied
to all work which can be measured.
c. Efficiency is best tested by requiring DLOs to
tender in competition with contractors for a
'considerable and representative proportion by value of
their work'.
t The Ministers have no Intention of reverting to the
over-rigid one-in-three rule ... but an application to
DLOs of the practice of awarding contracts either in
competition, or in continuation of contracts which have
been the subject of competition, would go a long way
towards meeting the requirements of competition and of
continuity, and they wish local authorities to follow it
as a general practice'.
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Appendix B	 Local authorities providing data on their
DLOs
County councils (England)
Avon
Cambridgesh ire
Devon
Gloucestershi re
Kent
Northarnptonsh ire
Shropshi re
Suffolk
Wiltshire
Bedfordsh ire
Co r nwa 11
Do r s e t
Hampshire
Leicestersh ire
Nor thumb e r I and
Somerset
Surrey
Berkshire
Cumbria
E.Sussex
Humbers ide
Norfolk
Oxfordshi re
Staffordshire
Warwi cksh ire
London and metropolitan district councils
Barnsley	 Bradford	 Bury
Gateshead	 Greenwich	 Kirklees
Leeds	 Newham	 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne
N. Tyneside
	 01 dham
	
Redbridge
Rochdale
	
Sef ton
	
Sol ihul 1
S. Tyneside
	
Stockport
	
Sunder land
Waltham Forest
	
Wi gan
	
WI rral
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Non-metropolitan district councils (England)
Aylesbury
Blackpool
Br eck land
Cambridge
Cope land
De rwen t s ide
E. Devon
Ha r 1 ow
Kennet
Mansfield
N. Devon
Norwich
Reading
Sedgefield
Stockton
Torridge
W. Derbyshire
Wy c h a von
York
Barrow
Bracknell
Burn ley
Chester
Cr awl ey
Durham
Forest of Dean
Hinckley
Kings Lynn
Mid-Sussex
N.E. Derbyshire
Pendle
Rushmoor
S. Oxfordshire
Stoke
Thane t
W. Lindsey
Wy r e
Basset 1 aw
Braintree
Blyth Valley
Ches te r-le-St reet
Derby
Eas I ngton
Gravesham
Hull
Lincoln
New Forest
N. Wiltshire
Preston	 -
St .Edmundsbury
S. Staffordshire
Teignbridge
Thur rock
Wreki n
Wyre Forest
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County councils (Wales)
Gwent
	
S. Glamorgan
	
W. Glamorgan
District councils (Wales)
BI aenau
	
Ceredigion
	
Coiwyn
Cynon
	
Gi yndwr
	
I S I Wy n
Lliw Valley	 Neath	 Rhondda
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DATA APPENDIX
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SECTION 1
213
Aggregate expenditure on Inputs
(a) Category Dl	 (50 authorities)
Aggregate expenditure on Inputs (E 000)
1981-2	 1982-3	 1983-4	 1984-5
Direct
Labour
+Indi rect
Labour
= LABOUR
COSTS
50 997	 55 738	 55 706	 61 154
13 539	 15 843	 16 681	 16 450
64 536	 71 581	 72 387	 77 604
Suppi jest
Services
+Sub-
contractors
=MATER IAL
COSTS
71 733	 76 978	 70 951	 72 971
12 687	 13 692	 13 266	 15 618
84 420	 90 670	 84 217	 88 589
Transport
plant
	
50 667	 50 419	 50 219	 48 717
+Ove rheads	 20 829	 23 863	 23 827	 25 449
=CAP ITAL
	
71 496	 74 282	 74 046	 74 166
Surplus	 8 142	 12 795	 10 040	 11 372
TOTAL
INCOME
	
228 594	 249 328	 240 690	 251 731
214
Dl Aggregate expenditure on Inputs ( 000)
1985-6	 1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
Direct
Labour
+Indirect
Labour
= LABOUR
COST S
60 259	 65 584	 72 036	 61 380
17 490	 19 158	 22 642	 16 194
77 749	 84 742	 94 678	 77 574
Supplies!
Services
+Sub-
contractors
=MATERIAL
COSTS
78 170	 79 705	 85 608	 71 822
15 004	 19 820	 22 856	 21 077
93 174	 99 525	 108 464	 92 899
Transport
plant
+Ove rheads
=CAPITAL
Surplus
53 588	 53 166	 56 567	 46 159
27 857	 30 256	 30 384	 30 340
81 445	 83 422	 86 951	 76 599
10 961	 13 024	 10 185	 4 079
TOTAL
INCOME
	
263 326	 280 713	 300 278	 251 181
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(b) Category D2
	 (10 authorities)
Aggregate expenditure on Inputs (E 000)
	
1981-2	 1982-3	 1983-4	 1984-5
Direct	 5 804	 6 002	 6 981	 8 399
Labour
+Indlrect	 1 629	 2 262	 2 809	 3 014
Labour
=LABOUR	 7 433	 8 264	 9 790	 11 413
COSTS
Supplies!
	
3 971	 4 991	 5 479	 6 636
Services
+Sub-	 3 246	 3 103	 2 678	 2 826
contractors
=MATERIAL	 7 217	 8 099	 8 157	 9 462
COSTS
Transport	 464	 645	 717	 736
G plant
+Qverheads	 2 444	 3 394	 4 213	 4 521
=CAPITAL	 2 908	 4 039	 4 930	 5 257
Surplus	 198	 -675	 -651	 333
TOTAL	 17 660	 19 862	 21 654	 26 574
INCOME
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D2 Aggregate expenditure on inputs (E 000)
	
1985-6	 1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
Direct	 7 079	 7 906	 8 105	 8 614
Labour
+Indirect	 2 516	 3 278	 3 356	 3 524
Labour
=LABOtJR	 9 595	 11 184	 11 461	 12 138
COSTS
Supplies!
	
5 979
	
6 901	 7 376	 7 150
Services
+Sub-
	 2 272
	
1 704	 4 114	 4 949
contractors
=MATER IAL
	
8 251
	
8 605	 11 490	 12 099
COSTS
Transport
plant
+Overheads
=CAPITAL
Surplus
810
3 773
4 583
2 792
945
4 916
5 861
492
651	 1 031
5 535	 6 602
6 186	 7 633
588	 -291
TOTAL	 25 618	 26 154	 29 745	 31 579
INCOME
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(c) Category D3
	
( 11 authorIties )
Aggregate expenditure on Inputs ( 000)
	
1981-2	 1982-3	 1983-4	 1984-5
Direct
Labour	 946	 1 510	 1 357	 1 669
+Indi rect
Labour	 209	 355	 488	 614
= LABOUR
COSTS	 1 155	 1 865	 1 845	 2 283
Suppi ies/
Services	 787
	
1 175	 1 043	 2 098
+Sub-
contractors
	
100
	
236
	
194	 547
= MATERIAL
COSTS
	
887	 1 411
	
1 237	 2 645
Transport
plant
	
329
	
422
	
281	 341
+Ove rhe ads	 321
	
534
	
696	 951
=CAP ITAL
	
650
	
956
	
977	 1 292
Surplus
	 136
	
146
	
221	 422
TOTAL INCOME	 2 828	 4 378	 4 280	 6 642
465	 544
5 776	 6 755
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D3 Aggregate expenditure on inputs ( 000)
	
1985-6	 1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
Dl rect
Labour	 1 932	 1 234	 1 349	 1 490
+Indlrect
Labour	 683	 500	 453	 450
= LABOUR
COSTS	 2 615	 1 734	 1 802	 1 940
Supplies!
Services
+Sub-
C on t rac r S
= MATERIAL
COSTS
1 961
971
2 932
1 559
483
2 042
2 031	 2 570
663	 692
2 694	 3 262
Transport
plant	 1 012	 1 148
+Overheads	 1 087	 789
=CAPITAL	 12 099	 1 937
Surplus	 463
	
637
TOTAL INCOME	 8 109
	
6 350
206	 166
609	 843
815	 1 009
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Cd) Category D4	 (61 authorities)
Aggregate expenditure on inputs (E 000)
	
1981-2	 1982-3	 1983-4	 1984-5
Direct	 52 987	 55 243	 58 310	 65 442
Labour
+Indirect	 8 213	 8 563	 9 038	 10 144
Labour
=LABOUR	 61 200	 63 806	 67 348	 75 586
COSTS
Supplies!
Services
+Sub-
cont ractors
=MATERIAL
COSTS
28 279	 26 150	 28 000	 35 539
2 195	 2 266	 6 674	 7 155
30 474	 28 416	 34 674	 42 694
Transport
	
6 463	 6 661	 7 143	 7 855
plant
+Overheads
	
20 917	 22 493	 25 534	 31 554
=CAPITAL
	
27 380	 29 154	 32 677	 39 409
Surplus
	
3 583	 5 134	 4 662	 4 874
TOTAL
	
122 599	 126 586	 139 236	 162 563
INCOME
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D4 Aggregate expenditure on inputs (E 000)
1985-6	 1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
DIrect	 69 302	 74 165	 81 654	 58 990
Labour
+Indj rect	 10 742	 11 496	 12 656	 9 143
Labour
= LABOUR
	
80 044	 85 661	 94 310	 68 133
COSTS
Supplies!
Services
+Sub-
contractors
=MATERIAL
COSTS
Transport
plant
+Ove rheads
=CAP ITAL
37 302	 43 700	 49 549	 41 597
6 772	 12 779	 13 607	 14 365
	
44 074	 56 479	 63 156	 55 962
	
8 218	 8 926	 10 109	 9 382
29 558	 37 989	 37 504	 32 025
37 776	 46 915	 47 613	 4 1407
Surplus	 7 740	 9 469	 8 603	 3 024
TOTAL
	
170 892	 198 524	 213 686	 170 380
INCOME
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SECTION 2
222
Category Dl
Labour Input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b)xlOO Expressed as
Direct labour Index of 	 a volume of
costs	 direct labour	 direct
(.E 000)	 costs	 labour
	
1981-2	 50 997	 86.3	 59 093	 0.9663
	
1982-3	 55 738	 90.0	 61 931	 1.0127
	
1983-4	 55 706	 94.2	 59 136	 0.9670
	
1984-5	 61 154	 100	 61 154	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 60 259	 103.0	 58 504	 0.9567
	
1986-7	 65 584	 106.0	 61 872	 1.0117
	
1987-8	 72 036	 112.1	 64 260	 1.0508
	
1988-9	 61 380	 136.8	 44 868	 1J.7337
223
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b)xlOO Expressed as
Indirect labour Index of	 a volume of
costs	 Indirect labour	 indirect
(E 000)	 costs	 labour
1981-2	 13 539	 87.9	 15 408	 0.9367
1982-3	 15 843	 91.2	 17 370	 1.0559
1983-4	 16 681	 95.0	 17 561	 1.0675
1984-5	 16 450	 100	 16 450	 1.0000
l9a5-8	 17 490	 103.6	 16 882	 1.0263
1986-7	 19 158	 108.5	 17 654	 1.0732
1987-8	 22 642	 125.1	 18 095	 1.1000
1988-9	 16 194	 131.5	 12 319	 0.7489
19 8 1-2
198 2-3
19 8 3-4
198 4-5
198 5-6
198 6-7
19 87-8
198 8-9
Overall volume of
labour	 (weighted)
0. 9601
1. 0223
0. 9902
1. 0000
0. 9724
1. 0256
1.0615
0. 7390
(a/b) x 100
103 966
104 459
90 947
88 589
88 822
89 581
92 863
75 040
Expressed as
a volume of
ma t e r I a 1 s
1. 1736
1.1791
1.0266
1. 0000
1.0026
1.0112
1.0482
0.8471
224
Materials input :
(a)	 (b)
Material costs Index of
	
(E 000)	 material
costs
	
1981-2	 84 420	 81.2
	
1982-3	 90 670	 86.8
	
1983-4	 84 217	 92.6
	
1984-5	 88 589	 100
	
1985-6	 93 174	 104.9
	
1986-7	 99 525	 111.1
	
1987-8	 108 464	 116.8
	
1988-9	 92 899	 123.8
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Capital Input :
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100
Transport a
	
Index of	 Expressed as
plant costs
	
plant	 a volume of
(E 000)	 costs	 plant
	
1981-2	 50 687	 93.3	 54 305	 1.1147
	
1982-3	 50 419	 97.4	 51 765	 1.0626
	
1983-4	 50 219	 98.3	 51 087	 1.0486
	
1984-5	 48 717	 100	 48 717	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 53 588	 105.5	 50 794	 1.0426
	
1986-7	 53 166	 104.5	 50 877	 1.0443
	
1987-8	 56 567	 110.8	 51 053	 1.0480
	
1988-9	 46 159	 115.3	 40 034	 0.8218
1981-2
198 2-3
198 3-4
198 4-5
19 8 5-6
198 6-7
19 87-8
198 8-9
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100
Overhead	 Index of
	
Expressed as
costs	 overhead	 a volume of
CE 000)	 costs	 overheads
20 829	 90.8	 22 939	 0.9014
23 863	 94.0	 25 386	 0.9975
23 827	 94.6	 25 187	 0.9897
25 449	 100	 25 449	 1.0000
27 857	 105.4	 26 430	 1.0385
30 256	 112.5	 26 894	 1.0568
30 384	 139.1	 21 843	 0.8583
30 340	 182.1	 16 661	 0.6547
226
Overall volume of
capital
1. 0526
1. 0417
1.0296
1.0000
1.0323
1 • 0488
0. 9817
0 .7555
1981-2
198 2-3
198 3-4
198 4-5
198 5-6
198 6-7
1987-8
198 8-9
Output :
19 8 1-2
198 2-3
198 3-4
198 4-5
19 8 5-6
198 6-7
19 87-8
198 8-9
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100
Value of	 Output price	 Expressed as
Output	 index	 a volume of
( 000)	 output
228 594	 95.2	 240 120	 0.9539
249 328	 94.2	 264 679	 1.0514
240 690	 96.5	 249 420	 0.9908
251 731	 100	 251 731	 1.0000
263 326	 103.3	 254 914	 1.0126
280 713
	 106.2	 264 325	 1.0500
300 278	 110.5
	
271 745	 1.0795
251 181	 121.7
	
206 394	 0.8199
227
Category Dl
Growth rate
1981/2-1982/3 in 1.0514 - in 0.9539
- 0.2977 (in 1.0233 - In 0.9601)
- 0.3831 (in 1.1791 - In 1.1736)
- 0.3192 (in 1.0417 - in 1.0526)
=	 0.0802
1982/3-1983/4 in 0.9908 - In 1.0514
- 0.3082 (in 0.9902 - In 1.0223)
- 0.3742 (in 1.0266 - in 1.1791)
- 0.3176 (In 1.0296 - in 1.0417)
=	 0.0059
1983/4-1984/5 in 1.0000 - in 0.9908
- 0.3184 (in 1.0000 - in 0.9902)
- 0.3669 (in 1.0000 - in 1.0266)
- 0.3147 (in 1.0000 - in 1.0296)
=	 0.0250
1984/5-1985/6 in 1.0126 - in 1.0000
- 0.3155 (in 0.9724 - in 1.0000)
- 0.3689 (in 1.0026 - in 1.0000)
- 0.3156 (In 1.0323 - in 1.0000)
=	 0.0079
228
1985/6-1986/7 in 1.0500 - in 1.0126
- 0.3124 (in 1.0256 - in 0.9724)
- 0.3705 (in 1.0112 - in 1.0026)
- 0.3171 (In 1.0488 - in 1.0323)
=	 0.0114
1986/7-1987/8 in 1.0795 - in 1.0500
- 0.3215 (in 1.0615 - in 1.0256)
- 0.3729 (in 1.0482 - in 1.0112)
- 0.3056 (In 0.9817 - in 1.0488)
=	 0.0234
1987/8-1988/9 in 0.8199 - in 1.0795
- 0.3202 (in 0.7390 - in 1.0615)
- 0.3750 (in 0.8471 - in 1.0482)
- 0.3048 (in 0.7555 - in 0.9817)
=	 0.0006
229
Category D2
Labour input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100 Expressed as
Direct labour Index of	 a volume of
costs	 direct labour	 direct
(E 000)	 costs	 labour
	
1981-2	 5 804	 86.3	 6 725	 0.8007
	
1982-3	 6 002	 90.0	 6 669	 0.7940
	
1983-4	 6 981	 94.2	 7 411	 0.8624
	
1984-5	 8 399	 100	 8 399	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 7 079	 103.0	 6 873	 0.8183
	
1986-7	 7 906	 106.0	 7 458	 0.8880
	
1987-8	 8 105	 112.1	 7 230	 0.8608
	
1988-9	 8 614	 136.8	 6 297	 0.7497
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(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100 Expressed as
Indirect labour	 Index of	 a volume of
costs	 indirect labour	 indirect
CE 000)	 costs	 labour
	
1981-2	 1 629	 87.9	 1 854	 0.6151
	
1982-3	 2 262	 91.2	 2 480	 0.8228
	
1983-4	 2 809	 95.0	 2 957	 0.9811
	
1984-5	 3 014	 100	 3 014	 1.0000
	
1985-6
	
2 516
	
103.6
	
2 429
	
0. 8059
	
1986-7
	
3 278
	
108.5
	
3 021
	
1. 0023
	
1987-8
	
3 356
	
125.1
	
2 682
	
0. 8898
	
198 8-9
	
3 524
	
131.5
	
2 681
	
0. 8895
Overall volume of
labour index
	
1981-2
	
0 .7538
	
198 2-3
	
0. 7960
	
1983-4
	
0. 9084
	
198 4-5
	
1. 0000
	
1985-6
	
0 .8162
	
198 6-7
	
0. 9092
	
19 8 7-8
	
0.8077
	
198 8-9
	
0.8100
231
Materials input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100
Material costs Index of	 Expressed as
CE 000)	 material	 a volume of
costs	 materials
	
1981-2	 7 217	 81.5	 8 858	 0.9362
	
1982-3	 8 099	 87.8	 9 249	 0.9775
	
1983-4	 8 157	 93.6	 8 717	 0.9213
	
1984-5	 9 462	 100	 9 462	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 8 251	 105.3	 7 838	 0.8284
	
1986-7	 8 605	 109.1	 7 887	 0.8335
	
1987-8	 11 490	 115.0	 9 990	 1.0558
	
1988-9	 12 099	 121.1	 9 988	 1.0556
Capital input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100
	
Transport	 Index of	 Expressed as
plant costs	 plant	 a volume of
(E 000)	 costs	 plant
	
1981-2	 464	 93.3	 497	 0.6752
	
1982-3	 645	 97.4	 662	 0.8994
	
1983-4	 717	 98.3	 729	 0.9904
	
1984-5	 736	 100	 736	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 810	 105.5	 768	 1.0434
	
1986-7	 945	 104.5	 904	 1.2282
	
1987-8	 651	 110.8	 588	 0.7989
	
1988-9	 1 031	 115.3	 894	 1.2146
1981-2
1982-3
1983-4
1984-5
1985-6
198 6-7
1987-8
1988-9
232
	
(a)
	
(b)	 (a/b) x 100
	
Ove rhead
	
Index of
	
Expressed as
costs	 overhead	 a volume of
(	 000)	 costs	 overheads
2 444	 90.8	 2 692	 0.5954
3 394	 94.0	 3 611	 0.7987
4 213	 94.6	 4 453	 0.9850
4 521	 100	 4 521	 1.0000
3 773	 105.4	 3 580	 0.7919
4 916	 112.5	 4 370	 0.9666
	
5 535	 139.1	 3 979	 0.8801
	
6 602	 182.1	 3 625	 0.8018
Overall volume
of capital
	
19 8 1-2
	
0.6083
	
198 2-3
	
0. 8150
	
198 3-4
	
0. 9859
	
198 4-5
	
1. 0000
	
19 8 5-6
	
0.8362
	
198 6-7
	
1.0007
	
19 8 7-8
	
0 • 8717
	
198 8-9
	
0.8577
233
Output :
(a)
	
(b)
	 (a/b) x 100
Value of
	
Output price	 Expressed as
1961-2
1982-3
1983-4
198 4-5
1985-6
198 6-7
19 87-8
Output	 index	 a volume of
(E 000)	 output
17 660	 95.2	 18 550	 0.6981
19 862	 94.2	 21 085	 0.7934
21 654	 96.5	 26 574	 0.8444
26 574	 100	 26 574	 1.0000
25 618	 103.3	 24 872	 0.9360
26 154	 106.2	 24 627	 0.9267
29 746	 110.5	 26 919	 1.0130
1988-9	 32 111	 121.7	 26 385	 0.9929
234
Category D2
Growth rate
1981/2-1982/3 in 0.7934 - in 0.6981
- 0.4186 (in 0.7960 - in 0.7538)
- 0.4083 (in 0.9775 - in 0.9362)
- 0.1731 (in 0.8150 - in 0.6083)
=	 0.0371
1982/3-1983/4 in 0.8444 - in 0.7934
- 0.4341 (in 0.9084 - in 0.7960)
- 0.3923 (in 0.9213 - in 0.9775)
- 0.1736 (in 0.9859 - in 0.8150)
=	 0.0049
1983/4-1984/5 in 1.0000 - in 0.8444
- 0.4409 (in 1.0000 - in 0.9084)
- 0.3664 (In 1.0000 - in 0.9213)
- 0.1927 (In 1.0000 - in 0.9859)
=	 0.0940
1984/5-1985/8 in 0.9360 - In 1.0000
- 0.4020 (in 0.8162 - in 1.0000)
- 0.3391 (In 0.8284 - In 1.0000)
- 0.2589 (in 0.8362 - in 1.0000)
=	 0.1257
235
1985/6-1986/7 in 0.9267 - in 0.9370
- 0.4011 (in 0.9092 - In 0.8162)
- 0.3256 (in 0.8335 - in 0.8264)
- 0.2733 (in 1.0007 - in 0.8362)
=	 -0.1043
1986/7-1987/8 in 1.0130 - in 0.9267
- 0.4065 (In 0.8077 - in 0.9092)
- 0.3577 (In 1.0558 - in 0.8335)
- 0.2358 (in 0.8715 - in 1.0007)
=	 0.0852
1987/8-1988/9 in 0.9929 - in 1.0130
- 0.3661 (in 0.8100 - in 0.8077)
- 0.3816 (In 1.0556 - in 1.0558)
- 0.2523 (In 0.8577 - In 0.8717)
=	 -0.01698
236
Category D3
Labour input
1981-2
198 2-3
198 3-4
198 4-5
1985-6
198 6-7
19 87-8
1988-9
Volume of
labour
0.6710
1. 0263
0.8896
1.0000
0.4034
0.8353
0.9772
1.0491
Materials input
19 81-2
1982-3
198 3-4
198 4-5
1985-6
198 6-7
1987-8
198 8-9
Volume of
ma t e r i a I s
0.3951
0. 6076
0. 4994
1. 0000
1.0526
0. 7081
0. 8802
1.0125
outPut
0.4473
0.6998
0. 6677
1. 0000
1.1819
0. 9002
0.7870
0. 8357
1981-2
1982-3
1983-4
1984-5
198 5-6
198 6-7
19 8 7-8
198 8-9
237
Capital input
Volume of
capital
1981-2
	 0.8274
	
1982-3
	 0.9079
	
1983-4
	 0.7670
	
1984-5
	 1.0000
	
1985-6
	 1.9427
	
1986-7
	 1. 4985
	
19 8 7-8
	 0.7237
	
198 8-9
	 0.9102
Volume of
238
Category D3
Growth rate
1981/2-1982/3 in 0.6998 - in 0.4473
- 0.4348 (in 1.0263 - In 0.6710)
- 0.3315 (in 0.6076 - in 0.2951)
- 0.2337 (in 0.9079 - in 0.8274)
=	 0.0984
1982/3-1983/4 In 0.6677 - in 0.6998
- 0.4476 (in 0.8896 - In 1.0263)
- 0.3191 (In 0.4994 - in 0.6076)
- 0.2333 (in 0.7670 - in 0.9079)
=	 0.1192
1983/4-1984/Sin 1.0000 - in 0.6677
- 0.4108 (in 1.0000 - in 0.8896)
- 0.3650 (In 1.0000 - In 0.4994)
- 0.2242 (in 1.0000 - In 0.7670)
=	 0.0430
1984/5-1985/6 in 1.1819 - In 1.0000
- 0.3545 (in 1.4034 - in 0.8896)
- 0.4044 (in 1.0526 - in 1.0000)
- 0.2411 (in 1.9427 - in 1.0000)
=	 -0.1339
239
1985/6-1986/7 in 0.9002 - In 1.1819
- 0.3228 (in 0.8353 - in 1.4034)
- 0.3705 (In 0.7081 - in 1.0526)
- 0.3068 (In 1.4985 - in 1.9427)
=	 0.1218
1986/7-1987/B In 0.7870 - in 0.9002
- 0.3214 (In 0.9772 - in 0.8353)
- 0.4323 (in 0.8802 - in 0.7081)
- 0.2463 (In 0.7237 - in 1.4985)
=	 -0.0996
1987/8-1988/9 in 0.8357 - in 0.7870
- 0.3258 (in 1.0491 - in 0.9772)
- 0.5162 (in 1.0123 - in 0.8802)
- 0.1580 (in 0.9102 - in 0.7237)
=	 -0.0716
240
Category D4
Direct labour and materials input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100 Expressed as
Direct labour Index of	 a volume of
maintenance direct labour	 of direct
material costs	 materiaI	 lab./mats.
(E 000)	 costs
	
1981-2	 83 481	 86.0	 97 048	 0.8975
	
1982-3	 83 659	 91.0	 91 933	 0.8502
	
1983-4	 92 984	 95.2	 97 672	 0.9032
	
1984-5	 108 136	 100	 108 136	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 113 376	 103.5	 109 542	 1.0130
	
1986-7	 130 644	 108.8	 120 077	 1.1104
	
1987-8	 144 810	 117.1	 123 664	 1.1436
	
1988-9	 114 952	 123.8	 92 853	 0.8587
241
Indirect labour input
(a)	 (b)	 (a/b) x 100 Expressed as
Indirect labour Index of	 a volume of
costs	 Indirect labour	 indirect
(.E 000)	 costs	 labour
	
1981-2	 8 213	 87.9	 9 347	 0.9214
	
1982-3	 8 563	 91.2	 9 388	 0.9255
	
1983-4	 9 038	 95.0	 9 515	 0.9380
	
1984-5	 10 144	 100	 10 144	 1.0000
	
1985-6	 10 742	 103.6	 10 369	 1.0222
	
1986-7	 11 496	 108.5	 10 593	 1.0443
	
1987-8	 12 656
	
125.1
	
10 114	 0.9970
	
1988-9	 9 143
	
131.5
	
6 955	 0.6856
Capital input
19 8 1-2
198 2-3
1983-4
198 4-5
198 5-6
1986-7
19 8 7-8
198 8-9
Overall volume
of capital
0.7660
0.7843
0.8708
1.0000
0 .9111
1. 0735
0. 9197
0.6173
242
Output
Volume of
output
1981-2	 0.7922
1982-3	 0.8266
1983-4	 0.8876
1984-5	 1.0000
1985-6	 1.0177
1986-7	 1.1499
1987-8	 1.1896
1988-9	 0.8612
243
Category D4
Growth rate
1981/2-1982/3 In p.8266 - in 0.7922
- 0.6950 (in 1.0263 - in 0.6710)
- 0.0698 (in 0.6076 - in 0.2951)
- 0.2353 (in 0.9079 - in 0.8274)
=	 0.0743
1982/3-1983/4 In 0.8876 - in 0.8266
- 0.6904 (in 0.8896 .- In 1.0263)
- 0.0689 (in 0.4994 - in 0.6076)
- 0.2416 (in 0.7670 - in 0.9079)
=	 0.0033,
1983/4-1984/5 in 1.0000 - In 0.8876
- 0.6884 (in 1.0000 - in 0.8896)
- 0.0659 (in 1.0000 - in 0.4994)
- 0.2477 (in 1.0000 - in 0.7670)
=	 0.0109
1984/5-1985/6 In 1.0177 - in 1.0000
- 
0.6746 (in 1.4034 - In 0.8896)
- 0.0650 (in 1.0526 - In 1.0000)
- 0.2604 (in 1.9427 - in 1.0000)
=	 0.0317
244
1985/6-1986/7 in 1.1499 - in 1.0177
- 0.6772 (in 0.8353 - in 1.4034)
- 0.0638 (In 0.7081 - in 1.0526)
- 0.2595 (in 1.4985 - in 1.9427)
=	 0.0160
1986/7-1987/8 In 1.1896 - in 1.1499
- 0.6986 (In 0.9772 - in 0.8353)
- 0.0613 (In 0.8802 - in 0.7081)
- 0.2402 (in 0.7237 - in 1.4985)
=	 0.0445
1987/8-1988/9 in 0.8612 - in 1.1896
- 0.6991 (in 1.0491 - in 0.9772)
- 0.0584 (in 1.0123 - in 0.8802)
- 0.2426 (in 0.9102 - in 0.7237)
=	 -0.0041
245
SECTION 3
246
Labour (L) and Capital (K) ratios
and TE measure
(a)
	
Dl 1982-83
1 Cynon
2 Devon
3 Greenwich
4 Hinckley
5 Hurnberside
6 Newcastle-U-Tyne
7 New Forest
8 N.E.Derbyshire
9 N.Tyneside
10 Oldham
11 Redbridge
12 Rochdale
13 St Edmundsbury
14 Sedgefield
15 Solihull
16 S.Tyneside
17 Stockp.ort
18 Stockton
19 Sunderland
20 Thanet
21 Wigan
22 Avon
23 Beds.
L
0.537
0.426
0.427
0.529
0.333
0.465
0.463
0.521
0.426
0.394
0.378
0.630
0.367
0.584
0.614
0.412
0.581
0.681
0 • 548
0.640
0.424
0.395
0.392
K
0.400
0.440
0.426
0.311
0.597
0.455
0.516
0.414
0 • 541
0 572
0.572
0.295
0.581
0.252
0.322
0.443
0.355
0.208
0.324
0.266
0.487
0.501
0.542
TB
0. 8416
0. 9329
0. 9468
0 .9581
0 .9395
0. 8764
0. 8367
0 .8381
0. 8604
0. 8790
0. 8968
0.8937
0 .9013
0. 8587
0. 8698
0 .9549
0. 8552
1
0. 9237
0. 9353
0. 9018
0. 9266
0. 8971
247
24 Berks.
25 Cambs.
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbria
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
0.386
0.290
0.428
0.426
0.389
0.535
0.413
0.314
0.510
0.311
0.420
0.469
0.533
0.405
0.609
0.600
0.416
0.357
0.518
0.467
0.660
0.396
0.581
0.661
0.507
0.599
0.358
0.494
0.503
0.279
0.561
0.591
0.479
0 • 670
0.478
0.445
0.333
0.559
0.358
0.320
0.569
0 • 571
0.445
0.368
0.294
0.591
0.402
0.332
0. 9336
1
1
0. 8962
0 .9369
1
0. 8627
0 .9643
0. 8093
0. 9535
0.9146
0. 8786
0.9273
0.8974
0. 8288
0.8849
0. 8491
0 .9251
0. 8192
0 .9408
0. 8665
0. 8607
0. 8081
0.8212
K0.768
0.144
0.061
0.331
0.176
0.365
0.365
0.522
0.526
0.421
0.375
0.337
0.423
0.364
0.298
0.359
0.255
0.377
0.108
0.488
0.417
0.307
0.247
0.930
TE
0.4044
0. 8099
1
0 .7905
0. 7615
0.7717
0. 8530
0 .8701
1
0. 8018
0. 8365
0.8107
0. 8666
0 .9222
0 .7961
0. 8700
1
0 .7198
0 .7154
0 .9670
0.9596
0. 7736
0. 8632
0.5279
248
(b)	 D2 1982-83
L
1 Greenwich	 1.288
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne	 0.262
3 N.Tyneside	 0.634
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 0.657
5 Sedgefield	 0.779
6 S.Tyneside	 0.667
7 Sunderland	 0.603
8 Bradford	 0.552
9 Gwent	 0.466
10 Barnsley	 0.631
11 Leeds	 0.611
12 Reading	 0.634
13 Barrow	 0.571
14 Derby	 0.546
15 Chester-le-Street 0.664
16 Derwentside	 0.586
17 Durham	 0.519
18 Easington	 0.717
19 Harlow .	0.874
20 Hull	 0.490
21 Burnley	 0.510
22 Mansfield	 0.683
23 Wrekin	 0.634
24 Isiwyn	 0.894
249
25 Stoke	 0.559	 0.439	 0.8774
26 Lincoln	 0.682	 0.292	 0.7847
K0.466
0.510
0.353
0.090
0.461
0.285
0.. 235
0.251
0.461
0.280
0.545
0.376
0.392
0.356
0.328
0.265
0.412
0.289
0.289
0.227
0.377
0.196
0.491
0.172
0.249
TE
1
0. 7649
0.8398
1
0. 7091
0 .9096
0.7241
0.8150
0. 8608
1
0.7155
0. 7389
0. 9764
0.6198
0 .7097
0. 8413
0. 8511
0. 8394
0 .7822
0 .9471
0 .7282
0.7692
0 .8155
0. 9981
0. 8049
250
Cc)	 D3 1982-83
L
1 Devon	 0.330
2 Greenwich	 0.490
3 Newcastle-U-Tyne	 0.506
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 0.743
5 N Tyneside	 0.573
6	 S.Tyneside	 0.500
7 Sunderland	 0.730
8 Barrow	 0.675
9 Blaenau	 0.430
10 Gwent	 0.430
11 W.Glamorgan	 0.521
12 Newham	 0.588
13 Bury	 0.386
14 Barnsley	 0.606
15 Gateshead	 0.699
16 Leeds	 0.614
17 Derby	 0.466
18 Chester-le-Street 0.657
19 Derwentside	 o.657
20 Durham	 0.564
21 Easington	 0.595
22 Harlow	 0.828
23 Hull	 0.449
24 Lincoln	 0.612
25 Blyth V.	 0.690
251
26 Wrekin	 0.699
	
0.315
	 0. 7269
27 Stoke	 0.542
	
0.497
	 0. 7207
28 Islwyn	 0.456
	
0.301
	 0. 9434
K0.291
0.147
0.359
0.260
0.211
0.329
0.319
0.191
0.389
0.458
0.155
0.187
0.166
0.205
0.193
0.062
0.340
0.186
0.097
0.240
0.103
0.356
0.238
0.379
0.285
TE
0. 8249
1
0 .9606
0. 9173
0. 8151
0.9875
0.8818
0. 8185
0. 9548
0. 9795
0.8706
0. 8083
0.8319
0. 8166
0. 82551
1
0. 9635
0. 8326
0. 9426
0. 8995
0. 9824
0. 8321
0 .8278
0 .9505
0. 8847
252
(d)
1 Cope land
2 Cynon
3 Greenwich
4 Hinckley
5 Kirklees
6 Newcastle-LT-Tyne
7 New Forest
8 N.E.Derbyshire
9 N.Tyneside
10 Oldham
11 Redbridge
12 Rochdale
13 Rushrnoor
14 St.Edmunds
15 Sedgefield
16 Solihull
17 S.Tyneside
18 Stockport
29 Stockton
20 Sunderland
21 Thanet
22 Wigan
23 Aylesbury
24 Bassetlaw
25 Bracknell
D4 1982-83
L
0.720
0.638
0.570
0.646
0.749
0.563
0.651
0.769
0.557
0.521
0.780
0.783
0.798
0.765
0.764
0.925
0 • 572
0.756
0.862
0.670
0.798
0.681
0.736
0.570
0.661
253
26 Braintree
27 Breckland
28 Chester
39 Coiwyn
40 Crawley
31 E.Devon
32 Forest of Dean
33 Glyndwr
34 Gravesham
35 Kennet
36 Kings Lynn
37 Lliw V.
38 Mid Sussex
39 Neath
40 N.Devon
41 N.Wilts.
42 Rhondda
43 S.Oxfords.
44 S.Staffs.
45 Teignbridge
46 Torridge
47 W.Derbs.
48 W.Llndsey
49 Wychavon
50 Barrow
51 Blackpool
52 Blaenau
0.758
0.572
0.605
0.611
0.677
0.757
0.661
0.645
0.730
0.706
0.817
0.512
0.648
0.651
0.596
0.693
0.543
0.687
0.634
0.656
0.663
0.813
0.591
0.687
0.565
0.687
0.680
0.146
0.402
0.376
0.403
0.262
0.212
0.307
0.298
0.209
0.248
0.156
0.421
0.294
0.343
0.403
0.278
0.438
0.248
0.265
0.338
0.333
0.189
0.464
0.282
0.327
0.249
0.282
0 .9017
0. 9270
0 .9104
0 .889619
0. 8818
0 .8083
0.8760
0.8975
0. 8326
0 .8535
0.83881
1
0 .9012
0 .8669
0. 9064
0. 8495
0. 9477
0. 8788
0. 9301
0. 8769
0. 8653
0. 7822
0. 8729
0. 8582
0. 9875
0.8780
0. 8653
254
53 Bradford
	
0.540
	
0.439
	
0.9444
54 Cambridge	 0.546
	
0.429
	
0. 9507
55 Ceredigion
	 0.676
	
0.318
	
0. 8527
K0.406
0.532
0.553
0.520
0.492
0.499
0.520
0.400
0,473
0.362
0 .391
0.322
0.355
0.332
0.255
0.391
0,359
0.283
0.319
0.368
0.469
0.462
0.463
0.432
0.418
TE
0.7554
0. 8902
0. 8824
0. 9881
0.7753
0 .7925
0. 9375
0. 8307
0. 8618
0. 8353
0.65B
0 .9099
0. 9857
1
1
1
0 .8861
0. 9445
0. 9643
0.8487
0. 8111
0.8079
0. 8875
0. 8656
0. 8111
255
Ce)
1 Cynon
2 Devon
3 Greenwich
4 Hlnckley
5 Humberside
6 NewcastIe-U-Tyne
7 New Forest
8 N.E.Derbyshire
9 N.Tyneside
10 Oldharn
11 Redbridge
12 Rocbdale
13 St Edmunds.
14 Sedgefield
15 Solihull
16 S.Tyneside
17 Stockport
18 Stockton
19 Sunder.Iand
20 Thanet
21 Wigan
22 Avon
23 Beds.
24 Berks.
25 Cambs.
Dl 1987-88
L
0.665
0.414
0.410
0.367
0.495
0.467
0.396
0.537
0.430
0.626
0.513
0.599
0.433
0.449
0.652
0 • 370
0.540
0.661
0.531
0.587
0.476
0.506
0.418
0.457
0.542
256
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbrla
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
0.552
0.443
0.402
0.485
0.357
0.416
0.433
0.372
0.410
0.493
0.546
0.523
0.411
0.601
0.507
0.565
0.483
0.529
0.421
0.418
0.522
0.496
0.375
0 • 532
0.499
0.446
0.604
0.559
0.500
0.615
0.555
0.461
0.427
0.425
0.583
0.340
0.464
0.374
0.403
0.403
0.453
0.552
0.346
0,474
0. 8525
0.8334
0. 9164
0 .8240
1
0.8764
0. 8555
0. 9584
0. 8818
0. 8079
0. 8016
0 .7985
0. 8866
0. 8836
0. 7948
0.8468
0.7962
0. 8374
0. 8824
0.8718
0. 9211
0. 7924
K0.476
0.360
0.308
0.072
0.259
0.323
0.368
0.500
G.335
0.373
0.253
0.259
0.491
0.422
0.253
0.337
0.235
0.377
0.091
0.472
0.388
0.348
0.315
0.279
TE
0.9265
0. 7115
0. 8371
1
0.6974
0. 8711
0. 9493
1
0.8550
0.8843
0. 9511
0. 8480
0. 9246
0.9457
0.8689
0. 8659
1
0 .8714
0. 9785
0 .9625
0. 8269
0 .8919
0. 8667
0. 9076
257
(f)	 D2 1987-88
L
1 Greenwich	 0.500
2 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne	 0.829
3 N.Tyneside	 0.667
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 0.828
5	 Sedgefield	 0.965
6	 S.Tyneside	 0.660
7 Sunderland	 0.555
8 Bradford	 0.420
9 Gwent	 G.664
10 Barnsley	 0.609
11 Leeds	 0.632
12 Reading	 0.737
13 Barrow	 0.492
14 Derby	 0.519
15 Chester-le-Street 0.721
16 Derwentside	 0.657
17 Durham	 0.604
18 Easington	 0.619
19 Harlow.	 0.817
20 Hull	 0.470
21 Burnley	 0.661
22 Mansfield	 0.619
23 Wrekin	 0.670
24 Islwyn	 0.651
258
25 Stoke	 0.504	 0.500	 0.9003
26 LIncoln	 0.787	 0.197	 0.8689
K0.466
0.510
0.353
0.090
0.461
0.285
0,235
0.251
0.461
0.280
0.545
0.376
0.392
0.356
0.328
0.265
0.412
0.252
0.289
0.227
0.377
0.196
0.491
0.172
0.249
TE
0. 8844
0. 8199
0. 9594
1
0.9721
0. 9099
0. 8810
1
0.8294
0 .9614
0. 9245
0. 8431
0.8388
0.8577
0.8109
0 .8594
0. 9254
0.8500
0 .9492
1
0. 8092
0. 8712
0. 7987
1
0. 8604
259
(g)	 D3 198788
L
1 Devon	 0.450
2 Greenwich	 0.490
3 Newcastle-U-Tyne	 0.481
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 0.887
5 N Tyneside	 0.413
6 S.Tyneside	 0.602
7 Sunderland	 0.697
8 Barrow	 0.406
9 Blaenau	 0.502
ID Gwent	 0.560
11 W.Glamorgan	 0.428
12 Newham	 0.570
13 Bury	 0.564
14 Barnsley	 0.580
15 Gateshead	 0.666
16 Leeds	 0.680
17 Derby	 0.446
18 Chester-le-Street 0.718
19 Derwen.tside	 0.562
20 Durham	 0.585
21 Easington	 0.615
22 Harlow	 0.785
23 Hull	 0.492
24 Lincoln	 0.688
25 Blyth V.	 0.708
260
26 Wrekln
	 0.669
	
0.315
	
0.8222
27 Stoke	 0.501
	
0.497
	
0. 7886
28 Islwyn	 0.703
	
0.301
	
0. 8059
K0.284
0.192
0.455
0.216
0.256
0 • 337
0.397
0.232
0.399
0.141
0.170
0.190
0.193
0.186
0.252
0.268
0.325
0.220
0.181
0.087
0.360
0.307
0.200
0.110
0.145
TE
0.8625
0.6397
1
0. 8304
0.7933
0. 9595
1
0. 8482
0. 9706
0. 6911
0.8725
0.7242
0. 7375
0.8120
0.7560
0. 8432
0. 9791
0.8009
0.6277
1
0.8868
0.9658
0. 7930
0.8808
0. 8700
261
(h)
1 Copeland
2 Cynon
3 Greenwich
4 Hinckley
5 Kirklees
6 Newcastle-U-Tyne
7 New Forest
8 N.E.Derbyshire
9 N.Tyneside
10 Oldharn
11 Redbridge
12 Rochdale
13 Rushmoor
14 St.Edmunds.
15 Sedgefield
16 Solihull
17 S.Tyneside
18 Stockport
19 Stockton
20 Sunderland
21 Thanet
22 Wigan
23 Aylesbury
24 Bassetlaw
25 Brackneil
D4 1987-88
L
0.653
0.904
0.527
0.680
0.710
0.579
0.544
0.662
0.569
0.845
0.660
0.792
0.783
0.704
0.750
0.664
0 • 571
0.714
0.924
0.798
0.629
0.576
0.720
0.661
0.668
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26 Braintree
27 Breckland
28 Chester
29 Coiwyn
30 Crawley
31 E.Devon
32 Forest of Dean
33 Glyndwr
34 Gravesham
35 Rennet
36 Rings Lynn
37 Lliw V.
38 Mid Sussex
39 Neath
40 N.Devon
41 N.Wilts.
42 Rhondda
43 S.Oxfords
44 S.Staffs.
45 Teignbridge
46 Torridge
47 W.Derbs.
48 W.Llndsey
49 Wychavon
50 Barrow
51 Blackpool
52 Blaenau
0.624
0.626
0.564
0.655
0.792
0.617
0.863
0.587
0.728
0.585
0.722
0.558
0.672
0.685
0.687
0.603
0.665
0.602
0.631
0.716
0.629
0.707
0.610
0.749
0.565
0 • 711
0.615
0 • 129
0.199
0.309
0.188
0 • 219
0.143
0.243
0.229
0.167
0.091
0.150
0.214
0.211
0.202
0.153
0.164
0.179
0.132
0.180
0.175
0.171
0.185
0.263
0.186
0 • 227
0.226
0.276
0. 9301
0 .9033
0. 9870
0.8750
0 .7240
0 .9408
0.6606
0 .9612
0.7919
1
0. 7581
1
0. 8500
0. 8318
0. 8365
0 .9524
0. 8606
0 .9667
0 .9050
0.8000
0. 9086
0.8091
0 .9193
0 .7662
0 .9954
0.7974
0.9127
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Figs. DA3 (a - Ii)
	
Labour and capital combinations
(a)
	 D1 1982/83
0
0
	
0.2	 0.4	 0.6	 0.8
	
1
Capital Per Thousand Pounds of Output
265
(b)
0.8
4-4o 0.6
0
C,,
•0 0.5
00.
0.4
0.3
0.20
.0
2
0.1
0
D1 1987/88
0	 0.2	 0.4	 0.6	 0.8
Capital Per Thousand Pounds of Output
266
(c)	 D2 1982/83
0	 0.2	 0.4	 0.6	 0.8
Capital Per Thousand Pounds of Output
1
0.9
%0.8
0
0.7
Cl)
0.6
= 0.5
U)
.Q 0.2
0.1
0
267
(d)
1-
0.9 -j
o
•	 0.7 -J
U)
0.5
o 0.3 -
0.1
01
D2 1987/88
:
U
U
U
U
U
0	 0.2	 0:4	 0:6
Capital Per Thousand Pounds of Output
268
(e)
	 D3 1982/83
1
0.9 -
.9- 0.8 -
o
•	 0.7 -;
Cl,
-
00.
H
U,
o 0.4
2 0.2
0.1
0
0
	
0.2	 0.4	 0.6	 0.8
Capftal Per Thousand Pounds of Output
0.9
0.8
4-
0.7
0.6
0
Cl,
0
0.3
C-
0.2
0.1
0
269
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Figs. DA3 (I - p)	 Unit Isoquants
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SECTION 4
281
Performance measures for Individual DLOs
(a) Dl 1982-83
°oSurplus 9oReturn VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Cynon	 5.1	 50.2	 6340	 0.8416
2 Devon	 8.4	 15.8	 6441	 0.9329
3 Greenwich	 -17	 -48.6	 6700	 0.9468
4 Hinckley	 13.4	 30	 6958	 0.9582
5 Humberside	 5	 27.4	 740	 0.9395
6 Newcastle-U-Tyne 5.3	 37.9	 4918	 0.8764
7 New Forest	 1.7	 15.1	 4529	 0.8367
8 N.E.Derbys.	 3.6	 33.3	 9350	 0.8381
9 N.Tyneside	 2	 20.1	 6197	 0.8604
10 Oldham	 2.2	 17	 4056	 0.8790
11 Redbridge	 3.8	 13	 5337	 0.8968
12 Rochdale	 5.5	 6.3	 7582	 0.8937
13 St.Edmunds.	 5.1	 14.9	 5650	 0.9013
14 Sedgefield	 4.3	 8.2	 7210	 0.8587
15 Solihull	 3.4	 21.1	 6490	 0.8698
16 S.Tyne5ide	 11	 170	 4950	 0.9549
17 Stockport	 3.5	 16.8	 7979	 0.8552
18 Stockton	 6.8	 38	 8910	 0.8552
19 Sunderland	 10.7	 42.3	 10088	 0.9237
20 Thanet	 5.1	 8.4	 10000	 0.9353
21 Wlgan	 7	 37.4	 5096	 0.9018
22 Avon	 7	 43	 5102	 0.9266
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23 Beds.
24 Berks.
25 Cambs.
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbria
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
4
8.9
6.6
12.7
5.2
6.7
13.9
3.6
6.5
0.7
1.2
6.3
5.1
8.2
2.9
1.8
3.9
0.9
3.6
2.7
11.4
3.4
0.8
1.4
0.3
27.7
27.9
17
46.9
15.5
16.3
47.5
19.3
5.7
3.6
6.3
23.2
7.7
25.1
9.5
8
17 • 8
15.1
5.7
20.3
44.6
20.4
5.3
36
7.5
7026
6646
5253
9024
6401
5558
11432
5306
5796
6742
3978
5596
7381
9955
5456
9439
7534
5263
5306
8757
8438
7347
4335
4857
7100
0.8971
0.9336
1
1
0.8962
0.9369
1
0. 8627
0. 9643
0. 8093
0 .9535
0.9146
0.8786
0.9273
0.8974
0.8288
0.8849
0.8491
0. 9251
0.8192
0. 9408
0.8665
0.8607
0.8081
0.8212
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(b) Dl 1987-88
Surplus	 Rturn VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Cynon	 -4.9	 -1	 10667	 0.7554
2 Devon	 4.0	 8.6	 7711	 0.8902
3 Greenwich	 2.3	 7.9	 2236	 0.8824
4 Hinckley	 8.0	 48	 9500	 0.8810
5 Humberside	 0.5	 8.5	 12206	 0.7753
	
6 Newcastle-U-Tyne 3.4	 23.2	 5732	 0.7925
7 New Forest	 6.6	 17	 3140	 0.9375
8 N.E.Derbys.	 4.0	 47.5	 11864	 0.8307
9	 N.Tyneside	 6.7	 54.5	 6431	 0.8618
10 Oldham	 2.4	 10	 8966	 0.8353
11 Redbridge	 7.3	 25.6	 11618	 0.8656
12 Rochdale	 5.8	 18.0	 11232	 0.9099
13 St.Edmunds.	 14.8	 28.1	 8353	 0.9857
14 Sedgefield	 13.3	 42.7	 11083	 1
15 Solihull	 4.6	 40.0	 11930	 1
16 S.Tyneside	 14.6	 273	 9890	 1
17 Stockport	 6.3	 29.4	 10809	 0.8861
18 Stockton	 3.3	 11	 12103	 0.9445
19 Sunderland	 13.0	 52.2	 15580	 0.9643
20 Thanet	 2.9	 6.5	 8226	 0.8487
21 Wigan	 2.6	 22.9	 7900	 0.8111
22 Avon	 0.7	 5.2	 10484	 0.8079
23 Beds'.	 7.9	 49.9	 12763	 0.8875
24 l3erks.	 8.0	 24.8	 12063	 0.8656
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25 Cambs.
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbria
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
2.1
3.9
1.6
6.3
4.0
5.1
1.4
4.3
0.8
2.2
2.5
1.3
3.2
0.3
3.1
1.8
3.6
2.5
4.4
8.7
2.0
10.6
1.9
9.5
8.4
7
20.4
28.7
17
8.7
14.9
6,2
7.4
6.5
8.2
5.2
5
10.7
15.5
18.3
26.8
6.6
62.6
9.6
49.2
8
9871
10101
7531
• 9858
10788
7852
8053
14600
2490
6489
9191
8076
10234
6903
8548
9283
13297
14373
9028
6783
7271
8833
10750
0.8111
0.8525
0. 8334
0.9164
0. 8240
1
0. 8764
0. 8555
0.9584
0.8818
0.8079
0.8016
0.7985
0. 8866
0. 8836
0. 7948
0 .8468
0. 7962
0.8374
0.8824
0.8718
0.9211
0.7924
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Cc) D2 1982-83
9oSurplus 9oReturn VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Greenwich	 -24.4	 -1454.7	 2823	 0.4044
2 Newcastle-U-T	 33	 86.4	 7000	 0.8099
3 N.Tyneside	 0.8	 7.4	 5536	 1
4 N.E.Derbyshire 18.1	 358.8	 10467	 0.7905
5	 Sedgefield	 1.1	 48	 6292	 0.7615
6	 S.Tyneside	 -1.2	 -68.5	 4783	 0.7717
7	 Sunderland	 2.7	 42.3	 7698	 0.8530
8 Bradford	 3.2	 15	 2653	 0.8702
9 Gwent	 1.7	 736.7	 7243	 1
10 Barnsley	 -5.2	 -100	 1281	 0.8019
11 Leeds	 1.4	 13.6	 5990	 0.8366
12 Reading	 0.6	 5.9	 6420	 0.8107
13 Barrow	 1.2	 8.1	 3684	 0.8667
14 Derby	 9	 8.2	 5623	 0.9223
15 Chester-le-St.	 3.8	 22.9	 9955	 0.7962
16 Derwent	 5.4	 34.2	 6005	 0.8700
17 Durham	 21	 177.4	 9121	 0.8700
18 Easington	 6.4	 57	 4848	 0.7199
19 Harlow	 1.8	 13.1	 9020	 0.7155
20 Hull	 2	 18.8	 7010	 0.9670
21 Burnley	 7.3	 72.5	 8995	 0.9596
22 Mansfield	 0.8	 7.6	 4772	 0.7736
23 Stoke	 0.5	 9.8	 5005	 0.8774
24 Lincoln	 2.5	 145.8	 7424	 0.7847
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(d) D2 1987-88
9oSurplus	 oReturn VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Greenwich	 0.2	 14.3	 7720	 0.9265
2 Newcastle-tJ-T. -0.1	 0	 4686	 0.7115
3 N.Tyneside	 1	 22.2	 5481	 0.8371
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 5.7	 44	 10380	 1
5	 Sedgefield	 1.3	 4	 4312	 0.6974
6	 S.Tyneside	 0.5	 27.1	 10526	 0.8711
7	 Sunderland	 7.5	 170.9	 10240	 0.9493
8 Bradford	 0	 0	 3840	 1
9 Gwent	 0.1	 0	 5824	 0.8550
10 Barnsley	 1.8	 0	 7110	 0.8844
11 Leeds	 0	 123.5	 5522	 0.9512
12 Reading	 0.4	 6.1	 7255	 0.8480
13 Barrow	 1.6	 6.9	 7757	 0.9246
14 Derby	 0.2	 16.4	 8130	 0.9457
15 Chester-le-St.	 2.6	 22	 7823	 0.8689
16 Derwent	 0.5	 9.9	 7717	 0.8660
17 Durham	 16.1	 138.2	 10520	 1
18 Easington	 0.1	 10.3	 6800	 0.8714
19 Harlow	 9.2	 338.6	 10883	 0.9785
20 Hull	 5.9	 142.9	 10842	 0.9625
21 Burnley	 -4.9	 -10	 4840	 0.8269
22 Mansfield	 3.2	 6.2	 6891	 0.8919
23 Stoke	 0	 25.4	 7123	 0.9004
24 Lincoln	 1.6	 23.2	 8932	 0.8689
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Ce) D3 1982-83
Surplus	 Return VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Devon	 9.5	 33.6	 8583	 1
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 1.3	 28.2	 4742	 0.8398
3 N.E.Derbyshire 12.5 	 214.5	 8958	 1
4 N.Tyneside	 4.6	 51.9	 4690	 0.7091
5	 S.Tyneside	 15.7	 608	 5350	 0.9097
6	 Sunderland	 0.7	 5.4	 8714	 0.7242
7 Barrow
8 Gwent
9 W.Glamorgan
10 Newharn
11 Bury
12 Gateshead
13 Leeds
14 Derby
15 Chester-le-St.
16 Derwentside
17 Durham
18 Easingxon
19 Harlow
20 Hull
21 Lincoln
22 Wrekin
23 Stoke
8.5
0.3
9.9
2.2
5.1
2.6
1
22
7.1
4
14.7
12.7
2.9
10.1
12.8
2.9
3
65.4
148
101.5
35.5
32.2
35.7
7.6
795.6
17.9
100
107.8
42.2
21.2
67.8
722.3
41.1
25.4
4357
8840
7425
5090
4860
5640
3021
9640
5910
5550
9100
2840
4120
7640
9204
6710
4211
0 .8150
1
0 .7156
0 .7390
0. 9764
0 .7097
0.8413
0. 8512
0.8394
0.7822
0.9471
0.7282
0. 7693
0.8156
0. 9982
0.7269
0 .7208
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(f) D3 1987-88
9oSurplus	 Return VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
1 Devon	 4.1	 12.1	 3000	 0.8844
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 5.1 	 96.4	 7932	 0.9594
3 N.E.Derbyshire	 3.3	 0	 10167	 1
4 N.Tyneside	 5.5	 151.2	 3096	 0.9721
5	 S.Tyneside	 1.2	 151.2	 8938	 0.9099
6	 Sunderland	 6.1	 78.4	 11000	 0.8810
7 Barrow	 1	 142.4	 18250	 1
8 Gwent	 5	 0	 7612	 0.9614
9 W.Glamorgan	 2.6	 78	 9086	 0.9245
10 Newham	 3.4	 149	 11410	 0.8431
11 Bury	 4.4	 39.2	 10835	 0.8388
12 Gateshead	 0.6	 37	 7121	 0.8577
13 Leeds	 0	 0	 9928	 0.8110
14 Derby	 4.9	 80	 14144	 0.8594
15 Chester-le-St.	 2.9	 26.3	 8493	 0.9254
16 Derwentside	 5	 331.2	 16479	 0.8500
17 Durham	 8.8	 175.2	 8942	 0.9492
18 Easington	 0.8	 30.4	 6292	 1
19 Harlow	 1.8	 61.5	 14972	 0.8092
20 Hull	 1.6	 55.5	 8190	 0.8713
21 Lincoln	 4	 695.8	 16257	 0.7988
22 Wrekin	 1.6	 61.9	 9522	 1
23 Stoke	 0.1	 0	 9432	 0.8223
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(g) D4 1982-83
1 Hinckley
2 Kirklees
3 Newcastle
4 New Forest
5 N.E.Derbyshire
6 N.Tyneside
7 Oldham
8 Redbridge
9 Rochdale
10 Rushmoor
11 St.Edmunds.
12 Sedgefield
13 Solihull
14 S. Tyneside
15 Stockport
16 Stockton
17 Sunderland
18 Thanet.
19 Wigan
20 Aylesbury
21 Bassetlaw
22 Bracknell
23 Braintree
24 Chester
Surplus	 Return VAper
Output	 Capital Worker TE
	
5.9	 13.8	 7333	 0.9174
7	 19.7	 6148	 0.8152
	
8.5	 93.9	 5755	 0.9875
	
7.1	 20.7	 8750	 0.8819
	
3.6	 22.3	 6586	 0.8186
	
4.2	 33.9	 5822	 0.9549
	
1.2	 15.3	 3783	 0.9796
	
6.3	 62.4	 8594	 0.8707
	
2.4	 6.9	 7101	 0.8084
	
2.8	 7.2	 8071	 0.8320
	
6.5	 48.6	 6980	 0.8157
	
2.1	 6.6	 7832	 0.8256
3	 11.1	 8187	 1
	
9.4	 118	 4381	 0.9636
	
5.2	 29.5	 7458	 0.8327
	
2.6	 20.4	 7418	 0.9427
	
6.3	 40.9	 8698	 0.8995
5	 16	 7095	 0.9825
	
4.2	 18.4	 4356	 0.8323
	
3.4	 4.2	 7444	 0.8279
	
1.4	 5.3	 4667	 0.9506
3.7	 35.1	 9414	 0.8848
	
7.5	 77	 8200	 0.9018
1.5	 33	 4048	 0.9270
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25 Coiwyn
26 Crawley
27 E.Devon
28 Forest of Dean
29 Glyndwr
30 Gravesham
31 Kennet
32 Kings Lynn
33 LIiw Valley
34 Mid-Sussex
35 Neath
36 N.Devon
37 N.Wilts.
38 Rhondda
39 S.Oxfords.
40 S.Staffs.
41 Teignbridge
42 Torridge
43 W.Derbyshire
41 W.Lindsey
45 Wychavon
46 Barrow
47 Blackpool
48 Blaenau
49 Bradford
50 Cambridge
51 Ceredigion
6.4
4.5
3.5
3.2
5.1
5.4
2.8
4.5
3.4
2.5
1.7
1.9
7.6
1.7
0.7
3.4
1
2.5
5.2
2.1
2.5
7.9
5.7
3.1
2.8
3.2
2.4
32
23.2
11.8
14
8.7
31.1
11.2
12.9
15.1
9.3
13.6
12.5
15.7
13.7
45.7
9.6
5.9
9.2
9
8.8
7.2
32.4
23.2
7.2
10.8
10.2
14.5
4386
7365
7063
5907
5292
7220
7348
8216
3897
6975
5108
4270
7069
5556
7099
6407
5192
5912
7310
3885
6415
5676
8984
6069
4286
9914
4657
0 .9105
0.8897
0. 8819
0.8084
0. 8760
0.8976
0.8327
0. 8536
0.8389
1
0. 9000
0. 8670
0 .9065
0.8496
0.9478
0.8789
0.9301
0.8770
0. 8654
0.7823
0.8730
0. 8583
0.9875
0.8781
0. 8654
0. 9445
0 .9508
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(h) D4 1987-88
1 Hinckley
2 Kirklees
3 Newcastle
4 New Forest
5 N.E.Derbyshire
6 N.Tyneside
7 Oldham
8 Redbridge
9 Rochdale
10 Rushmoor
11 St.Edmunds.
12 Sedgefield
13 Solihull
14 S. Tyneside
15 Stockport
16 Stockton
17 Sunderland
18 Thariet
19 Wigan
20 Aylesbury
21 Bassetlaw
22 Bracknell
23 Braintree
24 Chester
%Surplus
Output	 Capital
8	 23.5
2	 21.8
8.2	 87.2
3.9	 15
9.7	 28.6
2.5	 27.8
1.2	 11.5
3.4	 120
1.1	 7.6
1.3	 5.9
0.8	 33.8
-0.1	 7.2
4.4	 39.7
7.8	 90
4.7	 31.1
2.5	 19.4
9.1	 58.9
8.6	 26.7
1.2	 17.4
4.5	 5.6
7.9	 78.3
7.4	 110.6
4.9	 15.2
0.2	 2.5
VAper
Worker TE
	
8959	 0.8304
	
8316	 0.7934
	
6667	 0.9596
	
10622	 1
	
8517	 0.8483
	
6445	 0.9706
	
9776	 0.6911
	
12851	 0.8726
	
8960	 0.7243
	
12940	 0.7375
	
10817	 0.8121
	
11713	 0.7560
	
9333	 0.8433
	
5754	 0.9791
	
9044	 0.8009
	
8974	 0.6278
	
11285	 1
	
9722	 0.8868
	
7426	 0.9659
	
9946	 0.7930
	
10034	 0.8809
	
14909	 0.8700
	
10578	 0.9302
	
6246	 0.9034
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25 Colwyn	 5.9
26 Crawley	 -7.7
27 E.Devon	 9.4
28 Forest of Dean -5.8
29 Glyndwr	 8.5
30 Gravesham	 3.1
31 Kennet	 0.3
32 Kings Lynn	 2.7
33 Lliw Valley	 8
34 Mid-Sussex	 1.8
35 Neath	 3.1
36 N.Devon	 6.1
37 N.Wilts.	 1.3
38 Rhondda	 5.1
39 S.Oxfords.	 6.8
40 S.Staffs.	 4.6
41 Teignbridge	 1.1
42 Torridge	 3
43 W.Derbyshire	 8.2
44 W.Lindsey	 3.9
45 Wychavon	 5.2
46 Barrow	 3
47 Blackpool	 4.6
48. Blaenau	 8
49 Bradford	 0.5
50 Cambridge	 3.3
51 Ceredigion	 3.6
21.7
-16.5
51.6
-7 • 8
16.9
14.2
49.8
9.2
42.9
6.9
49
33.8
55.9
88
29.2
6.1
5.4
42.9
17
17.1
113.6
92.8
13.8
223.3
6.4
11.6
51.6
11286
8571
9700
6818
8073
9831
12286
10482
8582
8625
8626
9419
11604
8927
12507
8343
7945
10281
8167
8541
12330
10832
10657
8962
6459
10667
8587
0 .9 871
0.8750
0.7240
0 .9409
0. 6606
0.9612
0. 7919
1
0.7582
1
0.8500
0.8319
0 .8366
0 .9524
0 .8606
0.9667
0 .9050
0 .8000
0 .9087
0.8091
0. 9193
0 .7663
0. 9955
0. 7975
0 .9127
0 .9425
0. 8182
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Arithmetic mean, maximum and minimum values
(a) Dl	 Surplus	 Return	 VA
Output	 Capital	 worker()
1981-82 Mean	 3.8	 13.9	 6070
Mm	 -2.3	 -65.4	 2095
Max	 23.4	 160	 10310
1982-83 Mean	 4.8	 18.4	 6798
Mm	 -17	 -48.6	 7400
Max	 13.9	 170	 11432
1983-84 Mean	 3.9	 14.2	 6806
Mm	 1	 5.2	 3656
Max	 11.1	 148	 12235
1984-85 Mean	 4.8	 21.4	 7722
Mm	 0.2	 5.1	 2472
Max	 16.9	 243	 11974
1985-86 Mean	 4.2	 16.1	 8088
Mm	 a	 5	 2684
Max	 18.8	 198	 16588
1986-87 Mean	 4.3	 19.0	 8936
Mm	 -8.8	 -42.9	 3171
Max	 13.8	 153	 17353
1987-88 Mean	 3.4	 15.7	 9174
Mm	 -5	 -1	 2236
Max	 14.88	 273	 15580
1988-89 Mean	 2.9	 26.0	 9185
Mm	 -44	 -167	 3334
Max	 18.4	 427	 14922
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(b) D2
1981-82 Mean
Mm
Max
1982-83 Mean
Mm
Max
1983-84 Mean
Mm
Max
1984-85 Mean
Mm
Max
1985-86 Mean
Mm
Max
1986-87 Mean
Mm
Max
1987-88 Mean
Mm
Max
1988-89 Mean
Mm
Max
96 Surplus
Output
3.5
-16.2
17.2
3.9
-24.4
33
0.8
-80.1
15.6
1.4
-9
6.8
1.9
-6.5
8.8
1.6
-13.1
6.3
2.4
-4.9
16.1
1.32
-35.3
9.6
6 Return
Capital
40.5
-933
500
12.2
-1454.7
736.7
3.8
-3129.4
229.1
42 • 8
-20.4
220
70.5
-12.2
519.5
64.2
-3.1
517.7
47 • 3
-10
338.6
23.7
-423.9
300
worker(E)
6050
1185
9842
6342
1281
10467
6611
1520
10324
5968
533
10249
6804
4002
10568
6793
3680
10024
7212
3840
10883
7409
1136
11533
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(c) D3
1981-82 Mean
Mm
Max
1982-83 Mean
Mm
Max
1983-84 Mean
Mm
Max
1984-85 Mean
Mm
Max
1985-86 Mean
Mm
Max
1986-87 Mean
Mm
Max
1987-88 Mean
Mm
Max
1988-89 Mean
Mm
Max
0o Surplus
Output
8.0
-8,8
28.6
6.9
0.3
22
5.7
-0.9
23.9
4.9
0.4
26
3.7
-9.5
8.9
4.3
1.2
9.2
3.0
0
8.8
4.0
0.1
9.9
Oo Return
Capi tal
121.3
-154.5
872
137.8
5.4
795.6
159.1
-7.1
1922.3
83.4
8.9
450
159.5
-30
834
125.8
0
712
99.4
0
695.8
128.6
0
507.2
worker(E)
4811
1260
9286
6123
2840
9640
6695
2938
10217
6072
1655
11800
8238
1212
16667
9004
3000
17121
9635
3000
18250
10311
4250
17871
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Cd) D4
1981-82 Mean
Mm
Max
1982-83 Mean
Mm
Max
1983-84 Mean
Mm
Max
1984-85 Mean
Mm
Max
1985-86 Mean
Mm
Max
1986-87 Mean
Mm
Max
1987-88 Mean
Mm
Max
1988-89 Mean
Mm
Max
% Surplus
Output
4.8
0.2
18.4
3.5
0.7
9.4
5.4
0.8
19.1
2.7
-7.5
9.7
3.8
-2.3
9.6
4.1
-1.1
9.3
4
-7.7
9.7
3.4
-4.1
9.2
Return
Capital
22.2
1.6
307.5
14.7
4.2
118
25.9
5.7
118.1
29.3
-9
226.1
35.3
-4
101
38.4
-5 • 5
144.9
41.6
-16.5
223.3
12.6
-25.3
89 • 6
worker(E)
5920
2814
10213
6213
3783
9914
6861
3198
14699
7506
4259
15984
8123
4687
15143
8973
5550
17093
9245
5754
14909
9877
5141
16071
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Figs. DA4 (a — c) illustrate the overall mean values of
the performance measures (by category) over the period.
1983	 1984	 19.	 196	 1987	 19	 19
I.
II)
0
1982
2
3
5
6
7
B
298
Fig. DA4 (a) Mean value :
	 Surplus I Output
D	 = Dl
1.
	= D2
•	 = D3
= D4
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Fig. flA4 Ib) Mean value :
	
Return I Capital
19S3	 1984	 19	 1985	 1987	 19	 19
= Dl
I. = D2
• = D3
= D4
14C
120
110
1
90
70
40
20
10
0
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11
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9
8
7
i.
cp'
Qc	 6
V0 5
-s-i-
4
3
2
1
0
192 1983	 1984	 19	 198	 1987	 1968	 19
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Fig. DA4 (c) Mean value : Value added per worker ()
= Dl
= D2
•	 = D3
D4
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SECTION 5
302
Rankings by performance measure for
1982-83 and 1987-88
(a) Dl 1982-83
Surplus	 oReturn VA	 TE Overall
Output	 Capital Worker
1 Cynon	 19	 2	 27	 40 11
2 Devon	 8	 29	 26	 15 16
3 Greenwich	 47	 47	 22	 9 45
4 Hinckley	 2	 13	 20	 6	 7
5 Humberside	 23	 16	 14	 11 12
6 Newcastle-tJ-TYfle 17	 9	 42	 31 22
7 New Forest	 40	 31	 44	 42 44
8 N.E.Derbys.	 28	 12	 6	 41	 9
9 N.Tyneside	 38	 22	 28	 36 35
10 Oldharn	 37	 25	 46	 29 41
11 Redbridge	 27	 34	 34	 25	 36
12 Rochdale	 16	 40	 12	 27 21
13 St.Edmunds.	 19	 33	 30	 22 32
14 Sedgefield	 24	 36	 17	 37	 30
15 Solihull	 33	 19	 23	 32	 28
16 S.Tyneside	 5	 1	 41	 7 10
17 Stockport	 32	 27	 11	 38 24
18 Stockton	 12	 8	 8	 1	 5
19 Sunderland	 6	 7	 2	 19	 3
20 Thanet	 19	 45	 3	 13 20
21 Wigan	 10	 10	 40	 21 15
10
25
7
13
3
18
14
1
28
15
45
42
16
19
9
35
39
26
43
28
36
4
33
44
41
46
6
15
14
25
4
30
28
3
23
42
46
40
18
38
17
35
37
24
31
42
21
5
20
45
11
39
39
19
24
38
7
25
32
1
35
29
21
47
31
15
4
33
5
13
37
35
9
10
16
45
43
18
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22 Avon
23 Beds.
24 Berks.
25 Cambs.
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbria
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
17 13
	
24	 14
	
14	 8
	
1	 29
	
1	 2
	
26	 26
	
12	 27
	
1	 1
	
34	 34
	
5	 33
	
46	 43
	
8	 46
	
20	 18
	
30	 25
	
16	 6
	
23	 38
	
43	 31
	
28	 17
	
39	 41
18 40
	
45	 19
	
10	 4
	
33	 23
	
35	 47
47 37
	
44	 39
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(b)	 Dl. 1987-88
g6 Surplus %Return VAj TE OveralJ
Output	 Capital worker
1 Cynon	 -	 47	 47	 17	 46 42
2 Devon	 22	 32	 37	 14 35
3 Greenwich	 34	 37	 47	 20 45
4 Hinckley	 8	 7	 25	 5 11
5 Humberside	 45	 33	 6	 46 27
6 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne 25	 17	 44	 44 29
7 New Forest	 12	 22	 45	 10 24
8 N.E.Derbys.	 21	 8	 10	 34	 8
9 N.Tyneside	 11	 3	 43	 26 20
10 Oldham	 33	 28	 28	 32 30
11 Redbridge	 10	 15	 11	 24	 6
12 Rochdale	 15	 20	 12	 13 15
13 St.Edmunds.	 1	 13	 31	 6 12
14 Sedgefield	 3	 9	 13	 1	 3
15 Solihull	 17	 10	 9	 1	 6
16 S.Tyneside	 2	 1	 22	 1	 4
17 Stockport	 14	 11	 14	 17	 9
18 Stockton	 26	 26	 7	 9 21
19 Sunderland	 4	 4	 1	 7	 1
20 Thanet	 29	 41	 32	 29 37
21 Wigan	 30	 18	 35	 36 26
22 Avon	 44	 44	 18	 38 38
2 Beds.	 9	 5	 4	 15	 2
24 Berks.	 7	 16	 8	 24	 5
	36
	
30
	
23
	
37 31
	
23
	
35
	
20
	
28 23
	
40
	
39
	
38
	
33 44
	
13
	
19
	
24
	
12 19
	
20
	
12
	
15
	
35 14
	
16
	
22
	
35
	
1 22
	
41
	
31
	
34
	
22 40
	
19
	
25
	
2
	
27	 13
	
43
	
43
	
45
	
8	 46
	
34
	
38
	
42
	
21 43
	
32
	
41
	
27
	
38	 36
	
42
	
35
	
33
	
40	 41
	
27
	
44
	
19
	
41	 33
	
46
	
46
	
40
	
16	 47
	
28
	
27
	
30
	
18	 28
	
39
	
24
	
26
	
43	 32
	
24
	
21
	
5
	
30	 18
	
31
	
14
	
3
	
42	 16
	
18
	
40
	
21
	
31	 25
	
6
	
2
	
41
	
19	 17
	
37
	
29
	
39
	
23	 39
	
5
	
6
	
29
	
11	 10
	
38
	
36
	
16
	
45	 34
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25 Cambs.
26 Cornwall
27 Cumbria
28 Dorset
29 E.Sussex
30 Gloucs.
31 Hants.
32 Kent
33 Leics.
34 Norfolk
35 Northants.
36 Northumberland
37 Oxfords.
38 Shrops.
39 Somerset
40 Suffolk
41 Warwicks.
42 Wilts.
43 Blackpool
44 Blaenau
45 Bradford
46 Ceredigion
47 Copeland
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(c) D2 1982-83
oSurpIus Return
Output	 Capital
1 Greenwich	 24	 24
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 1	 5
3 N.Tyrieside	 18	 20
4 D.E.Derbys.	 3	 2
5	 Sedgefield	 17	 8
6 S.Tyneside	 22	 22
7 Sunderland	 10	 9
8 Bradford	 9	 13
9 Gwent	 14	 1
10 Barnsley	 23	 23
11 Leeds	 15	 14
12 Reading	 20	 21
13 Barrow	 16	 18
14 Derby	 4	 17
15 Chester-le-St.	 8	 11
16 Derwent	 7	 10
17 Durham	 2	 3
18 Easington	 6	 7
19 Harlow	 13	 15
20 Hull	 12	 12
21 Burnley	 5	 6
22 Mansfield	 18	 19
23 Stoke	 21	 16
24 Lincoln	 11	 4
Overall.
Worker
	
22	 24	 24
	
10	 14	 4
	16 	 1	 18
	
1	 17	 1
	
12	 21	 14
	
19	 20	 22
	
6	 11	 8
	
23	 9	 16
	
8	 1	 7
	
24	 15	 23
	
14	 12	 15
	
11	 13	 17
	
21	 10	 20
	
15	 6	 13
	
2	 16	 5
	
13	 8	 9
	
3	 1	 2
	
18	 22	 10
	
4	 23	 11
	
9	 4	 12
	
5	 5	 3
	
20	 19	 21
	
17	 7	 19
	
7	 18	 6
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Cd) D2 1987-88
Surplus oReturn
Output	 Capital
1 Greenwich	 16	 13
2 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne 22
	 20
3 N.Tyneside	 12	 10
4 D.E.Derbys.	 5	 6
5	 Sedgefield	 11	 19
6 S.Tyneside	 13	 7
7 Sunderland	 3	 2
8 Bradford	 20	 20
9 Gwent	 18	 20
10 Barnsley	 8	 20
11 Leeds	 20	 5
12 Reading	 15	 18
13 Barrow	 9	 16
14 Derby	 16	 12
15 Chester-le-St.	 7	 11
16 Derwent	 13	 15
17 Durham	 1	 4
18 Easington	 18	 14
19 Harlow	 2	 1
20 Hull	 4	 3
21 Burnley	 24	 24
22 Mansfield	 6	 17
23 Stoke	 20	 8
24 Lincoln	 9	 9
.i. Overall
Worker
	
11	 9	 12
	
22	 23	 23
	
20	 21	 15
	
5	 1	 5
	
23	 24	 20
	
3	 15	 6
	
6	 7	 4
	
24	 1	 22
	
18	 19	 21
	
15	 13	 16
	
19	 6	 17
	
13	 20	 18
	
10	 10	 9
	
8	 8	 10
	
9	 16	 8
	
12	 18	 13
	
4	 1	 2
	
17	 14	 19
	
1	 4	 1
	
2	 5	 3
	
21	 22	 24
	
16	 12	 11
	
14	 11	 14
	
7	 16	 7
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(e) D3 1982-83
Surplus Return
Output	 Capital
1 Devon	 9	 16
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 20	 18
3 N.E.Derbys.	 6	 4
4 N.Tyneside	 13	 11
5 S.Tyneside	 2	 3
6 Sunderland	 22	 23
7 Barrow	 10	 10
8 Gwent	 23	 5
9 W.Glamorgan	 8	 7
10 Newham	 19	 15
11 Bury	 12	 17
12 Gateshead	 18	 14
13 Leeds	 21	 22
14 Derby	 1	 1
15 Chester-le-St.	 11	 21
16 Derwentside	 14	 8
17 Durham	 3	 6
18 Easington	 5	 12
19 Harlow	 16	 20
20 Hull	 7	 9
21 Lincoln	 4	 2
22 Wrekin	 16	 13
23 Stoke	 15	 19
Overall
worker
	
7	 1	 8
	
17	 10	 21
	
4	 1	 4
	18 	 23	 14
	
14	 7	 5
	
6	 19	 19
	
19	 13	 11
	
5	 1	 9
	
9	 21	 7
	
15	 18	 18
	
16	 5	 17
	
12	 22	 15
	
22	 9	 23
	
1	 8	 1
	
11	 11	 16
	
13	 14	 10
	
3	 6	 3
	
23	 17	 13
	
21	 15	 22
	
8	 12	 6
	
2	 4	 2
	
10	 18	 12
	
20	 20	 20
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(f) .a. 1987-86
9oSurplus aReturn
Output	 Capital
1 Devon	 9	 19
	
2 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne 4	 8
3 N.E.Derbys.	 12	 20
4 N.Tyneside	 3	 4
- 5	 S.Tyneside	 18	 4
6 Sunderland	 2	 10
7 Barrow	 19	 7
8 Gwent	 5	 20
9 W.Glamorgan	 14	 11
10 Newham	 11	 6
11 Bury	 8	 15
12 Gateshead	 21	 16
13 Leeds	 23	 20
14 Derby	 7	 9
15 Chester-le-St.	 13	 18
16 Derwentside	 5	 2
17 Durham	 1	 3
18 Easington	 20	 17
19 Harlow	 15	 13
20 Hull	 16	 14
21 Lincoln	 10	 1
22 Wrekin	 16	 12
23 Stoke	 22	 20
VA per TE Overall
worker
	
23	 12	 17
	
18	 7	 9
	
9	 1	 15
	
22	 5	 8
	
15	 11	 12
	
7	 13	 4
	
1	 1	 7
	
19	 6	 18
	
13	 10	 13
	
6	 18	 6
	
8	 19	 10
	
20	 16	 22
	
10	 21	 20
	
5	 15	 5
	
16	 9	 18
	
2	 17	 1
	
14	 8	 3
	
21	 1	 23
	
4	 22	 11
	
17	 14	 19
3	 23	 2
	
11	 1	 14
	
12	 20	 21
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(g) .! 1982-83
Surplus 'Return
Output	 Capital
1 Hinckley	 -	 13	 28
2 Kirklees	 8	 20
3 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne 3	 2
4 New Forest	 7	 18
5 N.E.Derbys.	 25	 17
6 N.Tyneside	 22	 9
7 Oldham	 50	 24
8 Redbridge	 11	 4
9 Rochdale	 41	 47
10 Rushmoor	 36	 44
11 St.EdmundsburY	 9	 5
12 Sedgefield	 43	 48
13 SolihulI	 33	 35
14 S.Tyneside	 2	 1
15 Stockport	 16	 14
16 Stockton	 37	 19
17 Sunderland	 11	 7
18 Thanet.	 19	 22
19 Wigan	 22	 21
20 Aylesbury	 22	 51
21 Bassetlaw	 49	 50
22 Bracknell	 24	 8
23 Braintree	 6	 3
24 Chester	 48	 10
Overall
worker
	
17	 16	 16
	
30	 48	 18
	
3	 935
	
25	 5
	
27	 46	 23
	
34	 8	 20
	
51	 6	 48
	
6	 32	 2
	
20	 49	 40
	
10	 43	 30
	
25	 47	 8
	
11	 45	 36
	
9	 1	 26
	
44	 7	 11
	
12	 40	 10
	
14	 13	 24
	
5	 21	 3
	
22	 5	 19
	
45	 42	 29
	
13	 44	 32
	
41	 10	 51
	
2	 24	 7
	
8	 19	 1
	
48	 15	 38
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10
	
12
	
43
	
17 21
	
20
	
15
	
15
	
23 13
	
25
	
33
	
24
	
25 27
	
30
	
27
	
33
	
49 31
	
18
	
43
	
38
	
30 34
	
15
	
13
	
19
	
22 12
	
34
	
34
	
16
	
40 28
	
20
	
31
	
7
	
37 17
	
27
	
25
	
49
	
39 35
	
38
	
39
	
26
	
1 37
	
46
	
30
	
40
	
20 45
	
45
	
32
	
47
	
33 47
	
5
	
23
	
23
	
18 14
	
46
	
29
	
37
	
38	 44
	
1
	
6
	
21
	
11	 4
	
27
	
38
	
29
	
27 33
	
51
	
49
	
39
	
14	 50
	
38
	
40
	
32
	
29	 42
	
17
	
41
	
18
	
34 25
	
43
	
42
	
50
	
51	 49
	
38
	
44
	
28
	
31 43
	
4
	
11
	
36
	
36	 15
	
14
	
15
	
3
	
3	 6
	
32
	
44
	
31
	
28 39
	
34
	
36
	
46
	
34 46
	
30
	
37
	
1
	
12	 22
	
41
	
26
	
42
	
9	 41
25 Coiwyn
26 Crawley
27 E.Devon
28 Forest of Dean
29 Glyndwr
30 Gravesham
31 Kennet
32 Kings Lynn
33 Lliw Valley
34 Mid-Sussex
35 Neath
36 N.Devon
37 N.Wilts
38 Rhondda
39 S.Oxford
40 S.Staffs.
41 Teignbridge
42 Torridge
43 W.Derbys.
44 W.Lindsey
45 Wychavon
46 Barrow
47 Blackpool
48 Blaenau
49 Bradford
50 Cambridge
51 Ceredigion
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(ii) D4 1987-88
oSurpIus Return
Output	 Capital
1 Hinckley	 8	 26
2 Kirklees	 37	 27
3 Newcastle-tI-Tyne 7	 8
4 New Forest	 25	 35
5 N.E.Derbys.	 1	 23
6 N.Tyneside	 35	 24
7 Oldharn	 41	 39
8 Redbridge	 28	 2
9 Rochdale	 43	 41
10 Rushmoor	 39	 46
11 St.Edmundsbury	 45	 19
12 Sedgefield	 49	 42
13 Solihull	 24	 18
14 S.Tyneside	 12	 6
15 Stockport	 20	 21
16 Stockton	 35	 29
17 Sunderland	 3	 10
18 Thanet	 4	 25
19 Wigan	 41	 30
20 Aylesbury	 23	 47
21 Bassetlaw	 11	 9
22 Bracknell	 13	 4
23 Braintree	 19	 34
24 Chester	 48	 49
VA per TE Overall
worker
	
31	 33 18
	
41	 40 41
	
47	 12 16
	
15	 1 27
	
39	 29 17
	
49	 8 43
	
22	 49 40
	
3	 25	 4
	
30	 47 44
	
2	 46	 34
	
12	 35	 28
	
7	 45	 39
	
26	 30	 21
	
51	 7 23
	
27	 37 22
	
28	 51 37
	
10	 1	 2
	
23	 22	 10
	
45	 10 46
	
20	 41 35
	
19	 23	 6
	
1	 26	 1
	
16	 16	 24
	
50	 21	 51
16
51
2
50
5
30
47
34
9
38
31
15
39
18
14
21
43
32
6
25
17
33
21
10
46
29
27
28
51
12
50
33
36
14
40
16
43
15
19
11
7
22
45
48
16
32
31
3
5
37
1
44
38
12
9
37
24
46
43
21
6
17
36
34
33
25
8
32
4
40
44
18
42
38
5
11
14
29
48
13
35
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25 Colwyn
26 Crawley
27 E.Devon
28 Forest of Dean
29 Glyndwr
30 Gravesham
31 Kennet
32 Kings Lynn
33 Lliw Valley
34 Mid-Sussex
35 Neath
36 N.Devon
37 N.Wilts.
38 Rhondda
39 S.Oxford
40 S.Staffs.
41 Teignbridge
42 Torridge
43 W.Derbys.
44 W.Lindsey
45 Wychavon
46 Barrow
47 Blackpool
48 Blaenau
49 Bradford
50 Cambridge
51 Ceredigion
	
6	 11
24 49
	
48	 5
15 50
50 32
11 33
42 20
	
1	 36
44 15
	
1	 45
	
28	 29
	
32	 14
	
31	 13
13 12
	
27	 7
	
9	 42
20 47
38 19
19 31
	
36	 38
	
17	 3
	
43	 9
5 25
	
39	 8
18 48
	
14	 30
34 26
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SECTION 6
315
Attribute designations of DLOs for 1982-83
and 1987-88
(a) Dl 1982-83	 AttrIbutes
Ranking Output Work Sen. Work Prod.
Overall Value Prop. Div. Cats. Bonus
1 Cynon	 11	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
2 Devon	 16	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
3 Greenwich	 45	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
4 Hinckley	 7	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
5 Humberside	 12	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
6 Newcastle-tJ-Tyfle 22	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
7 New Forest	 44	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
8 N.E.Derbys.	 9	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
9 N.Tyneside	 35	 0	 1	 0	 1	 1
10 Oldham	 41	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
11 Redbridge	 36	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
12 Rochdale	 21	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0
13 St.Edmunds.	 32	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
14 Sedgefield	 30	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
15 SolihuIl	 28	 0	 1	 0	 0	 1
16 S.Tyneside	 10	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
17 Stockport	 24	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
18 Stockton	 5	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
19 Sunderland	 3	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
20 Thanet	 20	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
2lWigan	 15	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0
22 Avon	 13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
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23 Beds.	 14
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
24 Berks.	 8
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
25 Cambs.	 29
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
26 Cornwall
	
2
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
27 Cumbria
	
26
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
28 Dorset
	
27
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
29 E.Sussex
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
30 Gloucs.	 34
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
31 Hants.	 33
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
32 Kent
	
43
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
33 Leics.	 46
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
34 Norfolk
	
18
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
35 Northants.	 25
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
36 Northumberland
	
6
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
37 Oxfords.	 38
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
38 Shrops.	 31
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
39 Somerset
	
17
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
40 Suffolk
	
42
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
41 Warwicks.	 40
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
42 Wilts.	 19
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
43 Blackpool
	
4
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
44 Blaenau
	 23
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
45 Bradford
	
47
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
46 Ceredigion
	
37
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
47 Copeland
	
39
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
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(b) Dl 1987-88	 Attributes
Ranking Output Work Sep. Work Prod
Overall Value Prop. Div. Cats. Bonus
1 Cynon	 42	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
2 Devon	 35	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
3 Greenwich	 45	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0
4 Hinckley	 11	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
5 Humberside	 27	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
6 Newcastle-U-Tyne 29	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
7 New Forest	 24	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
8 N.E.Derbys.	 8	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
9 N.Tyneside	 20	 0	 1	 0	 1	 1
10 Oldham	 30	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
11 Redbridge	 6	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
l2Rochdale	 15	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0
13 St.Edmunds.	 12	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0
l4Sedgefield	 3	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0
l5Solihull	 6	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
16 S.Tyneside	 4	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0
17 Stockport	 9	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
18 Stockton	 21	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
19 Sunderland	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
20 Thanet	 37	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
2lWigan	 26	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0
22 Avon	 38	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
23 Beds.	 2	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
24Berks.	 5	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
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25 Cambs.	 31
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
26 Cornwall
	
23
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
27 Cumbria
	 44
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
28 Dorset
	
19
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
29 E.Sussex
	 14
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
30 Gloucs.	 22
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
31 Hants.	 40
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
32 Kent
	
13
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
33 Leics.	 46
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
34 Norfolk
	
43
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
35 Northants
	 36
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
36 Northumberland
	
41
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
37 Oxfords.	 33
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
38 Shrops.	 47
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
a
	
0
39 Somerset
	
28
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
40 Suffolk
	
32
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
41 Warwicks.	 18
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
42 Wilts.	 16
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
43 Blackpool
	
25
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
44 Blaenau
	 17
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
45 Bradford
	
39
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
46 Ceredigion	 10
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
47 Copeland
	
34
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
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(c) D2 1982-83	 Attributes
Ranking Output Work Sep Work Prod
Overall Value prop Div Cats Bonus
1 Greenwich	 24	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0
	
2 Newcastle-tJ-Tyne 4	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
3 N.Tyneside	 18	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
5	 Sedgefield	 14	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0
6	 S.Tyneside	 22	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0
7 Sunderland	 8	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
8 Bradford	 16	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1
9 Gwent	 7	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
10 Barnsley	 23	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
11 Leeds	 15	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
12 Reading	 17	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
13 Barrow	 20	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0
14 Derby	 13	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
15 Chester-le-St.	 5	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
16 Derwent	 9	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
17 Durham	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
18 Easington	 10	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
19 Harlow	 11	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
20 Hull	 12	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
21 Burnley	 3	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
22 Mansfield	 21	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
23 Stoke	 19	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
24 Lincoln	 6	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
320
Cd) D2 1987-88	 Attributes
Ranking Output Work Sep Wor]ç Prod
Overall Value prop Dlv Cats Bofl!
1 Greenwich	 12	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 23	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
3 N.Tyneside	 15	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1
4 N.E.Derbyshire	 5	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
5 Sedgefield	 20	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0
6 S.Tyneside	 6	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
7 Sunderland	 4	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
8 Bradford	 22	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
9 Gwent	 21	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
10 Barns ley	 16	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
11 Leeds	 17	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0
12 Reading	 18	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
l3Barrow	 9	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
14 Derby..	 10	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
15 Chester-Ie-St.	 8	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
16 Derwent	 13	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
17 Durham	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
18 Easington	 19	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
l9Harlow	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
20 Hull	 3	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
2lBurnley	 24	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
22 Mansfield	 11	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
23Stoke	 14	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
24 Lincoln	 7	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
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(e) D3 1982-83	 Attributes
Ranking Output Work	 Sep Work Prod
Overall Value Prop	 Div Cats Bonus
1 Devon	 8	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 21 	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
3 M.E.Derbyshire	 4	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
4 N.Tyneside	 14	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
5 S.Tyneside	 5	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0
6 Sunderland	 19	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
7 Barrow	 11	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0
9 W.Glamorgan	 7	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1
10 Newham	 18	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
11 Bury	 17	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
12 Gateshead	 15	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0
13 Leeds	 23	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0
14 Derby	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0
15 Chester-le-St.	 16	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
16 Derwentside	 10	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
17 Durham	 3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
18 Easington	 13	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0
19 Harlow	 22	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
20 Hull	 6	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1
21 Lincoln	 2	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
22 Wrekin	 12	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0
23 Stoke	 20	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0
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(f) D3 1987-88	 AttrIbutes
Ranking Output Work	 Work Prod
Overall Value Prop	 Div Cats Bonus
1 Devon	 17	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
2 Newcastle-U-Tyne 9	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
3 N.E.Derbyshire	 15	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
4 N.Tyneside	 8	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1
5 S.Tyneside	 12	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
6 Sunderland	 4	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
7 Barrow	 7	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
8 Gwent	 16	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
9 W.Glamorgan	 13	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
l0Newharri	 6	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0
11 Bury	 10	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
12 Gateshead	 22	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0
13 Leeds	 20	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
14 Derby	 5	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0
15 Chester-le-St.	 18	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
16 Derwentside	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
17 Durham	 3	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
18 Easingtori	 23	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0
19 Harlow	 11	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
20 Hull	 19	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
21 Lincoln	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
22 Wrekin	 14	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1
23 Stoke	 21	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0
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(g) D4 1982-83
1 Hinckley
2 Kirklees
3 Newcastle
4 New Forest
5 N.E.Derbyshire
6 N.Tyneside
7 Oldham
8 Redbridge
9 Rochdale
10 Rushrnoor
11 St.Edrnunds
12 Sedgefield
13 Solihull
14 S. Tyneside
15 Stockport
16 Stockton
17 Sunderland
18 Thanét
19 Wigan
20 Aylesbury
21 Bassetlaw
22 Bracknell
23 Braintree
24 Chester
Attributes
Rankin Output Work	 Work Prod
Overall Value Prop	 Dlv Cats Bonus
	
16	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1
	
18	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
9	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
5	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
23	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
20	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1
	
48	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
40	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0
	
30	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
8	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
36	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
26	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1
	
11	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0
	
10	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
24	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
19	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
29	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
	
32	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
51	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
7	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
38	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
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25 Colwyn
	 21
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
25 Crawley
	 13
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
27 E.Devon
	 27
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
28 Forest of Dean
	
31
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
29 Glyndwr
	 34
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
30 Gravesham
	 12
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
31 Kennet
	
28
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
a
	
0
32 Kings Lynn
	 17
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
33 Lliw Valley
	 35
	
a
	
1
	
0
	
a
	
0
34 Mid—Sussex
	 37
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
35 Neath
	
45
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
a
	
0
36 N.Devon
	 47
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
37 N.Wilts.	 14
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
a
	
0
38 Rhondda
	 44
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
39 S.Oxfords.	 4
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
40 S.Staffs.	 33
	
0
	
I
	
0
	
0
	
0
41 Teignbridge
	 50
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
42 Torridge
	 42
	
0
	
a
	
0
	
0
	
0
43 W.Derbyshire
	
25
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
44 W.Lindsey
	 49
	
a
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
a
45 Wychav.on
	 43
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
a
46 Barrow
	 15
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
47 Blackpool
	
6
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
48 Blaenau
	 39
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
49 Bradford
	
46
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
1
50 cambridge
	 22
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
1
51 Ceredigion
	 41
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
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(h) D4 1987-88
1 Hinckley
2 Kirklees
3 Newcastle
4 New Forest
5 N.E.Derbyshire
6 N.Tyneside
7 Oldham
8 Redbridge
9 Rochdale
10 Rushmoor
11 St.Edrnunds
12 Sedgefield
13 Solihull
14 S. Tyneside
15 Stockport
16 Stockton
17 Sunderland
18 Thanet
19 Wigan
20 Aylesbury
21 Bassetlaw
22 Bracknell
23 Braintree
24 Chester
Attributes
Ranking Output Work	 Sep Work Prod
Overall Value Prop	 Div Cats Bonus
	
18	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
41	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
27	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
17	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
43	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1
	
40	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
4	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
44	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0
	
34	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
28	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0
	
39	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0
	
21	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
23	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0
	
22	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
37	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	
10	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
46	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0
	
35	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
6	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1
	
24	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1
	
51	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
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25 Coiwyn
	 11
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
25 Crawley
	 49
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
27 E.Devon
	 5
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
26 Forest of Dean
	 50
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
29 Glyndwr
	 32
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
30 Gravesham
	 33
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
31 Kennet
	 20
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
32 Kings Lynn
	 36
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
33 Lliw Valley
	 15
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
34 Mid-Sussex
	 45
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
35 Neath
	
29
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
36 N.Devon
	 14
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
37 N.Wilts.	 13
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
38 Rhondda
	 12
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
39 S.Oxfords.	 7
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
40 S.Staffs.	 42
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
41 Teignbridge
	 47
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
42 Torridge
	 19
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
0
43 W.Derbyshire
	 31
	
0
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
44 W.Lindsey
	 38
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
45 Wychvon
	 3
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
1
46 Barrow
	 9
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
1
47 Blackpool
	
25
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
48 Blaenau
	 8
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
49 Bradford
	
48
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
	
1
50 Cambridge
	 30
	
1
	
1
	
1
	
0
	
1
51 Ceredigion
	 26
	
0
	
1
	
0
	
0
	
0
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SECTION 7
47
5
47
5
328
Results from NMREG application
Dl 198218AIn p ut parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 -0.22143
2	 0.29589
3	 0.51222
4	 0.04824
5	 0.47995
1987/88Input parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 -0.24891
2	 0.02011
3	 0.43431
4	 0.48740
5	 0.32536
.!2a 1982/8
24
5
1987/88
24
5
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Input parameters.
No. of observations:
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 —0.16622
2	 0.21201
3	 0.52341
4	 0.11710
5	 0.44825
Input parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent var i able
1	 0.22451
2	 0.13387
3	 0.14926
4	 0.22361
5	 0.29758
1982/83
23
5
• 1987/88
23
5
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Input parameters.
Mo. of observations :
No. of Independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 0.19629
2	 0.19180
3	 0.28513
4	 0.08527
5	 0.29333
InDut parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent, variable
1	 0.26909
2	 0.17130
3	 0.16578
4	 0.09806
5	 0.22314
! 1982/
51
5
1987/88
51
5
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Input parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 0.04956
2	 0.16464
3	 0.39924
4	 0.18808
5	 0.37214
Input parameters.
No. of observations
No. of independent variables:
Solution reached
Independent variable
1	 0.02439
2	 0.24175
3	 0.31885
4	 0.28430
5	 0.26961
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Figs. DA 7 (a-h) illustrate the impact values of the
attributes.
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Figs. DA 7 (a-h) Impact values of attributes
(a)	 Dl 1982-83
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(b)	 Dl 1987-88
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(c)	 D2 1982-83
1.00
I 0.80
M
0.60
P
A
0 • 40
C
T 0.20
0.00
V-a .20
A
-0.40
L
U
-0.60
E
S-a .80
-1.00
336
(d)	 D2 1987-88
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Ce)	 D3 1982-83
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(f)
	
D3 1987-88
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(g)
	
D4 1982-83
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(h)	 D4 1987-88
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